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Abstract 
Water supply systems are usually designed, constructed, operated, and managed in an open 
environment, thus they are inevitably exposed to varied uncertain threats and conditions. In 
order to evaluate the reliability of water supply systems under threatened conditions, risk 
assessment has been recognised as a useful tool to identify threats, analyse vulnerabilities and 
risks, and select proper mitigation measures. However, due to the complexity and uncertainty 
of water supply systems and risks, consistent and effective assessments are hard to 
accomplish by using available risk techniques. With respect to this, the current study develops 
a new method to assess the risks in complex water supply systems by reconsidering the 
organisation of risk information and risk mechanism based on the concepts of object-oriented 
approach. Then hierarchical assessments are conducted to evaluate the risks of components 
and the water supply system.  
 
The current study firstly adopts object-oriented approach, a natural and straightforward 
mechanism of organising information of the real world systems, to represent the water supply 
system at both component and system levels. At the component level, components of a water 
supply system are viewed as different and functional objects. Associated with each object, 
there are states transition diagrams that explicitly describe the risk relationships between 
hazards/threats, possible failure states, and negative consequences. At the system level, the 
water supply system is viewed as a network composed of interconnected objects. Object-
oriented structures of the system represent the whole/part relationships and interconnections 
between components. Then based on the object states transition diagrams and object-oriented 
structures, this study develops two types of frameworks for risk assessment, i.e., framework 
of aggregative risk assessment and framework of fault tree analysis. Aggregative risk 
assessment is to evaluate the risk levels of components, subsystems, and the overall water 
supply system. While fault trees are to represent the cause-effect relationships for a specific 
risk in the system. Assessments of these two frameworks can help decision makers to 
prioritise their maintenance and management strategies in water supply systems. 
 
In order to quantitatively evaluate the framework of aggregative risk, this thesis uses a fuzzy 
evidential reasoning method to determine the risk levels associated with components, 
subsystems, and the overall water supply system. Fuzzy sets theory is used to evaluate the 
likelihood, severity, and risk levels associated with each hazard. Dempster-Shafer theory, a 
typical evidential reasoning method, is adopted to aggregate the risk levels of multiple 
hazards along the hierarchy of aggregative risk assessment to generate risk levels of 
components, subsystems, and the overall water supply system. Although fuzzy sets theory and 
Dempster-Shafer theory have been extensively applied to various problems, their potential of 
conducting aggregative risk assessments is originally explored in this thesis.  
 
Finally, in order to quantitatively evaluate the cause-effect relationships in a water supply 
system, fuzzy fault tree analysis is adopted in this study. Results of this analysis are likelihood 
of the occurrence for a specific event and importance measures of the possible contributing 
events. These results can help risk analysts to plan their mitigation measures to effectively 
control risks in the water supply system.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 1 
CHAPTER 
1  
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Being one of the most important fundamentals for human living and development, water supply 
systems have received considerable attention relating to their performance under varied 
conditions. Water supply systems are usually designed, constructed, operated, and managed in an 
open environment, thus they are inevitably exposed to varied uncertain threats and hazards 
(Haestad et al., 2003). Due to the requirements of system safety and reliability, risk assessment 
has been recognised as a useful tool to identify threats, analyse vulnerabilities and risks, and select 
mitigation measures for water supply systems.  
Risk assessment has been highlighted world-wide by both governments and local managers of 
water supply systems. In the United States, on 15 July 1996, Clinton issued an Executive Order 
13010 establishing the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP). 
This order developed a national strategy for protecting these infrastructures from various threats 
in order to assure their continued operation (Clinton, 1996). In PCCIP, a water supply system is 
considered as one of the critical infrastructures. In May 1998, Clinton issued a Presidential 
Decision Directive 63 (PDD63) that called for a national effort to assure the security of the United 
States’ increasingly vulnerable and interconnected infrastructures (Clinton, 1998). The Federal 
Public Health Security and Bio-terrorism Preparedness and Response Act (Bio-terrorism Act) was 
passed on 12 June, 2002 to evaluate the vulnerability of water supply systems. It requires all 
community water supply systems that serve 3,300 or more persons to prepare a vulnerability 
assessment of their systems. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) requires these 
water systems to conduct and submit a security assessment. In the United Kingdom, “A Guide to 
Risk Assessment and Risk Management for Environmental Protection” and “Guidelines for 
Environmental Risk Assessment and Management”, published in 1995 and 2000 respectively, 
view risk assessment and management as essential elements of structured decision making 
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processes across government (DETR, 1995; DETR et al., 2000). The guidelines set out some 
basic principles which the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) 
and Environmental Agency (EA) would normally intend to use in the assessment and 
management of risks and which are recommended for all public-domain risk assessments (DETR 
et al., 2000). The guidelines also provide decision makers, practitioners and the public with a 
consistent language for risk assessment.  
At a local level, reactions were also taken against threats in water supply systems. The director of 
water services in the UK issued a statement on the request of water companies to perform disaster 
planning related to policies and procedures to deal with major interruptions or serious breaches in 
water quality or environmental performance (Vairavamoorthy and Lumbers, 1992). In this 
statement, it is stated that risk management will be incorporated into the design standards and 
operating procedures, which will form the basis for the next generation of asset management 
plans. Yorkshire Water in the UK carried out risk assessment in wide range of fields including 
risks of discoloration in pipelines, project capital investment, and asset management strategy for a 
water supply system (Pollard and Guy, 2001). In U.S.A, Santa Clara County’s water resources 
management agency and Santa Clara Valley Water District have conducted much work related to 
risk assessment, preparedness and protection of the county’s public water systems (Haestad et al., 
2003).  
Normally, an effective risk analysis requires basic knowledge about possible risks, characteristics 
of potential threats/hazards, and comprehensive understanding of the associated cause-effect 
relationships within the water system. However such an effective risk assessment method to 
consistently analyse risks, hazards/threats, and their relationships is unavailable so far because of 
the complexity and uncertainty existing in real-world water supply systems and risk assessment. 
Risk methods that have been developed were specific to either only subsystems/components of a 
water supply system, or only one aspect of risk assessment. Furthermore, the existing methods are 
almost application specific, which thus limits their reusability when they are applied to another 
system with different configuration and layout. Therefore, there is a need for research to develop a 
comprehensive framework according to the requirements of effective risk assessment. In the 
following parts, comments are given to existing risk assessment methods, and objectives of the 
current research are proposed.  
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1.2 Risk Assessment of Water Supply Systems 
1.2.1 Vulnerable Points of Water Supply Systems 
A general water supply system is composed of water sources, raw water transmission pipes, water 
treatment plants, and water distribution networks. However, these components and subsystems 
give the greatest opportunities for both natural and human-related influences because most of 
them are spatially diverse and accessible. With respect to this, researchers have identified the 
potential vulnerable areas during the process of delivering water from the sources to the 
customers as (see Figure 1.1): (1) water sources (e.g., river, reservoir, and wells); (2) water 
treatment plant that removes impurities and harmful agents and makes water suitable for domestic 
consumption and other uses; (3) water distribution pipelines that deliver clean water on demand to 
homes, commercial establishments, and industries; (4) storages (tanks); and (5) other facilities 
(transmission pipes, channels, pumps, valves, etc.) (Haestad et al., 2003). These vulnerable points 
are the focus of risk assessment. 
 
Treatment 
Plant 
(1) 
(2) 
(1) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
 
Figure 1.1 Elements and vulnerable points in a general water supply system 
(source Haestad et al., 2003) 
1.2.2 Risk Assessment in Water Supply Systems 
Risk indicates the potential damage or loss of an asset or a compromise in the function of an 
engineering system. Risk assessment of a water supply system is usually expressed as a process 
(Figure 1.2) of identifying threats/hazards, analysing vulnerabilities of components and system, 
and evaluating risks of components and system (revised based on Li and Vairavamoorthy, 2004a). 
A risk assessment would be considered effective and comprehensive if this process was conducted 
completely. 
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Figure 1.2 General procedure of risk assessment in a water supply system 
1.2.2.1 Basic Definitions 
Although extensive applications of risk assessment have been undertaken in the water supply 
system, general and uniform definitions of the risk factors (i.e., hazards/threats, vulnerability, and 
risk) are still unavailable due to the specific characteristics of different risks. Herein, it is 
necessary to discuss the definitions of hazards/threats, vulnerability, and risk which are used in 
this thesis.  
(1) Threats and hazards 
Normally, a threat or a hazard means a rare or extreme event in the natural or man-made 
environment that has adverse effects to engineering systems, or even human life (Coburn et al., 
1994). In historical risk assessment of infrastructure, natural hazards have been considered 
extensively. Only a limited amount of literature has been concerned with the analysis of human-
related threats (Grigg, 2003). With the occurrence of more human attacks to infrastructure, human 
activities have been more and more highlighted in order to give more comprehensive evaluations 
of risks. However, in water supply systems, threats/hazards do not necessarily have to be rare or 
extreme type events. Risk can be high even if hazard is moderate due to high vulnerabilities of 
components or the system. Therefore, the current study considers threats or hazards as hazardous 
events that can adversely effect the performance of a water supply system, which includes both 
natural hazards and human-related threats. 
Threats/Hazards 
Component (e.g., pipe) 
Vulnerable? Normal 
Yes 
No 
Component failure 
System analysis 
Vulnerable? Normal 
System risk 
No 
Yes 
• Identification of threats and hazards 
• Vulnerability assessment of component 
• Risk assessment for each component 
• Vulnerability assessment of the system 
• Risk assessment of the system 
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In order to support a quantitative risk assessment of an engineering system, a threat or hazard is 
also defined in a more specific and mathematical sense to mean the likelihood of the occurrence 
and severity of the consequence. Likelihood and severity are thus two important indices 
representing the serious level of a hazard or threat. This indicates that given a serious level of a 
hazard or threat, its likelihood and severity could be also obtained. This study adopts likelihood 
and severity to quantitatively represent a hazard or threat to a water supply system.  
(2) Vulnerability 
In the Oxford English Dictionary, vulnerability is defined as the quality or state of being 
vulnerable in various senses. This definition has been extended to various applications in 
engineering systems. For example, in UNDP/UNDRO Disaster Management Manual (Coburn et 
al., 1994), vulnerability is defined as the extent to which a community, structure, or geographic 
area that is likely to be damaged or disrupted by the impact of particular damaging phenomenon 
with a given serious level. In industrial systems, the vulnerability is defined as the properties of an 
industrial system whose premises, facilities, and production equipment, including its human 
resources, human organisation and all its software, hardware, and net-ware, may weaken or limit 
its ability to endure threats and survive accidental events which originate both within and outside 
the system boundaries (Einarsson and Rausand, 1998). Alternatively, vulnerability analysis is 
defined as a simple evaluation of where exposure is greatest and access control is weakest 
(National Security Telecommunication Advisory Committee, 1997). The last definition has been 
adopted by Ezell et al. (2000a, b) to analyse vulnerability of water utilities.  
In this study, vulnerability is defined as a property associated with a component, a subsystem, or 
the overall water supply system to represent the possibility of being influenced by hazards/threats 
with given likelihoods and severities. This property is determined by the attributes and conditions 
of a component, a subsystem, or the overall water supply system, and is varied with time and 
changes of hazards/threats. Detailed discussions of vulnerabilities associated with components 
and the water system are available in Section 3.4.1 and Section 3.4.2 . 
(3) Risk 
Although every engineering system always involves an element of risk, definitions of risk are 
slightly different in different systems. The common trend is to follow Lawrence’s definition 
(1976) of risk by defining it as a measure of likelihood and severity of negative adverse effects, 
which is also accepted by ISO (2001). This risk measure thus represents the cumulative effects of 
frequency and severity of a hazard/threat. Normally, this risk measure is represented as  
Risk=Likelihood × Severity (1.1) 
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It is obvious that the above definition of risk only considers the influences of threats or hazards. 
However, according to the risk assessment process (Figure 1.2), vulnerabilities of assets are also 
playing important roles in introducing risks into the water supply system. Therefore, a modified 
definition of risk is formed as 
Risk=(Likelihood × Severity) × Vulnerability (1.2) 
where likelihood and severity represent the characteristics of a hazard or threat; while 
vulnerability represents the property of an asset that is influenced by the hazard or threat. In this 
definition, both hazards/threats and assets are explicitly considered.  
Further, if the vulnerability was so high that it would be viewed as unity, then the second 
definition would be reduced to the first one. The current study adopts the second definition of 
risk, but views vulnerability as unity and proposes future research undertaking the detailed study 
on vulnerability assessment. 
1.2.2.2 Risk Assessment of Water Supply Systems 
Historical studies have been extensively undertaken so far on hazards identification, vulnerability 
assessment, and risk analysis, respectively.  
Firstly, both natural hazards and human-related threats have been identified as potential negative 
factors compromising the performance of water supply systems. With the development of risk 
assessment, people have learned much from natural hazards about risks to infrastructure systems, 
and now they are facing new threats from wilful attacks and other human-related activities (Grigg, 
2003; Mays, 2004a, b; Haimes et al., 1998).  
Secondly, vulnerability assessment has been undertaken as an important part of risk assessment 
process. Its common elements include characterisation of the water system, identification and 
prioritisation of adverse consequences, determination of critical assets, evaluation of existing 
counter measures, and analysis of current risk and development of a prioritised plan (Mays, 
2004b). With respect to these elements and complexity of water supplying, different methods 
have been proposed to assess the vulnerability of different systems (Mays, 2004b). 
Lastly, risk assessments have been performed at different scales in water supply systems by 
historical studies. For example, in order to analyse the influences of contamination events, both 
deliberate contamination and accidental contamination have been specifically studied in water 
distribution systems (Mays, 2004a,b). Meanwhile, series studies have been conducted to analyse 
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the characteristics of pollutant agents compounds, natural hazards influences to water sources, 
performance of water treatment plant, and reliabilities of water distribution networks, respectively. 
However, most of the existing methods consider only one aspect of risk assessment or one part of 
the whole water supplying process. The methods to organise those methods to give a 
comprehensive risk assessment have not been specifically studied. The main hurdles of this are 
complexity of water supply systems and uncertain information associated with risks. Therefore, 
this research is aimed to develop a framework that can organise various risk information by 
effectively dealing with complexity and uncertainty in the risk assessment of water supply 
systems. 
1.3 Research Objectives  
The general aim of this research is to develop a systematic framework and methodology for an 
explicit and effective risk assessment of water supply systems. This will be achieved by exploiting 
the synthesis of risk analysis processes with characteristics of water systems, hierarchical 
structure analysis, and fuzzy sets-based quantitative methods.  
Detailed research objectives are: 
(1) to develop qualitative frameworks for risk assessment of water supply systems including 
• a framework representing the hierarchical relationships of components and 
subsystems in a water supply system, 
• frameworks of aggregative risk assessment for component, subsystem, and the overall 
water supply system, 
• frameworks of fault trees describing the cause-effect relationships in the water supply 
system; 
(2) to develop quantitative approaches evaluating the above qualitative frameworks. This will 
include 
• quantitative representation of the risks in the water supply system, 
• an approach consistently evaluating the risk levels of components, subsystems, and 
the overall water supply system, 
• an approach assessing fault tree for specific risk in the water supply system. 
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1.4 Thesis Structure 
The structure of this thesis is depicted in Figure 1.3 and brief discussed in the following: 
Chapter 1 analyses the general composition of water supply systems and possible risks associated 
with them. After that definitions are given to clarify basic concepts associated with risk 
assessment in this study including hazard/threat, vulnerability, and risk. Finally, it briefly 
discusses the limitations associated with historical methods, and proposes research objectives for 
the current study.  
Chapter 2 reviews literature on historical risk assessment techniques and methods dealing with 
complexity and uncertainty in water supply systems. According to the reviews, comments are 
obtained to express the limitations associated with historical methods and to propose possible 
resolutions overcoming these limitations. Then the methodology background of the current study 
is formed and briefly discussed at the end of the chapter.  
Chapter 3 aims to develop conceptual frameworks for aggregative risk assessment and fault tree 
analysis of water supply systems. Firstly, it introduces the object-oriented approach and the 
potential application in organising complex information in water supply systems. Then the 
hierarchical structure of water supply systems is developed based on the concepts of object-
oriented approach. States transition diagrams are used to represent the cause-effect relationships 
of risks at component level. After that frameworks of aggregative risk assessment are formed 
based on the hierarchical whole/part relationships of water supply systems and components states 
transition diagrams. Frameworks of fault trees are established according to the interconnections 
among components and components states transition diagrams. These two frameworks can give 
useful information for decision makers in water supply systems.  
Chapter 4 introduces the method to quantitatively evaluate the hierarchical frameworks of 
aggregative risk assessment developed in Chapter 3. Fuzzy sets theory is adopted here to 
determine the risk levels of hazards/threats which are at the bottom level of the hierarchical 
structure. Fuzzy Dempster-Shafer theory, an evidential reasoning method, is adopted as an 
aggregative method to evaluate risk levels of components, subsystems, and the overall water 
supply system along the hierarchy.  
Chapter 5 applies fuzzy fault tree analysis to quantitatively evaluate the fault trees developed in 
Chapter 3. In fuzzy fault tree analysis method, the likelihood of top event and importance 
measures of contributing factors. Results of this analysis are useful to prioritise the components 
and hazards for specific risks and help risk analysts to make decisions. 
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Chapter 6 uses an assumed water supply system to illustrate the risk assessment with the methods 
developed in this research. Both natural hazards and human-related threats are considered in the 
assumed example. Risk levels of water contamination and reduced water quantity are obtained 
respectively for the components, subsystems, and the overall system. In addition, risk 
contributions and uncertainty contributions are obtained for each hazard and component. These 
results are useful for risk analysts to obtain a more comprehensive view of risks in the assumed 
water supply system. 
Chapter 7 summarises the work carried out in the current study and outlines the future work. A 
systematic approach has been proposed and developed to assess the risk of water supply system. 
However, there are needs for further study to strengthen the method.  
 
Figure 1.3 Thesis structure showing the organisation of chapters 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 2: Literature Review  
Chapter 3: Object-Oriented Risk 
Assessment of Water Supply 
Systems 
Chapter 4: Quantitative Aggregative 
Risk Assessment of Water Supply 
Systems 
Chapter 5: Quantitative Fault Tree 
Analysis of Water Supply Systems 
Chapter 6: Applications of Object-
Oriented Risk Assessment in Water 
Supply Systems 
Chapter 7: Conclusions and 
Recommendations for Further Work 
To develop conceptual 
frameworks for risk 
assessments 
Quantitative evaluations of 
the conceptual frameworks 
developed in Chapter 3 
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CHAPTER 
2  
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the techniques of risk assessment used in the water supply system, methods of 
dealing with complexity, and methods of representing uncertainty, respectively. Based on this, 
discussion are undertaken to analyse the limitations of the existing methods and potential solutions 
to overcome these limitations. Then a framework is formed at the end of this chapter to illustrated 
the methods that are used in this study. 
2.2 Literature Review 
Literature review in this chapter is composed of two parts. The first part is on the methods of 
assessing risks in the water supply system, which includes hazards assessment, vulnerability 
assessment and risk analysis. The purpose of this is to identify and discuss limitations associated 
with these existing methods. The second part is on the methods that are able to deal with 
complexity and uncertainty factors in the water supply system, which is the methodology basis of 
this research.  
2.2.1 Literature Review on Existing Risk Assessment Methods 
Literature review of existing risk assessment methods is composed of three parts in this thesis as 
threats and hazards analysis, vulnerability assessment, and risk assessment. 
2.2.1.1 Threats and Hazards to Water Supply Systems 
Extensive studies show that not only natural hazards can negatively influence water supply systems, 
but human related threats need to be considered in the risk assessment. The frequently mentioned 
hazards and threats and their possible influences on the water supply system are summarised in 
Table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1 Natural hazards and human related threats to a water supply system* 
Threats and hazards Consequences 
Earthquake • Pipe breaks 
• Loss of power 
• Structure collapse 
Flooding • Loss of treatment plant 
• Contamination of distribution system 
Drought • Water shortages  
• Water quality problem 
Wind • Flood-induced problems 
• Structure damage 
• Loss of power 
Water born diseases • Sickness 
• Death 
• Loss of public confidence 
Natural hazards 
Severe weather  • Frozen pipes, 
• Outages and leaks 
• High water use 
Cyber threats • Physical disruption of SCADA (supervisory 
control and data acquisition) network 
• Attacks on central control system to create 
simultaneous failures 
• Electronic attacks using worms and viruses 
• Network flooding 
• Jamming 
• Disguising data to neutralize chlorine or add 
no disinfectant, allowing addition of microbes 
Physical threats • Physical destruction of system’s assets or 
disruption of water supply is more likely than 
contamination 
• Loss of water pressure compromising 
firefighting capabilities and could lead to 
possible bacterial build-up in the system 
• Potential for creating a water hammer effect by 
opening and closing major control valves and 
turning pumps on and off too quickly, which 
could result in simultaneous main breaks.  
Human-related 
threats 
Chemical/Biological 
threats** 
• Heath problems, or death of customers 
• Panic 
• Loss of public confidence 
*Source: Grigg (2003) and Mays (2004a,b) 
**Detailed description of the chemical and biological contaminants are described in Appendix A. 
Firstly among the natural hazards, earthquakes, floods, and droughts are three most significant 
hazards that can cause water utilities damage and great losses (Grigg, 2003). For example, the 
Kobe’s earthquake of 1995 in Japan had caused over 5,000 deaths and $100 billion in damage with 
main breaks and damage to pumps and treatment plants (Chung, 1996). The flood of the 1993 
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Midwestern had caused more than $15 billion in damage and contaminated water at 250 drinking 
water treatment plants (Horsley et al., 1994). In the United States alone between 1980 and 2003 
extreme droughts have caused $144 billion in damages (Dai et al. 2004). Other natural disasters 
such as extreme weather and wind threaten water utilities as well, but not as significantly as 
earthquakes, floods, or droughts.  
Secondly, human-related threats in water supply systems had received little attention, and the water 
utilities were not implementing mitigation measures to respond to them. However, the situation has 
changed after 11 September, 2001 (Mays, 2004b). A water supply system of pipes, pumps, storage 
tanks, treatment units, and the appurtenances such as various types of valves, meters, and other 
components offers the greatest opportunity for terrorist attacks because of its extensive, relatively 
unprotected and accessible nature. Some of the major human-related threats include the attacks on 
the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, 
the attacks on the World Trade Centre (WTC) Towers in 2001 (Gilbert et al., 2003), and the attacks 
on water supply system of the U.S. Embassy in Italy (Dreazen, 2003). Recently, it is shown that a 
concerted effort at all levels of government begin to address issues related to the threat of human-
related activities. Articles on this topic also began to appear. Beiley (2001) studied the biological 
and toxin weapons threat to the United States. Blomgren (2002) discussed the needs of utility 
managers to protect water systems from cyber-terrorism. Haas(2002) analysed the role of risk 
assessment in understanding bioterrorism. 
2.2.1.2 Vulnerability Assessment of Water Supply Systems 
The common elements of vulnerability assessment in water supply systems are viewed as follows 
(Mays, 2004b): 
• characterisation of the water system, including its mission and objectives, 
• identification and prioritisation of adverse consequences to avoid, 
• determination of critical assets that might be subject to malevolent acts that could result in 
undesired consequences,  
• assessment of likelihood of such malevolent acts from adversaries, 
• evaluation of existing counter measures, and  
• analysis of current risk and development of a prioritised plan for risk reduction.  
Normally, the complexity of vulnerability assessment ranges on the basis of  the design and 
operation of the water systems. With respect to this, several methods have been developed to 
perform vulnerability assessment (Mays, 2004b). 
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Risk Assessment methodology for Water Utilities (RAM-WSM) was developed in cooperation with 
the Energy Department’s Sandia National Laboratories with funding from USEPA. RAM-WSM 
compares system components against each other to determine which components are most critical. 
In this method, vulnerability is defined as an exploitable security weakness or deficiency at a 
facility. Vulnerability assessment is performed based on the analysis of characteristics of undesired 
events, accessibility of the undesired events, security features and policies, protection measures, etc. 
Results of the assessment are used to generate risk assessment for the components and the system.  
The Vulnerability Self-Assessment Tool (VAST) was developed by the Association of the 
Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies (AMSA) in collaboration with two consulting firms with USEPA 
funding. This is a software-based system. The method is based upon a qualitative risk assessment. 
Vulnerability is evaluated on a qualitative scale (e.g., very high, high, moderate, and low) by 
considering counter measures already in place. Then the results are used to generate criticality 
ratings based on which the risk levels of assets can be evaluated. This method can be used to 
prepare for extreme events, respond should extreme events occur, and restore to normal business 
conditions thereafter. 
The National Rural Water association (NRWA) and the Association of State Drinking Water 
Administrators (ASDWA) with USEPA assistance developed the security Self-Assessment Guide 
for Small Systems Serving between 3,300 and 10,000. This guide provides an inventory of small 
water system critical components and general questions of vulnerability assessment. Once the 
questions have been answered , then the vulnerabilities of components are obtained and 
prioritisation of action is developed.  
ASSET (Automated Security Survey & Evaluation Tool) was developed by NEWWA in 
conjunction with the USEPA and other private firms. This tool is geared toward systems that serve 
between 3,300 and 50,000 people (small and medium systems). This is a software-based tool, 
which was mailed to all New England public water suppliers in June 2003. This tool is a self-
guided software program designed to help drinking water systems complete a vulnerability 
assessment, as well as to improve their security and their responsiveness to a range of threats. The 
assessment is achieved by completing eight sections, i.e., information collection, identifying 
mission objectives, determining critical system components, threat assessment, physical security 
and existing countermeasures, risk analysis, prioritised plan for risk reduction, and the final report.  
However, all the above methods are specific to different scales of water supply system, a more 
generic framework is unavailable so far to assess vulnerability consistently.  
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2.2.1.3 Risk Assessment of Water Supply Systems 
Customers’ requirements play key roles in water management, and thus determine the process of 
risk assessment. According to the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(1997), three attributes are crucial to water users: 
• There must be adequate quantities of water on demand. 
• It must be delivered at sufficient pressure. 
• It must be safe to use. 
The above three attributes could be compromised either by damage of key physical components of 
the water system or by the presence of contaminants in the raw or finished water supply (Haestad et 
al., 2003). Consequences associated with these failures are risks of reduced water flow (i.e., risks 
related to water quantity) and/or contaminated water to customers (i.e., risks related to water 
quality). Extensive studies have been undertaken to assess the hazards/threats and reliability of 
components of water supply systems, respectively. 
(1) Assessment of hazards/threats 
In order to evaluate the influences of pollutants in a water supply system, Deininger and Meier 
(2000) proposed a method of ranking various agents and compounds in terms of their relative 
effectiveness in the system. While in order to evaluate the influences of human-related threats, 
Tidwell et al. (2005) proposed a method of using Markov latent effects modelling.  
(2) Risk assessment of water sources  
Contamination and reduced water quantity are two concerned problems associated with water 
sources. Contamination of source water is of concern because contaminants can enter surface or 
ground water sources and make it difficult removed in the treatment utilities. Reduced water 
quantity is of concern because customers would not have enough water if this happened. Since 
water sources are usually influenced by natural hazards, extensive research has been undertaken to 
specifically study the influences of floods (Lund, 2002; Weiler et al., 2000; Beard, 1997) and 
droughts (Salas et al., 2005; Shiau and Shen, 2001; Shepherd, 1998), respectively.  
(3) Risk assessment of water treatment plant 
Water treatment, the primary barrier to prevent contaminants from reaching the customer, may not 
be effective due to failures inside the treatment plant, and thus introduce contaminants to the 
distribution system (Haestad et al., 2003). Fujiwara and Chen (1993) analysed the reliability of 
water supply system by including the reliability of treatment plant operations. Eisenberg et al. 
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(2001) proposed a method to evaluate the reliability of treatment processes by considering both 
mechanical reliability and plant performance.  
(4) Risk assessment of pipes 
As pipelines are the key elements in delivering water, extensive research has been accomplished to 
study their risk mechanisms due to some specific hazardous factors. These conventional models 
can be classified into physical-based and statistical-based models. Physical models focus on 
evaluating of the scope and severity of corrosion on the internal and external pipe walls and the 
estimation of resulting stresses from the loads applied to the water mains. Statistical models predict 
the likelihood and/or frequencies of pipe breakage using the past pipe breakage data. In developing 
a statistic model, the component (e.g., a pipe) in a water distribution system is treated as a black 
box or a lumped-parameter element, and its performance is observed over time (Mays, 2004a,b).  
Physical models 
To analyse the negative influences of hazardous factors, the following studies have been 
conducted. Rossum (1969) proposed a corrosion model to predict the metal pipe corrosion rate. 
Rajani et al. (1996) and Zhan and Rajani (1997) proposed models for estimating frost load on 
buried pipes in trenches and under roadways respectively.  
Kiefner and Vieth (1989) developed an analytical model to predict the pressure at which a pipe 
with a corrosion pit would fail based on experiment and tests on corroded steel pipes. The model 
asses the reduction in structural resistance in the presence of corrosion pits. Rajani and Makar 
(2000) have conducted an experimental study on pit and spun cast iron pipe samples with and 
without corrosion pits. The model was based on the results from a mechanical test to establish how 
the dimensions and geometry of corrosion pits influence the residual strength of grey cast iron 
mains. Randall-Smith et al. (1992) proposed a linear model to estimate the residual service life of 
water mains under the assumption that a corrosion pits depth has a constant growth rate. The model 
was developed as a rough screening tool to identify potential problems rather than provide a means 
to predict a break. Seica and Packer (2004) developed a finite element model to estimate the 
remaining strength of water pipes based on experimentally obtained material properties.  
Furthermore, Ahammed and Melchers (1994) developed a physical probabilistic-based model to 
estimate the failure probability of steel pipes using the Spangler-Watkins in plane pipe-soil model 
(Watkins and Spangler, 1958) as their underlying mechanical stress model.  
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Statistical models 
Shamir and Howard (1979) used regression analysis to develop an exponential model for the 
breakage rate of a pipe as a function of time. Walski and Pelliccia (1982) enhanced the exponential 
model by incorporating two additional factors (ratio of break frequency with previous breaks to 
overall break frequency for cast iron and ratio of break frequency for 500 mm diameter to overall 
break frequency for pit cast pipes) in the analysis. Clark et al. (1982) observed a lag between the 
pipe installation year and the first break and consequently proposed to further enhance the 
exponential model and transform it into a two phase model comprising a linear equation to predict 
the time elapsed to the first break and an exponential equation to predict the number of subsequent 
breaks. 
Kettler and Goulter (1985) found a moderate correlation between annual break rate and pipe age 
based on a sample of pipe installed within 10 years period, as a result, they suggested a linear 
relationship between pipe breaks and age. Marks et al. (1985) proposed to use a proportional 
hazards model (Cox, 1972) to predict water main breaks by computing the probability of the time 
duration between consecutive breaks. Marks et al. (1987) further developed the proportional hazard 
model to include a two stage pipe failure process. The early stage was observed with fewer breaks 
and was represented by the proportional hazard model, while the second stage was characterised by 
frequent breaks and was represented by a Poisson type model.  
Furthermore, Copper et al. (2000) developed a drunk mains burst model to estimate the failure risk 
of water mains greater than 300mm in diameter. Pelletier et al. (2003) developed a model to predict 
the evolution of annual number of pipe breaks using survival analysis and to estimate the impact of 
different replacement scenarios and applied the proposed modelling approach to three case studies.  
(4) Risk assessment of water distribution systems 
It has become conventional wisdom that water quality can change significantly as water moves 
through a water distribution system. This awareness has led to the development of water 
quality/hydraulic models which can be used to understand the factors that affect these changes and 
to track and predict water quality changes in drinking water network (Mays, 2004b). Historical 
studies show that both deliberate (Hickman, 1999; Deininger, 2000; Clark and Deininger, 2000) 
and accidental factors (Craun et al., 1991; Fox and Lytle, 1996; Clark et al., 1996) can cause 
contaminations in water distribution systems.  
Meanwhile studies were also conducted to analyse the influences of physical disruptions in water 
distribution networks. These studies has been analysed under different loading conditions including  
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fire demand, broken links, pump failures, power outages, control failure, and insufficient storage 
capacity (Mays, 2004a). Under such conditions, risk assessment of the distribution system is thus 
performed on the basis of components failure, which can be determined by the above physical or 
statistical models, as well as interaction and configuration of components in the water systems. As 
it is a complex task, various methods have been conducted on this. Some of them are summarised 
as follow.  
Topologic and hydraulic methods 
Most of the conventional risk or reliability assessments of water distribution network can be 
classified into two main categories: topological and hydraulic. Topological reliability refers to the 
probability that a given network is physically connected, given its components’ mechanical 
reliabilities or failure rates. Associated with this, there are many studies such as Wagner et al. 
(1988a,b), Shamir (1990) and Ostfeld (2001). In hydraulic methods, reliability refers directly to the 
basic function of a water distribution network: conveyance of desired water quantities at desired 
pressure to desired appropriated locations at desired appropriate time. Research associated with this 
includes Su et al. (1987), Duan and Mays, (1990a); Duan et al., (1990b); Bao and Mays, (1990), 
Cullinane et al. (1992), and Ostfeld (2001). 
State enumeration method 
State enumeration methods list all possible mutually exclusive states of the system components that 
define the state of the entire system. In general, for a water distribution system containing M 
components, each of which can be classified into N (normally N equals 2 to indicate normal or 
failed states respectively) operating states, there will be NM possible states for the entire system. 
Once all the possible system states are enumerated , the states that result in successful system 
operation are identified and the probability of the occurrence of each successful state is computed. 
The last step is to sum all the successful or failure state probabilities to yield the system reliability 
or system risk respectively. Event tree analysis is a typical method that uses this approach (Mays, 
1989, 2004a). 
Path enumeration method 
Path enumeration is a very powerful method for system reliability analysis. A path is defined as a 
set of components or modes of operation which lead to a certain outcome of the system. In system 
reliability analysis, the system outcomes of interest are those of failed state or operational state. A 
minimum path is one in which no component is traversed more than once in going along the path. 
Under this methodological category, the tie-set analysis and cut-set analysis are the two well-
known techniques. Detail description of this method is available in Mays (1989, 2004a).  
Chapter 2 Literature Review  
 18 
Conditional probability approach 
This approach starts with a selection of key components and modes of operation whose states 
(operational or failure) would decompose the entire system into simple series and/or parallel 
subsystems for which the reliability or failure probability of subsystems can be easily evaluated 
(Mays, 1989, 2004a). Then, the reliability of the entire system is obtained by combining those of 
the sub-systems using conditional probability rules as 
ifFsisFssyss
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×+×=  (2.1) 
In which ps,sys is the reliability of system; ps,i and pf,i are the probabilities of system function and fail 
given that  the ith component is operational, Fi
’, and failed, Fi, respectively;  ps|Fi’ and ps|Fi are the 
conditional system reliabilities given that the ith component is operational and failed  respectively.  
Efficient evaluation of the reliability of a complex system hinges entirely on a proper selection of 
key components, which generally is a difficult task when the system is large. Furthermore, this 
method cannot be easily coded for computerisation (Mays, 2004a).  
Fault-tree analysis 
The major objective of fault tree analysis is to represent the system condition, which may cause 
system failure, in a symbolic manner. In other words, the fault tree consists of sequences of events 
that lead to system failure. It is a backward analysis, which begins with a system failure and traces 
backward, searching for possible causes of the failure. Therefore, a fault tree is always viewed as a 
logical diagram representing the consequence of the component failures (basic or primary failures) 
on the system failure (top failure or top event). Before constructing a fault tree, engineers must 
thoroughly understand the system and its use. One must determine the higher-order functional 
events and continue the fault-tree analysis to determine their logical relationships with lower-level 
events. Once this is accomplished, the fault tree can be constructed and evaluated. 
Fault tree analysis has been pointed by Dhillon and Singh (1981) as a technique that: 
• provides insight into the system behaviour. 
• requires to understand the system thoroughly and deal specifically with one particular 
failure at a time.  
• helps ferret out failures deductively. 
• provides a visible and instructive tool to designers, user, and management to justify design 
changes and trade off studies. 
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• provides option to perform quantitative or qualitative reliability analysis. 
• handles complex systems well. 
• has available commercial codes.  
The potential application of fault tree in water distribution was considered by Mays (1989, 2004a). 
2.2.2 Comments on Historical Risk Assessment Methods 
Although the existing risk techniques have been successfully used in many applications, they still 
have different limitations when applied to a comprehensive risk assessment of a water supply 
system.  
2.2.2.1 Limitations and Difficulties 
Water supply systems usually have various configurations, scales, and uncertain operational and 
environmental conditions, which make them complex and introduce uncertainties in risk 
assessment. Complexity and uncertainty are two main hurdles that limit the extensive applications 
of those existing methods. 
The complexity of water supply systems mainly arises from the composition of a large number of 
components or subsystems (including water sources, treatment, distribution, etc.) which, in turn, 
comprise of further sub-subsystems or components (Table 2.2). Firstly, the exact definition of 
components, subcomponents, and sub-subcomponents depends on the level of details of the 
required analysis and, to somewhat greater extent, on the level of available data. Secondly, these 
components depend directly upon each other and as a result effect the performance of one another 
(Mays, 2004b). This introduces difficulties in establishing cause-effect relationships for specific 
risk in water supply systems. Furthermore, as discussed in preceding sections, components in a 
water supply system are vulnerable to both natural hazards and human-caused threats such as 
extreme weather, chemical/biological contamination, etc. Therefore both knowledge of components 
and their relationships are important for a thorough understanding of the operation of the overall 
system. A risk assessment would be effective and comprehensive if it could be consistently 
performed at both component and the overall system levels. However, this is hard to achieve by 
existing methods as they usually focused on either one specific part of a water supply system (e.g., 
water source or water distribution network), or one aspect of risks (e.g., reduced water quantity or 
contamination).  
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Table 2.2 Common elements and their hierarchical relationships in a water supply system 
System  Subsystems  Sub-subsystems/Components  
Water source Surface water River  
  Stream  
  Reservoir  
  Lake  
 Groundwater Well  
  Acquirers   
Pipe   Transmission pipes 
Channel   
Water 
supply 
system 
Screen   
 Mixing tank   
 Flocculation basin   
 Settling tank   
 Sand filter   
Water treatment plant 
Disinfection   
Pipes Main line  
 
 Service line  
 Pumps   
 
Distribution networks 
Demand nodes  
  
Junctions/Nodes 
Non-demand  
  Isolation valve 
  Directional valve 
  Altitude valve 
  Air release valve 
  
Valves 
Control valve 
  Meters  
  
Fittings 
Hydrant  
 Storages Tanks   
  Water towers   
 
The other factor, as important as complexity, is uncertainty of risk assessment. Normally, risk 
analysts are always finding difficulties in either representing risk information precisely or 
describing the risk mechanism of complex systems like a water supply system (Ang and Tang, 
1984). In a practical water supply system, the sources of uncertainty are various and diverse. Two 
main uncertainties frequently mentioned by analysts are insufficient data for statistic inferences and 
vagueness and variations of risk information. Natural hazards usually belong to the former, while 
human-caused failures are the latter. Data of human error are limited, and the knowledge of 
analysts about this kind of error is also incomplete or in some degree vague and fuzzy. These 
uncertainties introduce difficulties in controlling or predicting risks with an acceptable degree of 
accuracy (El-Baroudy and Simonovic, 2004). Thus the probabilistic theory, which is useful to 
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express the former uncertainty, will be challenged and questioned when applied to deal with the 
latter uncertainty. Furthermore it is very difficult or even impossible in many cases to precisely 
determine the parameters of a probability distribution for a given hazard event due to the existing 
uncertainties in practice.  
Additionally, as engineering risk analysis is a general methodology for the quantification of 
uncertainty and evaluation of its consequences (Ganoulis, 1994), the first step in any risk analysis 
is to identify the risk, clearly detailing all sources of uncertainty that may contribute to the risk of 
failure. Then quantification of the risk is second step by analysing the risk levels of each 
component and/or subsystem and their contribution to the overall system. For the first step, 
probability theory alone in traditional risk analysis has limited applicability in representing all 
types of the uncertain information. For the second step, risk of the overall system is not easily 
obtained by considering contributions from components and subsystems because of few specific 
models have been proposed. Therefore, there is a need to propose a new risk assessment framework 
that is able to overcome these limitations. 
2.2.2.2 Proposed Resolutions  
(1) Resolutions to complexity 
To deal with the complexity, hierarchical structure analysis is one of the promising methods 
(Haimes, 2004). Since the composition of water supply systems is hierarchical in nature (Table 
2.2), risk assessment of such systems is also driven by this hierarchical structure reality. 
Furthermore, the hazards and potential consequences associated with each component can also be 
simulated in a similar hierarchy. In this kind of hierarchical structure, risk levels of 
components/systems at a higher level are contributed by risk levels of components/subsystems at 
relative lower levels. The risk evaluation of the overall water supply system can then be obtained 
by knowing both the risk information of each basic element at the lowest level and their 
combination rules. This is one of the methodology basis of aggregative risk assessment in this 
thesis. Furthermore, as fault tree analysis is a special case of hierarchical analysis and can represent 
the cause-effect relationships explicitly, it is also adopted in this research.  
(2) Resolutions to uncertainty 
Two types of uncertainties are considered in this study. One is uncertainty with random 
characteristics, and the other is uncertainty with vague, fuzzy, and incomplete properties. For the 
uncertainty introduced by random variables, probability theory is applicable and practical methods 
are available. For uncertainty brought by vagueness or incomplete data, applications of probability 
theory are challenged. An alternative method, fuzzy sets theory, introduced by Zadeh (1965), can 
Chapter 2 Literature Review  
 22 
be adopted to give a fundamental support for risk analysis (Lee, 1996; Chen, 2003; Sadiq and 
Husain, 2005). In fuzzy sets theory, the vague information is described by fuzzy number, and risk 
evaluation thus becomes a process of dealing with fuzzy numbers rather than normal probabilistic 
numbers from the mathematic point of view. Furthermore, fuzzy sets had been used to effectively 
represent and analyse human reliability or subjective risk analysis in many studies (Onisawa, 1988, 
1996; Utkin and Gurov, 1998; Konstandinidou et al., 2005).  
Based on the above comments, there is a need for literature review on application of hierarchical 
analysis, probability theory, and fuzzy sets theory in risk assessment of water supply systems, 
respectively. 
2.2.3 Literature Review on Methods Dealing with Complexity and Uncertainty 
2.2.3.1 Methods of Dealing with Complexity 
Hierarchical framework method is considered to be straightforward and effective to deal with 
complexity by many researchers. Hierarchy is so common in practice that General Systems Theory 
(GST) regards it as an essential organizational principle among all types of systems (Whyte et al., 
1969; von Bertalanffy, 1968; Iberall, 1972). In risk assessment, one of the most valuable and 
critical contributions of hierarchical framework is its ability to facilitate the evaluation of 
subsystems risks and their corresponding contributions to the risks of the overall system (Haimes 
and Tarvainen, 1981). Particularly, its ability to model the intricate relationships among the various 
subsystems and to account for all relevant and important elements of risk and uncertainty renders 
the risk assessment process more tractable, representative, and encompassing (Haimes, 2004). In 
the following sections, literature is reviewed on applications of hierarchical structure to different 
aspects of risk assessment of water supply systems.  
(1) Threats assessment of water supply system 
To assist water utility industry in vulnerability assessments, a methodology, RAM-WTM, is 
developed (AWWA, 2002) to evaluate risks, R, by 
CPPR ea )1( −=  (2.2) 
where Pa is the probability of attack, Pe is the probability of system effectiveness, and C is the 
associated consequence. Risk assessment is performed primarily through a process of expert 
elicitation in which values for Pa, Pe, or C are quantified according to a structured and defined scale 
of high, medium, or low.  
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Herein Pa(1-Pe) is viewed as the part of threat assessment. Although the governing relation for 
threat assessment is simple, defining the associated terms is difficult, particularly human-related 
wilful attacks. Therefore, this method is in limited use by utilities because of the lack of data on 
threats (Grigg, 2003). Furthermore, insufficient experience and data also make it harder to quantify 
the associated probabilities, particularly in the case of human wilful attacks (Tidwell et al., 2004, 
2005). With respect to this, Tidwell et al. (2004, 2005) proposed a Markov Latent Effects 
modelling method, in which the complex threats in water supply systems are decomposed into 
more manageable subsystems or decision elements (Figure 2.1). Each decision element identified 
in the decomposition process represents a single factor influencing the likelihood that a threat will 
yield its intended consequence. Characteristics of decision elements are evaluated by experts or 
analysts using qualitative attributes which can be transferred to quantitative measures (e.g., scales 
from 0, very weak, to 1, very strong). Then weighted aggregation scheme is adopted to obtain the 
ultimate threats assessment at the top level of the hierarchical structure.  
This method can help risk analysts to evaluate system effectiveness (i.e., Pe) under the threat of 
human wilful attacks. However, its applications to evaluations of natural hazards are not explicitly 
explained. Furthermore, the factor of probability of attack, Pa , is not explicitly included in 
Tidwell’s method.  
 
Figure 2.1 Hierarchical structure for threat assessment in water systems (Tidwell et al. 2005) 
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(2) Vulnerability assessment  
Vulnerability assessment to external threats or hazards 
To give a risk analysis of municipal water distribution system, Ezell et al. (2000a,b) proposed a 
method based on evaluation of component vulnerabilities which are assessed in terms of exposure 
and access control. Vulnerability of a water system is defined as 
∑
=
=
n
i
ivV
1
 (2.3) 
where vi denotes the vulnerability of a component in the water system, which is determined by 
iiiv γα=  (2.4) 
where αi is accessibility and subjectively scaled in [0,1]; γi is the degree of exposure and 
subjectively scaled in [0,1]. A low vulnerability score for a component is an advantage.  
In this method, vulnerabilities for specific components are subjective (0 to 1) and constructed from 
an attribute scale. For example, in a distribution system, tank 1 is very exposed, say γi=0.7, due to 
its prominent location on the installation. However, tank 2 is in a remote area and has significantly 
less exposure, say γi=0.2. Tank 1 only has a simple lock preventing attackers access, hence, its 
accessibility is αi=0.8.  
 
Figure 2.2 Hierarchical structure of vulnerability assessment of water supply system (Ezell et al., 
2000a) 
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In order to quantify the vulnerabilities, a detailed decomposition of a water distribution system is 
developed (Figure 2.2) using hierarchical methods proposed by Haimes (1981). Based on this 
hierarchical structure, vulnerability of each component are first analysed by identifying the values 
of access and exposure respectively with respect to given threats (e.g., human physical damage). 
Then vulnerability of the subsystem or the overall system is calculated by Equation (2.3). With the 
values of vulnerabilities, a rank order is obtained for a water supply system.  
In this method only access and exposure are identified as the contributing factors to vulnerability, 
which makes it more suitable to analyse the vulnerability related to external hazards. However, for 
internal factors like deterioration of pipes due to changes of surrounding conditions, access and 
exposure might not be the proper indicators to value vulnerability.  
Vulnerability assessment of pipes 
In order to assess the current condition of pipes in water distribution systems, Yan and 
Vairavamoorthy (2003) introduced a hierarchical model for vulnerability assessment of water 
pipes. This model explicitly considers most of the indicators affecting water pipes and was 
established from historical data available in Lei and Saegrov (1998), FCM and NRC (2002), and 
AWWSC (2002). A hierarchical assessment framework was developed as shown in Figure 2.3, by 
grouping these factors with respect to their characteristics. In this hierarchical structure, two groups 
of water pipe deterioration indicators, i.e., physical and environmental indicators, have been 
selected in this simple example. For physical indicators, basic properties of pipes are considered, 
which include age, diameter, and material. For environmental factors, surrounding condition, soil 
condition, and road loading are considered as contributing factors. Result of this method is a fuzzy 
number representing the condition of a pipe. 
 
Figure 2.3 Hierarchical framework for vulnerability assessment of pipes in water distribution 
network (Yan and Vairavamoorthy, 2003) 
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In this method, some indicators (e.g., pipe age and diameter) are represented as crisp numbers, 
while other factors (e.g., surroundings, soil, etc.) are described as fuzzy numbers due to their vague 
nature. Then a fuzzy composite programming approach, which has be used in various areas as a 
multi-criteria decision making tool (Bardossy and Duckstein, 1992; Hagemeister et al., 1996; Jones 
and Barnes, 2000; Bender and Simonovic, 2000; Akter and Simonovic, 2005), was used to generate 
relative pipe condition.  
This method proposed a way to assess current conditions in the water pipelines, and has been 
applied to the assessment of contaminant intrusion into water pipes (Yan, 2006).  
(3) Evaluation of risks 
Risks of water supply systems 
Following on president Clinton’s commission (1998), Haimes et al. (1998) reviewed needs and 
opportunities to reduce risks in water systems to wilful attacks. They developed a hierarchical 
holographic model (Haimes, 1981), based on the overall risks to water supply systems. 15 major 
categories are envisioned in this study (Haimes et al., 1998). The categories represent risks to water 
systems from different perspectives, and each of the categories is further divided into detailed 
components which are more manageable and easy to evaluate. These 15 categories cover aspects of 
physical, scope, temporal, maintenance, organisational, management, resource allocation, SCADA, 
system configuration, hydrology, geography, external factors, system buffers, contaminants, and 
quality of surface and ground water. Detailed explanations of these categories are available in 
Haimes et al. (1998). In Haimes’s framework, different categories are considered as different views 
of the same water supply system. Each category is one perspective of the water supply system. 
Thus this method identifies as more as possible risks by checking different categories. However, 
the number of risks is usually too large for a moderate system, which thus requires extra effort to 
filter unimportant risks.  
Risk of water quality in water distribution systems 
Water quality failures in distribution networks can generally be classified into five major categories 
(Kleiner, 1998): intrusion of contaminants, regrowth of microorganism, microbial/chemicals 
breakthrough, by-products and residual chemicals from water treatment plants, leaching of 
pollutants from system component into water, and permeation of organic compounds from the soil 
through system components into water.  
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Figure 2.4 Hierarchical structure for aggregative assessment of water quality failure in water 
distribution networks (Sadiq et al., 2004) 
However quantitative analysis of risks is a difficult task because of different pipes with varied ages, 
various materials, variable operational and environmental conditions, pipes buried structures, and 
limited understanding of failure processes. With respect to this, Sadiq et al. (2004), based on the 
above categories of water quality failures (Kleiner, 1998), proposed a hierarchical model for the 
evaluation of an aggregative (cumulative) risk of water quality failure in distribution network 
(Figure 2.4). In this structure, each risk item is partitioned into its contributory factors, which are 
also risk items, and each of these can be further portioned into lower level contributory factors. The 
unit consisting of a risk factor is called “parent”, and its contributory factors are called “children”. 
A risk element with no children is called a “basic risk item” which is evaluated in terms of 
likelihood of failure event and its consequence. Both the likelihood and the consequence are 
defined using fuzzy numbers to capture vagueness in the qualitative definitions. These fuzzy 
numbers were subjectively determined in Sadiq et al.’s (2004) study. Then a multi-stage 
aggregation was conducted to obtain the risks of water quality.  
(4) Hierarchical organisation of simulation models in water system  
To reduce the complexity in water distribution system simulation models, White et al. (1999) used 
a hierarchical method to organise the models (Figure 2.5). In this hierarchical structure, the entire 
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‘Areas’. When a specific area is investigated, it is decomposed into its parts, called the ‘Locals’. 
Similarly, locals can be further divided into more detailed components such as pipe, pump, valve, 
etc. which are at the lowest level of the hierarchical structure.  
 
Figure 2.5 Hierarchical structure of organising simulations models in a regional water system 
(White et al., 1999) 
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system at the same level of detail. 
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hierarchical structure methods to solve the problems in water systems. For example, fault tree 
analysis was adopted to study the performance in wastewater treatment plant (Kelley and Allison, 
1979), to analyse risks in water treatment plant (Egerton, 1996), and to model the constraints to 
urban stream enhancements (Hess and Johnson, 2001). Xu and Powell (1991) used a hierarchical 
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2.2.3.2 Methods of Dealing with Uncertainty 
As pointed by Ang and Tang (1984), there is uncertainty in all engineering-based systems because 
these systems rely on the modelling of physical phenomena that are either inherently random or 
difficult to model with a high degree of accuracy. This is certainly applied to water supply systems. 
Both nature hazards and human-caused threats, as discussed in the preceding chapter, can cause 
serious damages or the total failures of a water supply system. However, the likelihood of 
occurrence and potential severity of a hazard or threat is quite uncertain and hard to quantitatively 
represent. Risk assessment itself is thus a process of analysing uncertain information so that 
evaluations of system performance can be obtained under different uncertain conditions. With 
respect to this, probability theory and fuzzy sets theory have been highlighted by many researchers.  
(1) Probability theory 
The problem of engineering system reliability, including water supply system, has received 
considerable attention from statisticians and probability scientists. The probabilistic reliability 
analysis has been extensively studied to deal with the problem of statistic uncertainty in water 
supply systems.  
Mays and Tung (1989) analysed component reliability by using probabilistic failure rate, repair 
rate, and loading-resistance methods. Probabilistic failure rates, combined with hydraulic theory, 
provide the basis for reliability analysis of water pipe networks. Major achievements of this type of 
methods include Su et al. (1987), Bao and Maya (1990), Gupta and Bhave (1994), Yang et al. 
(1996), Xu and Goulter (1998), and Shinstine et al. (2002).  
Meanwhile, Weiler et al. (2000) adopted probability risk analysis to assess influences of floods in a 
river basin. Beard (1997) and Ferro and Porto (2006) used probability method to determine the 
frequency and influence of floods. Chung and Salas (2000) adopted probabilistic theory to 
determine the drought occurring probabilities and risks of dependent hydrologic processes. 
Karamouze et al. (2004) used probabilistic measure to analyse hydrologic and agricultural droughts 
in central part of Iran.  
(2) Fuzzy sets theory 
In practice, most of the hazards cannot be controlled or predicted with an acceptable degree of 
accuracy. Uncontrollable external factors (natural or human-related) also affect the performance of 
water supply systems. Therefore, the determination of the uncertainties using probabilistic 
distribution is neither a easy nor a straightforward task. In order to deal with this, fuzzy sets theory 
has been proposed as an alternative measure.  
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The applications of fuzzy sets theory have covered various aspects of water supply systems. For 
water quality assessment and management, Sadiq et al. (2004) used fuzzy sets to represent the 
likelihood and severity associated water quality risk in water distribution in order to give an 
aggregative risk analysis for the overall system. Liou et al. (2003) used fuzzy sets theory to 
evaluate river quality by representing standard river pollution index indicators (e.g., DO, BOD5, 
SS, etc.) in terms of fuzzy numbers. Mujumdar and Sasikumar (2002) and Mujumdar et al. (2004) 
developed a fuzzy optimisation model for the seasonal water quality management of river systems 
by viewing the occurrence of low water quality as a fuzzy event. 
For evaluations of water supplies, Sherstha and Duckstein (1998) and El-Baraoudy and Simonovic 
(2004) suggested one measure of fuzzy reliability that can be used when both capacity and demand 
in water resources systems are fuzzy variables. Lee et al. (2000) proposed a method using fuzzy 
sets to assist decision makers in evaluating various water supply lines with uncertain information 
and deciding a proper line. 
For pipelines analysis, Revelli and Ridolfi (2002) showed the application of fuzzy approach for 
analysis of pipe networks. Yan and Vairavamoorthy (2003) and Yan (2006) adopted fuzzy sets to 
represent the uncertain information associated with pipes in water distribution networks. 
2.2.4 Comments on Methods Dealing with Complexity and Uncertainty 
Two comments are summarised as follow about the methods dealing with complexity and 
uncertainty. Firstly, hierarchical framework has been extensively studied and applied in every part 
of risk assessment of water supply systems, such as threats identification, vulnerability assessment, 
risk evaluation, etc. Hierarchical framework is effective because it decomposes the complex 
problem into more manageable subsystems or components, and represents the contributions to 
overall system by its components and subsystems. Thus it has the ability to perform risk 
evaluations at both component and system levels.  
Secondly, probability theory is more suitable to represent the uncertainties that can be statistically 
analysed. It can effectively express the statistical uncertainties in water systems. Fuzzy sets theory 
is more effective to represent the uncertainties introduced by incomplete, vague, ambiguous, 
descriptive, and subjective data or knowledge. The literature review shows that fuzzy sets theory 
has been accepted by more and more researchers of water systems due to two reasons. Firstly, it is 
not always possible to have enough data and historical records for a complex water system in 
practice. Then risk analysts can only represent some parameters by approximate probability 
distribution functions. While in other cases such as related to human activities (e.g., wilful attacks 
on the tank in a water distribution network), it is usually impossible or improper to use probabilities 
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representing likelihoods of event occurrences or relative consequences. As an alternative option, 
fuzzy sets theory is always adopted in these cases. Further, people’s understanding of the system is 
not complete in most cases. There are not always mathematical models that can be followed, which 
thus limit the effective use of probabilistic measures. In this case, fuzzy sets based analysis also 
plays important roles.  
However, limitations are still existing in the developed methods, which are summarised as follow 
• The developed methods always focus on one aspect of risk assessment of water supply 
system. For example, Tidwell’s (2004, 2005) method is on threats assessment of human-
related wilful attack; Yan’s (2003) method is only on condition assessment of pipes; while 
Sadiq’s (2004) method is specifically developed to water quality problems in water 
distribution networks. All these methods are unable to give a comprehensive framework 
for risk assessment of water supply systems.  
• The developed methods only considers one type of risk in water supply systems. For 
example, Sadiq’s method (2003) can only analyse water quality problems, but is not able to 
evaluate the problem with reduced water quantity. Tidwell’s method (2004,2005) is not 
able to analyse natural hazards in the same framework.  
• Some methods that consider system complexity do not consider uncertainty. For example, 
both Haimes (1998) method and White’s (1999) method only effectively deal with 
complexity of the water supply system. They did not explicitly consider uncertain 
information associated with the basic parameters in their frameworks.  
2.3 Framework of Methodology in This Study 
With the awareness of the effectiveness of hierarchies in dealing with complexity, this study adopts 
hierarchies, but based on an object-oriented approach, to represent the relationships in water supply 
systems, and to develop frameworks for risk assessment. Meanwhile, fuzzy sets theory, evidence 
reasoning, and fault tree analysis are integrated with these hierarchies to generate quantitative 
results. This method is composed of four parts (Figure 2.6): (1) hierarchical representation of water 
supply systems, (2) vulnerability assessment of components and system, (3) aggregative risk 
assessment, and (4) risk propagations in water systems. These four parts are described briefly as 
follow. 
2.3.1 Object-Oriented Framework for Water Supply Systems 
Firstly, object-oriented approach (OOA) is proposed in this research to deal with complexity of 
water supply systems and to generate hierarchical structure for risk assessment. Object-oriented 
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approach is a method that represents engineering systems in terms of objects. Every component in a 
water supply system is viewed as an object, and the overall water supply system is viewed as a 
network composed of sets of objects that are interconnected with each other. All risk factors about 
the components are considered as attributes or behaviours of objects. Furthermore, with the 
generalization and aggregation relationships, object-oriented hierarchical structures can be easily 
formed to represent the whole/part relationships and interconnections between objects in the water 
supply system. 
2.3.2 Object-Oriented Model for Vulnerability Assessment  
Practically, the influence of threats to component in water systems is a process in which the 
component changes its state from normal to failure due to its vulnerability. Vulnerability is the 
degree that a component can be influenced by threats. This mechanism can be easily described by 
objects states transition diagrams in object-oriented environment. Each object in a water supply 
system has different failure states due to the influences of different hazards or threats. Normally the 
vulnerabilities of an object are different according to the failure states and can be explicitly 
represented by its states transition diagrams. Then the vulnerabilities of objects can be integrated 
by following the whole/part structure to produce vulnerabilities of subsystems or the overall water 
system.  
For a quantitative analysis, fuzzy sets theory and aggregation methods can be an option to produce 
quantitative results for vulnerabilities. However, study on vulnerabilities exceeds the scope of this 
thesis, and is proposed in further work. According to the risk definition in Chapter 1, vulnerability 
of any component, subsystem, or the overall water supply system is assumed unity in the following 
part of this thesis, which will not compromise the usefulness of the current study. 
2.3.3 Object-Oriented Model for Aggregative Risk Assessment 
According to Figure 2.6, aggregative risk assessment is composed of two stages, i.e., the 
component level and the system level.  
Firstly, states transition diagrams of objects describe the relationships between hazards, object 
failure states, and object risks, which thus provides a hierarchical framework for risk assessment at 
components level. In this hierarchical framework, risk of object is at top level followed by relative 
failure states that are at its immediate lower level. Hazards or threats are the bottom level in this 
framework. This indicates that risks of object are determined by its failure states, which are in turn 
determined by the threats or hazards directly related to them. This research represents each hazard 
or threat in terms of its likelihood of occurrence and consequence that are represented by fuzzy 
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numbers. Risk of a component is thus an aggregative measure that is determined by aggregating the 
risks of threats or hazards along the hierarchical structure.  
Secondly, for the risk assessment at the system level, object-oriented whole/part relationship 
structure is used to determine aggregative risks of water supply systems. In this hierarchical 
framework, the water supply system is at the top level, its subsystems and components are at 
relative lower levels. Therefore, risk of the overall system is an aggregative measure which is 
contributed by the risks of its subsystems and components along the hierarchical structure.  
After the conceptual framework for aggregative risk assessment has been developed, fuzzy sets 
theory and aggregation method (i.e., evidence theory) are used to produce quantitative evaluations.  
  
Figure 2.6 Research compositions of the present study 
2.3.4 Object-Oriented Fault Tree Analysis 
Fault tree analysis is considered in this study to represent the cause-effect relationships in the water 
supply system. Fault tree analysis, a deductive reliability and risk analysis technique, can answer 
the question of how the system could produce a failure X (e.g., contamination at some demand 
nodes). With the help of fault tree analysis, risk analysts will know which component in the system 
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is more critical and which risk scenario is more possible. Meanwhile risk contributions and 
uncertainty contributions can also be easily obtained to support selection of mitigation measures 
and asset management. 
However the development of fault trees is still as much an art as a science. This research uses an 
object-oriented approach to generate fault tree structures via two steps. Firstly, object states 
transition diagram is used to generate the fault trees at component level. Then, interconnections 
between components in a water supply system are used to develop fault trees at system level. After 
fault trees have been constructed, fuzzy fault tree analysis is adopted to obtain quantitative results. 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter proposes the methodology used in this study on the basis of literature review about 
historical risk assessment, methods dealing with complexity, and methods dealing with uncertainty 
in water supply systems. An object-oriented approach is adopted in this study to analyse water 
supply systems and represent the hierarchical structure of risk assessment.  
 
Figure 2.7 Logic relationships among the methods used in this research 
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Four frameworks, i.e., hierarchical representation of water supply systems, vulnerability 
assessment, aggregative risk assessment, and cause-effect relationships, can be developed based on 
concepts of object-oriented approach. Fuzzy sets theory, aggregation method, and fuzzy fault tree 
analysis are integrated with these frameworks to generate quantitative evaluation of risks. A 
diagram illustrated in Figure 2.7 explicitly shows the relationships among object-oriented 
approach, fuzzy sets theory, aggregation method (i.e., Dempster-Shafer theory), and fuzzy fault tree 
analysis in this study. 
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CHAPTER 
3  
Object-Oriented Risk Assessment of Water Supply 
Systems 
3.1 Introduction 
Frameworks of risk assessment are developed in this chapter based on concepts of object-oriented 
approach and characteristics of water supply systems (Figure 3.1). Firstly, Section 3.2 introduces 
the basic concepts of object-oriented approach and their potential in dealing with complexity of 
water supply systems. Then in Section 3.3, object-oriented hierarchy is developed to represent the 
relationships among components, subsystems, and the overall water supply system. Furthermore, 
for a component at the lowest level in the hierarchical structure, object states transition diagrams 
are used to describe its states transitions due to the influences of multiple hazards or threats. After 
that two kinds of frameworks are developed for risk assessment on the basis of the above object-
oriented structure and object states transition diagrams. One is for aggregative risk assessment and 
discussed in Section 3.4; and the other is for fault tree analysis and discussed in Section 3.5. 
Aggregative risk assessment is to analyse the risk levels of different objects in a water supply 
system, i.e., a component, a subsystem, and the overall system. While fault trees are used to 
describe the cause-effect relationships for a given risk in the system. In this thesis, these 
frameworks are developed at both component and system levels in order to meet the requirements 
of a comprehensive risk assessment. Figure 3.1 gives an explicit illustration of the structure of this 
chapter. 
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Figure 3.1 Structure of developing conceptual frameworks for risk assessment based on concepts 
of object-oriented approach 
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3.2 Object-Oriented Approach 
3.2.1 Basics Concepts  
Object-oriented approach is a method that can naturally represent real-world entities and 
phenomena in terms of objects and classes (Booch, 1994; Martin and Odell, 1995, 1998; Embley 
et al., 1992). In an object-oriented modelling paradigm, object and class are two key concepts 
with which analysts can effectively manage complex engineering systems. These two concepts are 
also effective to organise risk information in a water supply system.  
(1) Objects 
Objects are model constructs used to represent real-world entities which can communicate with 
one another (Booch, 1994; Martin and Odell, 1998). This communication consists of messages 
exchanged between objects. Messages represent the transfer of information, materials, or energy. 
Components (e.g., pipe, pump, etc.) and subsystems (e.g., water source, water distribution, etc.) in 
a water supply system can be viewed as different objects. These objects are interconnected 
together to form a system of supplying water to customers. Water flow is the message exchanged 
between any two objects in a water supply system.  
When an object receives a message, it gives responses by altering its internal state and important 
characteristics or attributes, and generating output messages to other objects in the model. The 
way in which the object responds to messages depends on its internal processes and states. For a 
pipe in a water supply system, road loading can be viewed as an external message/hazard which is 
potentially influencing the pipe. If the road loading is too high, the pipe will be broken and change 
its state from normal operation to failure state, which consequently introduces risk to the water 
system.  
One of the most important characteristics of object is encapsulation. This means that the attributes 
and behaviours of a component or subsystem are entirely encapsulated within the confines of a 
self-contained object. Attributes define an object’s state and behaviours describe an object’s 
functionality. The entire system is thus viewed as the combination of individual objects with 
different functionalities. Meanwhile the individual objects communicate with one another in a 
way that faithfully replicates their interactions in the real-world (Booch, 1994). In a water supply 
system, for example, a river can be viewed as an individual object encapsulating the attributes of 
raw water. A water treatment plant can be viewed as an another object which encapsulates the 
behaviour of removing the impurities from raw water in order to meet the standards of drinking 
water. Similarly, a pipe in the water system can be viewed as an object which encapsulates the 
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attributes, such as length, diameter, age, and roughness factor, and behaviours of delivering water 
and reducing water head due to roughness. The overall water supply system is thus a composite 
object composed of interconnected individual objects (including river, water treatment plant, 
pipes, etc.). In the object-oriented environment, the system object has functions (e.g., hydraulic 
models) that control the communications among individual objects in a way that faithfully 
replicates the interactions in the real-world water supply system.  
(2) Classes 
In a real engineering system, there are many objects of a specific kind. It would be extremely 
inefficient to redefine the same methods in every single occurrence of that object. Thus the 
concept of class is proposed in the object-oriented approach. A class is a template or blueprint that 
defines the methods and variables included in a particular kind of objects. The methods and 
variables that make up the object are defined only once in the definition of the class. The objects 
that belong to a class, commonly called instances of the class, contain only their own particular 
values for the variables. This concept is also applied to a water distribution network with large 
numbers of pipes. Although different pipes have different values of length, diameter, and material, 
all the pipes share some common attributes (e.g., diameter, length, age, material, etc.) and 
behaviours (e.g., delivering water, introducing head loss, deteriorating with age, etc.). With 
respect to this, mechanical engineers always use the same template/blueprint to produce pipes that 
have similar properties; and water engineers use the concept of pipe class to represent different 
pipe instances in the system by extracting their common features. Normally associated with the 
pipe class, many models are developed to describe its behaviours in real water supply processes. 
This process of obtaining classes is usually called abstraction or generalisation in practice. Even 
though it is only an abstract concept which has no physical counterpart in real world, class plays 
important roles in helping people organise complex information in the system.  
Inheritance is an important characteristic of class. It is one of the fundamental rules supporting 
abstraction and generalisation in object-oriented approach. During the generalizing process, the 
more general class is called base class, and the relative less general class is viewed as derived 
class or instance. Inheritance allows the derived class or instance to inherit the attributes and 
behaviours defined within the base class. In a distribution network, pipe instances are usually 
viewed as derived classes, and the general pipe class is viewed as their base class. Attributes (i.e., 
diameter, length, age, material, roughness coefficient, etc.) and behaviours (i.e., introducing head 
loss, deteriorating with time, etc.) are defined within the base class. These attributes and 
behaviours are inherited by the pipe instances. This mechanism of inheritance facilitates the 
process of risk assessment in water supply system by developing common risk models for pipe 
class, while repeatedly reusing these models in different pipe instances.  
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(3) Applications of object-oriented approach 
Applications of object-oriented approach have covered various areas in practice. Object-oriented 
paradigm has represented a major achievement in software engineering that facilitates modelling 
complex real-world problems (Martin and Odell, 1998). When properly applied, it can yield 
robust models consisting of reusable, easy-to-maintain components in different kinds of 
engineering systems (Booch, 1994; Solomatine, 1996; Ross et al., 1992; Black and Megabit, 
1995). Meanwhile, object-oriented approach has also been used to solve engineering problems, 
which includes development of framework for decision making (Liu and Stewart, 2003), surface 
water quality management (Elshorbagy and Ormsbee, 2006), management of river system and 
water resources (McKinney and Cai, 2002; Simonovic, et al., 1997, Reitsma and Carron, 1997; 
Tisdale, 1996), reliability and risk assessment (Wyss, et al., 2004; Wyss and Durán, 2001; Black 
and Megabit, 1995; Matsinos, et al., 1994), material failures (Roberge, 1996), uncertainty of early 
design (Crossland, et al., 2003) etc. The effectiveness of using object-oriented approach to deal 
with complexity is also specifically illustrated by many researchers (Booch, 1994; Wyss et al, 
1999; Weber and Jouffe, 2006;). However, its potential in risk assessment of complex system has 
not been specifically considered in the existing research.  
From the above discussion and applications of object-oriented approach, it is identified that one of 
most important power of objects and classes is their effectiveness in organising complicated 
information of engineering system (Martin and Odell, 1998). Firstly, all engineering systems, 
including water supply systems, are designed, constructed, operated and managed in terms of 
objects. For a water supply system, its performance is determined by the performance of the 
components/objects. That is risks of individual objects contributing to the risks of the overall 
water system. Secondly, most of the knowledge about the engineering system focuses on objects. 
For an example of analysing pipe deterioration, many models (including physical and statistical 
models) have been developed to represent the deteriorating process with time. Even though these 
models are different with their applications, they are all related to specific pipe objects in a water 
system. These models can be viewed as the behaviours or methods of pipe objects. Thirdly, 
generalisation of classes is a straightforward way to avoid repeated work, which thus makes it 
effective in managing the common features in a complex system.  
The above discussion shows the possibility of using object-oriented approach as an effective tool 
to organise complex risk information in water supply systems. This awareness motivates this 
study to adopt object-oriented approach to develop frameworks of risk assessment.  
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3.2.2 Complexity of Water Supply Systems and Object-Oriented Approach 
Since complexity is one of the hurdles limiting historical risk assessment methods, it is necessary 
to explicitly discuss the potential of object-oriented approach in dealing with complexity of the 
water supply system.  
In order to effectively analyse complex systems, many researchers have carried out extensive 
studies on the characteristics of complex systems. Courtois (1985) suggests five attributes 
common to all complex systems by building upon the work of Simon (1982). The characteristics 
of object-oriented approach make it possible to deal with the complexities effectively. Being one 
of the complex engineering systems, a general water supply system inherently has these five 
attributes. The following discussion is about the effectiveness of using object-oriented approach to 
deal with the five attributes of water supply systems.  
(1) “Frequently, complexity takes the form of a hierarchy, whereby a complex system is 
decomposed of interrelated subsystems that have in turn their own subsystems, and so on, until 
some lowest of elementary components is reached.”(Courtois, 1985). 
Based on above discussions, this attribute is obvious for water supply systems and could be easily 
represented by object-oriented approach. This can be shown by a simple example in Figure 3.2. 
The object-oriented hierarchical structure depicts the whole/part relationships in the water supply 
system, which enables us to understand, describe, and see the system and its parts better (Booch, 
1994).  
 
Figure 3.2 Hierarchical structure of a simple water supply system  
Furthermore this hierarchical structure also provides a possible framework for risk assessment. It 
is obvious within this hierarchy that risk levels of the water system are governed by the risk levels 
of its subsystems (i.e., river, treatment unit, and distribution network) as well as the hierarchical 
relationships among them. Risk levels of the subsystem, e.g., distribution network, are further 
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determined by risk levels of its own components, e.g., a set of pipes. Normally risks of elementary 
components such as river, treatment unit, and pipes in this example are not difficult to obtain as 
many existing models can be used to evaluate them. Once risks of these components have been 
determined, aggregation can then be conducted along the hierarchy to generate risks of 
subsystems and the overall system. 
(2) “The choice of what components in a system are primitive is relatively arbitrary and is largely 
up to the discretion of the observer of the system.” 
Primitive elements in this study are viewed as the components that are indecomposable and at the 
lowest level of the hierarchical structure. Above discussion shows that they play important roles in 
risk assessment. However, the determination of primitive elements are arbitrary and depends a lot 
on the observer of the system because they have different choices of what components are 
primitive in practical risk assessment. As the example shown in Figure 3.2, a project manager is 
usually interested in the risks of the overall system, i.e., the risks associated the object at the top of 
the hierarchical structure. While a water treatment manager is interested in the risks within the 
water treatment plant, i.e., object at the second level in the figure. Pipe engineers are always 
interested in the risks associated with different pipes which are at the bottom level of the 
hierarchical structure. With the different interests of stakeholders, difficulties are consequently 
introduced in risk assessment of the water supply system.  
In addition, available risk information also determines what components in a water supply system 
are primitive. Normally more risk information will support risk analysts to derive the hierarchical 
structure to more detailed or micro levels, while limited risk information will limit the risk 
assessment at relative higher or macro levels.  
No matter what components are primitive, they are directly related to specific objects in the 
object-oriented hierarchical structure. This structure can be either truncated at higher levels or 
extended to lower levels with the changes of primitive elements. This therefore provides a 
consistent and flexible way of developing hierarchies for different users.  
(3) “Intra-component linkages are generally stronger than inter-component linkages. This fact has 
the effect of separating the high-frequency dynamics of the components, involving the internal 
structure of the components, from the low-frequency of dynamics involving interaction among 
components.” 
This difference between intra- and inter-component interactions provides a clear separation of 
concerns among the various parts of the water supply system, which makes it possible to study 
risk levels of each part in relative isolation. Object-oriented hierarchical structure (Figure 3.2) is 
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developed with respect to this attribute. For a primitive element in this structure, its risk is usually 
determined by its own internal state and current condition, that is, its states transition diagrams. 
However, the influences from other elements are relative smaller and could be neglected in many 
cases. For the composite object (e.g., distribution network) in this structure, its risk is more 
directly affected by the components that it is composed of (i.e., pipes) rather than other 
components (such as river). Actually object-oriented structure is developed by implicitly 
considering intra-component linkages in the water supply systems.  
(4) “Hierarchic systems are usually composed of only a few different kinds of subsystems in 
various combinations and arrangement.” 
This attribute indicates that complex systems have common patterns (Booch, 1994). This is also 
obvious in object-oriented structure of water supply systems. A general water supply system is 
composed of some common elements such as river, reservoir, channel, treatment facility, pump, 
etc. All these elements are further abstracted as fewer common element types or classes like water 
source, water treatment plant, pipe, pump, valve, junction, and storage. The overall system is thus 
a specified arrangement of these different objects or classes. Identification of these basic 
components is obvious and explicit in an object-oriented approach. 
(5) “A complex system that works is invariably found to have evolved from a simple system that 
worked…A complex system designed from scratch never works and cannot be patched up to make 
it work.” (Gall,1986) 
This attribute indicates that a water supply system will work normally if all its components and 
subsystems are working normally. A water supply system will fail to supply water to consumers, 
if some components or subsystems have failed. However direct determination of risk levels of a 
complex water supply system is difficult or nearly impossible. A possible solution to this is 
indirect evaluation by aggregating the risks of its subsystems (i.e., water source, water treatment, 
etc.) because they are less complex. These less complex objects, in turn, are composed of much 
less complex objects such as river, pipe, etc. Therefore, risk information can be obtained for a 
complex water supply system by studying risks of simple objects in an object-oriented 
hierarchical structure.   
The above discussions not only demonstrate the potential abilities to deal with all the five 
attributes of complex systems, but also support the development of risk frameworks. 
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3.3 Object-Oriented Representation of Water Supply Systems 
Now it is obvious that the similarities exist between objects in object-oriented approach and 
components in water supply systems. Objects are the focus of object-oriented approach. An object 
is an abstraction of real world entity described by attributes and methods. Each object can be 
influenced by the environment or external factors and interact with other objects by receiving and 
sending messages. Similarly, in risk assessment of a water supply system, the focus is the 
components in the system. Risks of water system are introduced by failures of one or more 
components. External hazards or threats, or environmental factors, can only compromise the 
functions of a water system by failing its components. With respect to these similarities, is 
straightforward to use object-oriented structures to represent the risk assessment process of water 
supply systems. 
3.3.1 Object-Oriented Hierarchical Structure  
The hierarchy of a water supply system is constructed (Figure 3.3) by viewing all the physical 
elements in a water supply system as objects that encapsulate specific attributes and behaviours 
and interact with one another (Li and Vairavamoorthy, 2004a; Li et al., 2005). There are two 
kinds of relationships, that is, aggregation relationship and generalisation relationship, represented 
in this hierarchy. These two relationships not only represent the water supply system from 
different point of view, but also are useful for risk assessment.  
(1) Aggregation relationship 
Aggregation represents the “is composed of” or “whole/part” relationship, e.g., a water 
distribution network is composed of pipes, pumps, tanks, etc. In object-oriented approach, the 
structure of aggregation is also called object/component structure (Booch, 1994) because it 
represents the relationships among objects/components. This aggregation relationship also 
provides a framework for aggregative risk assessment of water supply systems. This indicates that 
risk of water supply system, which is at the top level, is determined by risks of the objects at its 
immediate lower level (i.e., water source, transmission pipe, water treatment plant, and water 
distribution system) which are in turn determined by risks of objects at their immediate lower 
levels (i.e., well, river, etc.) respectively. This research views the real physical elements in a water 
supply system as primitive objects and put them at the lowest levels in the hierarchical structure 
(Figure 3.3). For each of these primitive objects, states transition diagrams are used to represent its 
responses to hazards or threats, which is discussed later in the following section.  
 
Chapter 3 Object-Oriented Risk Assessment of Water Supply Systems 
 45 
 
Figure 3.3 Object and class structures of a water supply system 
(2) Generalisation relation 
Generalisation represents the “is kind of” relationship, e.g., a river is kind of surface water source, 
and a well is kind of ground water source. All river objects belong to river class which in turn 
belongs to surface water class. Similarly, all pipes belong to pipe class, and all pumps belong to 
pump class in a water supply system. With the help of this generalisation process, all elements of 
a system are grouped with respect to their “likeliness of behaviour” into classes; these classes are 
grouped into larger classes, and so on (Solomatine, 1996). Finally another hierarchical structure is 
formed to express the class structure in water systems (Figure 3.3).  
In the class hierarchical structure, the number of classes are much smaller than that of objects in 
object structure, which thus simplifies the work of assessing risks for primitive objects (Figure 
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water supply system, rather he/she can develop risk analysis models only for the types of objects 
(or class), and reuse them in the object instances. Actually this is also in compliance with the 
common sense of people in risk modelling and analysis.  
 
Figure 3.4 Process of developing frameworks of risk assessment for a water supply system based 
on object-oriented concepts 
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aggregative risk assessment at system level. While interconnections between objects provides a 
framework describing the cause-effect relationships at a system level. By considering the 
frameworks at both components and system levels, risk analysts can obtain a more comprehensive 
view of risks in the water supply system. Furthermore, this is a general method and can be applied 
to various water supply systems.  
3.3.2 Object States Transition Diagram 
Figure 3.4 shows that states transition diagrams are an important step to develop frameworks of 
risk assessment at component level. Therefore it is necessary to discuss them specifically in this 
thesis. 
In an object-oriented environment, a state transition diagram shows the state space of a given class 
or object type, the events that cause a transition from one state to another, and the actions that 
result from a state change (Booch, 1994). Associated with each object in a water supply system, 
there are inputs, outputs, states, and methods (Figure 3.5). Inputs include water flow, external 
hazards (e.g., traffic loads, flood, etc.), and internal failures (e.g., deterioration, etc.); outputs 
denote the outflow of water; states represent the possible states of the component such as normal, 
failure, etc.; methods are the relative responses of the object to input information. Within each 
object, the states are stored as its attributes, and methods represent its behaviours in varied 
conditions. Inputs and/or internal state drive the methods of object to produce the associated 
outputs and alter state of object.  
 
Figure 3.5 States transition diagram of an object due to hazards or threats  
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Figure 3.6 Examples of using states transition diagrams to represent operational scenarios of the 
pipe in a water supply system 
An explicit explanation of states transition is illustrated by a pipe example (Figure 3.6). In this 
example, inputs are external load and water with flow rate (Qin) and pressure (Hin); outputs is 
water with flow rate (Qout) and pressure (Hout); the possible states are normal and leakage; and the 
methods or behaviours are delivering water (Figure 3.6). There are three operational scenarios 
associated with the pipe that are normally considered in practice. In the first scenario, the pipe 
works normally (Figure 3.6a) and delivers normal water flow to other components with which it is 
connected. In the second scenario, the pipe changes its state from normal to leakage due to some 
internal factors such as deterioration with time (Figure 3.6b). Water quantity and pressure of 
outflow is consequently reduced. In the last scenario, the pipe changes its state from normal to 
leakage due to the overloading from external factors (e.g., road traffic, etc.). Excessive loading 
force tends to cause longitudinal cracks and results in dramatic reduction of water quantity. 
Usually the first scenario represents the normal operation of pipes, while the last two scenarios are 
specifically applied to a risk or reliability study of water distribution systems due to the influences 
of external or internal threats/hazards.  
It is obvious that hazards, failure states, and possible risks are important factors to develop the 
states transition diagrams of a specific primitive object. According to the object-oriented 
hierarchical structures (Figure 3.3), this study identifies five classes as primitive, which includes 
water source, water treatment plant, pipe, pump, and storage. Although water distribution 
networks and water supply systems are also objects, they are usually viewed as composite objects 
because they are composed of more basic objects or components. Risk assessment of these objects 
is not easily accomplished by directly using states transition diagrams, but can be obtained by 
using aggregative method on primitive objects.  
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Associated with each primitive object, the following discussions identify the hazards, its failure 
states, and relative risks. 
3.3.2.1 Hazards, Failure States, and Risks of Each Primitive Object 
According to the literature review, possible risks in a water supply system are reduced water 
quantity, reduced pressure, and water contamination. Normally water quantity and pressure are 
two closely related factors because occurrence of one of them will result in the occurrence of the 
other. Considering this and in order to simplify the risk analysis, this thesis only considers risks of 
reduced water quantity and contamination specifically. The methods developed based on these 
two risks will also be applied to the risk assessment of pressure reduction.  
(1) Water source 
The variations of water quantity and quality are important characteristics of a water source since 
they influence the operations of the following water treatment and the finished water supplied to 
the customers (WHO, 2004). A water source is vulnerable to multiple external hazards or threats, 
and would thus be contaminated or in the condition of reduced capacity. Generally, the potential 
hazards or threats are categorised as natural and human-caused factors. Important natural factors 
include drought, flood, underground minerals, etc. Human-related factors include sewage 
discharge, industrial discharge, wilful chemical/biological contamination, etc. For example, 
discharge of municipal wastewater can be a major source of pathogens; urban runoff and livestock 
can contribute substantial microbial load; and serious drought can dramatically reduce the quantity 
supplied to customers, etc. (WHO, 2004) Associated with these hazards, relative failure states and 
risks are identified for the water source object and summarised in Table 3.1. 
(2) Water treatment plant 
Water treatment plant is the most important facility in a water supply system to remove 
contaminants in raw water, disinfect treated water, and produce drinkable water to consumers. 
However, hazards may be introduced during the process of treatment, or hazardous circumstances 
may allow contaminants to pass through treatment in significant concentrations. Constituents of 
drinkable water can be introduced through the treatment process, including chemical additives 
used in the treatment process or products in contact with water. Furthermore, suboptimal filtration 
following filter backwashing can lead to the introduction of pathogens into the distribution 
system. Meanwhile extreme natural hazards, wilful human attacks, or interdependency failures 
(e.g., power failures) can all introduce risks in water treatment process.  
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Table 3.1 Hazards or threats associated with basic components in a water supply system 
Basic 
components 
Failure states Hazards/Threats Relative risk 
Natural hazards failure Drought Reduced water quantity  
Natural hazards failure Flood 
Underground minerals 
Water contamination 
Human-caused threat Sewage discharge 
Industrial discharge 
Livestock 
Chemical/biological 
Water contamination 
Water source 
Interdependence failure Spills 
Contaminated site 
Water contamination 
Natural hazards failure Earthquake 
Flood 
Reduced water quantity 
and water contamination 
Human-caused threat Chemical/biological Water contamination 
Operational failure Process control 
Equipment failure 
Alarm and monitoring 
Inadequate backup 
Inappropriate treatment 
Reduced water quantity 
and water contamination 
Interdependence failure Power failure Reduced water quantity 
and water contamination 
Water treatment 
plant 
Interdependence failure Contaminated material Water contamination 
Natural hazards failure Earth movement Reduced water quantity 
 Flood Reduced water quantity 
and water contamination 
Operational failure External load 
Temperature 
Internal pressure 
Natural deterioration 
Reduced water quantity  
Operational failure Regrowth of organism 
Leaching of chemicals 
Water contamination 
Pipe 
Interdependence failure Contaminated water 
Contaminated soil 
Contamination 
Natural hazards failure Earthquake 
Flood 
Reduced water quantity  
Human-caused threat Bombing Reduced water quantity 
Operational failure Control failure 
Equipment failure 
Alarm and monitoring 
Inadequate backup 
Age 
Reduced water quantity 
Pump 
Interdependence failure Power failure Reduced water quantity 
Storage Natural hazards failure Animal 
Rainfall 
Water contamination 
 Human-caused threat Disruption of structure Reduced water quantity  
 Human-caused threat Chemical/biological 
Contaminated water 
Water contamination 
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Generally, potential hazards and hazardous events that can have an impact on the performance of 
water treatment have been classified as the following (WHO, 2004): 
• Natural disasters such as flood, earthquake, etc. 
• Human–related threats, such as accidental and deliberate pollution; 
• Inappropriate or insufficient treatment processes, including disinfection; 
• Inadequate backup (including infrastructure and human resources); 
• Process control and equipment failure; 
• Failures of alarm and monitoring equipment; 
• Power failures. 
According to the above discussion, hazards are identified for water treat plant as shown in Table 
3.1. In addition, the relative failure states and possible consequences are also identified and 
summarised in this table.  
However, it is obvious that water treatment itself is also a complex system due to its complicated 
composition and process. Normally, a water treatment plant includes many subunits such as pre-
treatment, coagulation, flocculation, sedimentation, filtration, and disinfection. Each of the 
subunits has attributes and behaviours and is connected to one another in order to effectively 
remove different types of contaminants from raw water. From the object-oriented point of view, 
all the subunits can be viewed as different objects, and water treatment plant is viewed as an 
composite object composed of these objects. Therefore object-oriented hierarchical structures as 
well as state transition diagrams can also be applied to the treatment plant by following the similar 
steps which we have done for the water supply system. This research views water treatment plant 
as a primitive component in water supply process. That is a self-contained object, or “black 
function block. Detailed analysis within the water treatment plant is beyond the scope of this 
research and proposed to future study. 
(3) Pipe 
Pipelines are the most important part in a water distribution network. Extensive research has been 
performed to analyse the risks associated them among which are leakage, deterioration, corrosion, 
contamination intrusion, etc.  
Leakages of pipes can occur from multiple reasons such as slow deterioration caused by 
mechanical cycling of pipes, joints, and fittings; corrosion of the internal or external surfaces of 
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network components; specific events and situations such as ground movement, stresses from road 
traffic, excessive water pressure; and/or faulty workmanship or construction (Smith et al., 2000).  
Leakage rates can range from a slow leak or “drip” to large compromise of integrity called a 
“main break”. Examples of typical drips include loose joints, gaskets, or service connections. 
Typical examples of a break include a longitudinal crack in a pipe body or end bell, a 
circumferential crack in a pipe body, or a through-wall penetration of a network component. Drips 
usually result in lost of water. While main breaks in large transmission lines could result in wide 
spread outages and/or present the potential for contamination.  
Normally, water contamination events in the pipelines in distribution system can be influenced by 
five major categories as (Kleiner 1998): 
• Intrusion of contaminants into the distribution system through system components whose 
integrity was compromised or through misuse; 
• Regrowth of micro-organisms in the distribution network; 
• Microbial/Chemical breakthrough and by-products and residual chemicals from water 
treatment plant; 
• Leaching of chemicals and corrosion products from system components into the water; 
and  
• Permeation of organic compounds from the soil through system components into the 
water supplies.  
Based on the above discussion, Table 3.1 summarises the hazards, relative failure states and risks 
associated with pipes in the water supply systems.  
(4) Pump 
Pumps also play the important roles in the process of delivering water. However, hazards or 
threats sometimes more easily affect pumps than pipes because it is visible and its normal 
operation depends highly on control, equipment reliability, and human proper activity. In risk 
analysis of pumps, analysts have to consider all the four failure states, i.e., natural hazard failure, 
human-caused failure, operational failure, and interdependence failure. Hazards to pumps in a 
water supply system are listed in Table 3.1. 
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(5) Storage 
Water storages are another important part contributing to water quality problems in distribution 
systems besides pipes. Contamination can occur within the distribution system through open or 
insecure treated water storage reservoirs and tanks, as they are potentially vulnerable to surface 
runoff from the land and to attracting animals and waterfowl as faecal contamination sources and 
may be insecure against vandalism and tampering (WHO, 2004). Meanwhile water quantity can 
also be decreased due to cracks of storage facilities. Table 3.1 lists the hazards, failure states, and 
relative risks of a storage in water supply systems. 
3.3.2.2 States Transition Diagrams of Primitive Objects in Water Supply Systems 
Based on the information identified in Table 3.1, states transition diagrams are developed to 
represent the influences of hazards or threats for water source, water treatment plant, pipe, pump, 
and storage respectively (Figure 3.7 through Figure 3.11). 
State transition diagrams depict the relationships among hazards, failure states, and relative risks. 
Hazards are viewed as input information in this diagrams, to which an object gives its responses 
by changing its state from normal to one of the failure states and produces risk as output 
information. The hazards and internal state (i.e., vulnerability) of the object drive the states 
changes and produce risks, which is in accordance with the definition of risk in Section 1.2.2.1.  
In the following states transition diagrams, Figure 3.7 shows that water source can change its state 
from normal to natural hazard failure state due to the influence of drought, and consequently 
produces reduced capacity. Accidental sewage or industrial discharge can change the water source 
to human-caused failure state and contaminates raw water quality. Similarly in Figure 3.8, power 
supplying failures will negatively influence the performance of water treatment plant and make it 
in an interdependence failure state. While in Figure 3.9, equipment failure can make pump station 
in an operational failure state and reduce the water quantity lifted by the pumps.  
Furthermore, it is also shown that states transition diagrams used here focus on the logic 
relationships among hazards/threats, failure states, and risks rather than analysing the likelihood or 
consequence of a specific hazard or threat. Therefore they can represent the influences of both 
natural hazards and human-caused threats in a consistent way. Specific methods of analysing 
likelihood and consequence of a hazard or threat are either available from historical achievements, 
or proposed to the future research.  
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Figure 3.7 States transition diagrams of water source 
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Figure 3.8 States transition diagrams of water treatment plant 
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Figure 3.9 States transition diagrams of pipe 
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Figure 3.10 States transition diagrams of pump 
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Figure 3.11 States transition diagrams of storage unit 
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and organic pollutants. Then the “message” receiving object (transmission pipe B) treats the 
message as an input, makes responses to it by delivering this “message” to its intermediate 
downstream object C (i.e., water treatment). Object C removes the contaminants and turbidity in 
the water, and delivers it to its downstream object D (deliver pipe). Then object D receives the 
message and deliver the water to users that the end of the process.  
However, in a risk scenario, the above process will be integrated with objects states transition 
diagrams. For example, the river is influenced by high contaminated flood, while all other 
components are working normally. Because of the flood, the river object (A) is at a state with high 
pollutants (Figure 3.7). Then transmission pipe (object B) delivers the highly contaminated raw 
water to water treatment object (C). Since the pollutant levels of raw water exceeds the limits of 
normal treatment, the outputs from water treatment would be contaminated water (Figure 3.8) that 
will be delivered and distributed by pipelines in water distribution system (Object D). In this 
process, object A changes its state from normal to natural hazard failure due to the influence of 
flood. Other objects are working normally and do not have states change. The cause of 
contamination at users side is therefore flood influences to river in this example.  
 
Figure 3.12 Information interaction between components in a simple water supply process 
The above example indicates there are two sources of hazards in a water supply process. One is 
the directly hazards from external factors, the other is the hazards delivered with the water flow. 
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3.4.1 Aggregative Risk Assessment for Basic Components 
(1) General framework of aggregative risk assessment at component level 
Framework of aggregative assessment is developed at component level by extracting the risk 
information from object states transition diagrams (Figure 3.13). In the states transition diagram, 
failure states are directly related to negative consequences or risks. Thus the risk levels of an 
object is determined directly by the risk levels of its failure states. Further, the change from 
normal state to a failure state of an object is directly related to and driven by specific hazard or 
threat. That is the hazards directly contributing to the risk levels of the failure states. A specific 
hazard is usually evaluated in terms of its likelihood of occurrence and possible consequence. 
Then risks can be determined for hazards, failure states, and risk of object respectively by 
following the hierarchy of aggregative risk assessment.  
 
Figure 3.13 Framework of aggregative risk assessment at component level which is developed on 
the basis of object states transition diagrams 
According to the above hierarchical structure, conceptual equations for quantitative analysis can 
be expressed as: 
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In order to quantitatively perform Equation (3.1), it is important to consider the following aspects 
specifically: 
• Firstly a mathematical methods, f(•), is necessary to generate quantitative results for this 
framework, which is specifically studied in Chapter 4.  
• Secondly, likelihood and severity are two important factors to evaluate the serious level 
of a hazard or threat. However, the study on methods determining the likelihood and 
severity of a hazard exceeds the scope of this research. This thesis assumes that both of 
these two factors can be predetermined either objectively by existing methods (e.g., 
those reviewed in Chapter 2) or subjectively by experts’ opinion.  
• Furthermore, vulnerability, a property of the component/object, represents the degree 
that the object can be influenced by the hazard. However, it is not unusually difficult to 
determine the vulnerability of an object due to the influence of a hazard or threat. 
Detailed study on vulnerability is also beyond the scope of current study. Therefore, this 
thesis assumes the vulnerability to be unity and proposes detailed study of vulnerability 
to future work.  
(2) Frameworks of aggregative risk assessment for primitive objects in the water system 
With respect to Table 3.1, negative consequences of the risks are reduced water quantity and/or 
water contamination in water supply systems. For each primitive object frameworks are developed 
to represent risk contributions from hazards to risk of the object (Figure 3.14 through Figure 3.18). 
 
Figure 3.14 Frameworks of aggregative risk assessment of water source 
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Figure 3.15 Frameworks of aggregative risk analysis of water treatment plant 
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Figure 3.16 Frameworks of aggregative risk analysis of pipe 
 
Figure 3.17 Framework of aggregative risk analysis of pump 
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Figure 3.18 Frameworks of aggregative risk assessment of storage 
3.4.2 Aggregative Risk Assessment of Subsystems and the Overall System 
Framework of risk assessment of subsystems and the overall water supply system is determined 
by the whole/part relationships represented in object-oriented structure (Figure 3.19). In this 
framework primitive components are at the bottom level whose risk levels are determined by the 
framework proposed above (Figure 3.13). This aggregative process explicitly shows that risk of 
the overall system is determined by risks of its subsystems, which are in turn determined by risks 
of their components.  
 
Figure 3.19 Framework of aggregative risk assessment at system level which is developed on the 
basis of whole/part relationship of water supply system 
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where WS is the risk of the water supply system; Ws is the risk of subsystem s; and si (i=1,…sn) is 
the risk of object si which is determined by Equation (3.1). 
sW
V  denotes the vulnerability of the 
overall system due to the failure of subsystem Ws. 
is
V  denotes the vulnerability of subsystem Ws 
due to the failure of component/object si.  
In order to quantitatively perform Equation (3.2), it is important to consider the following two 
aspects: 
• Firstly it is necessary to use proper mathematical methods, f(•), to solve this equation. 
This is specifically studied in Chapter 4.  
• Secondly, vulnerability is important to determine the final risk assessment of the water 
supply system. The vulnerabilities of system and subsystem are determined by multiple 
factors such as the composition and layout the water supply system, changes of water 
demands, various requirements of different users, etc. Specific study of this is beyond 
the scope of this study. In the following parts, this thesis assumes these vulnerabilities 
to be unity and propose the detailed study to future work. 
Figure 3.20 gives an example illustrating the framework of aggregative risk assessment at the 
system level. In this framework, risks of the water supply system are determined by its immediate 
subsystems including water source, transmission pipes, water treatment plant, and water 
distribution network. For the subsystem water source, its risks are further determined by risks of 
river, wells, and the reservoir. For the transmission pipe, its risks are contributed by a channel and 
two pipes. While for the water distribution network, its risks are contributed by its components 
such as a pump, a tank, and a set of distribution pipes. Subsystem of water treatment plant is 
viewed as an primitive component whose risk is directly determined by its states transition 
diagrams.  
Finally, by combining the frameworks at component and system levels, a general framework is 
formed for aggregative risk assessment of water supply systems. This hierarchical assessment is 
believed effective as it has the ability to model the intricate relationships among components and 
subsystems and to account for all relevant and important elements of risk and uncertainty, which 
thus renders the assessing process more tractable and representative (Haimes, 2004). Furthermore, 
since both of the frameworks are developed from a general point of view, they can be applied to 
specific applications in various water supply systems. A possible quantitative evaluation of these 
aggregative frameworks is particularly studied in the following chapter. 
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Figure 3.20 Framework of aggregative risk assessment for water supply system 
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development of computer-based analysis techniques since the early 1970’s. Nowadays, fault tree 
analysis is viewed as a powerful tool for assessing the risk and reliability of complex large-scale 
systems. 
Fault tree is a backward analysis tool which begins with a system risk and traces backward, 
searching for possible causes of the risk. Thus it can identify the causal relationships in an 
engineering system. In practice, a fault tree is used to provide a logical and hierarchical 
description of a risk (top event) in terms of sequences and combinations of malfunctions of 
individual components. Then the reliability or risk of a complex system can be computed in terms 
of the given probabilities of the components failures.  
Even though it has be used widely, the construction of fault trees for a engineering system is still 
as much as an art as a science. To give an consistent risk analysis based on fault trees, the 
construction process is required to perform at both component and the system levels. Encouraged 
by the fact that effective fault tree analysis is determined by component interrelationships in 
system and component failure characteristics (Henley and Kumamoto, 1981), the construction of 
fault trees is studied, particularly in this section, based on object-oriented concepts. Similar with 
the development of aggregative risk frameworks discussed in preceding sections, two steps are 
also proposed here to develop the structure of fault trees, i.e., (1) fault trees at component level; 
and (2) fault trees at a system level. 
3.5.2 Hazardous Influences based on Object-Oriented Concepts 
Before the construction of fault trees, it  is necessary to analyse the hazardous influences from 
object-oriented point of view. Based on the discussion in Section 3.3.3, the unsatisfied outflow of 
a component in water systems is mainly caused by two ways: (1) hazards/threats directly affecting 
on the component itself; and/or (2) abnormal water flow delivered from its upstream components 
(Figure 3.21). The first hazardous scenario is also called primary hazards in this research. The 
mechanism of risks introduced by this hazards can be analysed based on state transition diagrams 
of the objects. On the contrary, in the second hazardous scenario, the component/object itself is 
not directly affected by hazards/threats and could be working in a normal state. However what is 
abnormal in this case is its inflow water transmitted from upstream component/object which might 
be directly influenced by hazards/threats and in a failure state. For the instance in Figure 3.12, the 
outflow of a water treatment plant is unsatisfied even though the water treatment plant works 
normally. The cause of the contaminated outflow of water treatment plant is not the failures of 
treatment plant itself, but the contaminated inflow coming from its upstream, i.e., river. Risks 
belonging to this situation are called inflow hazards in this study. Characteristics of inflow 
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hazards are related to the interconnections and interdependences between objects in a water 
supply system.  
 
Figure 3.21 Diagrams representing the influences to an object by primary and inflow hazards 
The above analysis of hazardous influences therefore leads to the development of fault trees on 
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extract the potential hazards/threats that can possibly alter the object state from normal to the 
failure states identified in step 2. These above three steps will produce a hierarchical fault tree in 
which hazards are at the bottom level and viewed as basic events, and risk of object is the top 
event. This therefore provides a cause-effect relationship for a given risk of object.  
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By repeating the above three steps, fault trees are formed for all the primitive objects in the water 
supply system (Figure 3.23 through Figure 3.27). In the fault trees, R1 denotes the risk of reduced 
water quantity; R2 denotes the risk of contamination; and R3 denotes the risk of contamination and 
reduced water quantity. F1, F2, F3, and F4 represent the failure states of natural hazard failure, 
human-caused failure, operational failure, and interdependence failure, respectively; Hij is the 
hazard j associated with ith failure state as shown by the relative states transition diagrams.  
 
Figure 3.22 Steps of developing fault trees of an object due to its primary hazards by extracting 
risk information from objects state transition diagrams 
 
Figure 3.23 Structures of fault trees for water source 
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Figure 3.24 Structures of fault trees for water treatment plant 
 
Figure 3.25 Structures of fault trees for pipe 
 
Figure 3.26 Structure of fault tree for pump 
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Figure 3.27 Structures of fault trees for storage 
3.5.4 Development of Fault Trees at System Level 
This study develops fault trees at a system level based on interconnections between components in 
the water supply system. This indicates that inflow hazards of an object are from its immediate 
upstream objects, whose inflow hazards, in turn, are from their immediate upstream objects. A 
three-step method is proposed in this study as follow:  
• To obtain the flow directions in a water supply system with the help of simulation models 
or software (e.g., EPANET, KYPIPE, etc.), and to record information of upstream and 
downstream components as attributes of a specific object. 
• To find the object that is directly related the risk under study, and to identify its upstream 
objects based on the results obtained in step 1.  
• To set one of the upstream object as current object and repeat step 2 until all the upstream 
objects have been studied.  
In order to facilitate the construction of fault trees, a notional diagram is provided in Figure 3.28 
based on which computer programming are coded in this study.  
The above diagram is general and applicable to construct fault trees of serial, parallel, and 
complex water systems.  
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Figure 3.28 Diagrams of constructing fault trees at system level based on interconnections among 
the components in a water supply system 
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(1) Serial connections of objects 
A serial water supply system means that its components are serially interconnected (Figure 3.29). 
For the risk occurs at user point (e.g., reduced water quantity, contamination, or reduced water 
quantity and contamination), a fault tree is formed by following the above diagram (Figure 3.28). 
The result shows that risk at user point can be caused by primary hazard from object C (pipe) or 
by inflow hazard which is resulted from object B (pump). Then for the risk at outflow of B, it can 
be caused by primary hazard from object B or by inflow hazard from object A (storage). This 
structure is equivalent to the fault tree developed by using conventional techniques on serial 
systems.  
The fault tree of serial water system can be represented in terms “and” (I ) and “or” (U ) 
relations as 
CBAR UU=  
where R denotes the risk of reduced water, contamination, or reduced water and contamination at 
the user point; A, B, and C are primary risk events of pipe, pump, and storage respectively. 
 
Figure 3.29 Construction of fault tree for a serial water system 
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(2) Parallel connections of objects 
A simple example of parallel system means is given in Figure 3.30 where fault trees are developed 
to represent risk of contamination (R2), reduced water quantity (R1), and reduced water quantity 
and contamination (R3) respectively.  
i. Risk of water contamination 
The risk of water contamination (R2) at user point can be caused either by contamination failures 
of object B (pipe 1) or object C (pipe 2), or by inflow hazards from their upstream object, i.e., 
object A (storage). Therefore, the fault tree can be formed to represent this risk as  
CBAR UU=2  
where R2 denotes the top risk event of contamination; A, B, and C respectively represent primary 
risk event associated with different objects. 
ii. Risk of reduced water quantity 
Analysis of the reduced water quantity (R1) at user point is not straightforward because different 
reduced quantities might have different cause-effect relationships. In order to explain this, this risk 
is classified to three scenarios (Figure 3.30). In the first possible scenario, the possible range of 
reduced quantity (∆Q) at user point satisfies 0≤∆Q≤min(QBmax, QCmax) and ∆Q≠Q. Here QBmax and 
QCmax denote maximum flow delivered by pipes B and C respectively; Q is water flow demanded 
at user point. This indicates that the water reduction could be caused either directly by primary 
failures of pipes B or C, or indirectly by inflow hazards from their upstream object storage A 
(Figure 3.30(a)). The top event is represented as 
CBARR UU== 2
1
1  
where R1
1 denotes risk event in the first possible scenario; A, B, and C are primary failures of pipe 
1, pipe 2, and storage respectively. 
In the second possible scenario, the possible range of reduced quantity (∆Q) at user point is 
constrained by min(QBmax, QCmax)≤∆Q≤max(QBmax, QCmax) and ∆Q≠Q. Then the risk could be 
caused directly by primary failure of the pipe with larger flow rate or primary failures of two pipes 
simultaneously. The indirect cause is resulted by inflow hazards from their upstream object 
storage A. Then the fault tree can also be simplified to a simpler fault tree from the logic point of 
views (Figure 3.30b). Here we assume that QBmax is larger than QCmax. Thus the top event is finally 
represented as 
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Figure 3.30 Construction of fault trees for a parallel water system 
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ABACBBR UUIU == ))((21  
where R1
2 denotes top event in the second possible case. 
In the third possible scenario, the possible range of reduced quantity (∆Q) at user point satisfies 
∆Q≥max(QBmax, QCmax) or ∆Q=Q, which indicates that the risk could be caused either directly by 
simultaneous primary failures of pipes B and C, or indirectly by inflow hazard from their 
upstream object storage A (Figure 3.30(c)). The top event is represented as 
ACBR UI )(31 =  
where R1
3 denotes top event in the third possible case. 
Results of the above three scenario are summarised in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 Cause effect relationships of water reduction in a simple parallel system 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
0≤∆Q≤min(QB, QC) min(QB, QC)≤∆Q≤max(QB, QC) ∆Q≥max(QB, QC) 
CBA UU  AB U  ACB UI )(  
 
It is obvious that CBA UU ≥ AB U ≥ ACB UI )( , which indicates that likelihood of the first 
scenario is larger than the second scenario which is larger than the third scenario. This is in 
compliance with the common sense of risk knowledge about the water systems because minor 
water reduction is more frequent than major water reduction. However in practical risk or 
reliability assessment of water distribution system, only no water flow at user points (i.e., ∆Q=Q) 
is more frequently considered by analysts. With respect to this, current study therefore only 
considers the construction of fault trees for risk of no water flow at user points in the following 
parts of this thesis.  
iii. Risk of water contamination and reduced water quantity 
The risk of reduced water quantity and contamination (R3) at user point is an intersection events of 
reduced water quantity (R1) and contamination (R2). Thus it is represented as: 
213 RRR I=  
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Figure 3.31 Construction of fault tree of no water flow delivered at user point of a complex water 
system  
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(3) Complex water supply systems 
Most practical water supply systems, particular the distribution networks, have no serial-parallel 
configuration and the development of fault trees are much more difficult. Backward analyses, 
such as fault tree analysis, are believed to be effective for identifying potential causes for a 
specific problem, by starting with a system risk and tracing backward to search possible causes of 
the hazard (Mays and Tung, 1989). The diagram proposed above (Figure 3.28) is in accordance 
with the concept of backward analysis, which makes it applied to generate fault trees complex 
water supply systems.  
An example is adopted here to demonstrate the construction of fault trees by using the proposed 
method (Figure 3.31). This example is a distribution network composed of seven pipes (i.e., 
P1,…,P7). The flow directions among the network are also pre-determined and represented in the 
figure. Because of the complicated interconnections among pipes, the network is neither serial nor 
parallel. Suppose that there is no water delivered to user in this example. Fault tree is developed 
(Figure 3.31) to depict the cause effect relationships for this problem.  
Fault tree shows that the top event can be caused by failures pipe 1, pipe 2 and pipe 3, pipe 2 and 
pipe 6, pipe 5 and pipe 6, pipe 3 and pipe 4 and pipe 5, or pipe 7. This means that single failures 
of pipe 1 or pipe 7, or some combination failures of the pipes (e.g., pipes 2 and 3, etc.) will result 
in no water at user side. This can be simply represented by  
7)543()65()62()32(11 PPPPPPPPPPPR UIIUIUIUIU=  
However, the above analysis only considers the normal flow direction in the pipelines (Figure 
3.31). In practice water flow in pipe 4 can be in the reverse direction as shown in Figure 3.31. By 
considering these two possible directions in the pipelines, the result of fault tree analysis will be 
7)543()65()642()32(11 PPPPPPPPPPPPR UIIUIUIIUIU=  
It is obvious that the former result is a conserve approximation of the latter as it ignores the other 
possible delivering path from the source to the users. Even the result of the former is slightly 
higher than the real value, it is sufficient to represent the cause-effect relationships and much 
easier to be developed. This will be more advantageous in complex water supply systems. 
Therefore, this thesis only considers the development of fault trees based on normal water flow 
directions in a water supply system. 
3.6 Summary and Comments 
This study has discussed that object-oriented approach is effective in dealing with complexity in a 
water supply system, and can be used to develop frameworks of risk assessment for water supply 
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systems. Two types of frameworks, i.e., aggregative risk assessment and fault trees, have been 
developed on the basis of object-oriented structure of the water supply system. Framework of 
aggregative risk assessment is used to evaluate the risks associated with components, subsystems, 
and the overall system. While fault trees are developed to represent the cause-effect relationships 
for specific risk in the water system. By combining these two frameworks, risk analysts can obtain 
a more comprehensive view of the risks in a water supply system.  
Frameworks of risk assessment developed on the basis of object-oriented approach are more 
suitable for a comprehensive risk assessment than most existing methods from several aspects: 
• It can be used by different users. The frameworks can be flexibly established at different 
hierarchical levels according to the requirements of system observers and/or available 
information. 
• It can be reused in different water supply systems. The frameworks are developed from a 
general point of view, which encapsulate the common features of various water supply 
systems and can be reused in any specific application. 
• It can evaluate of risks by considering multiple hazards. The frameworks can aggregate 
both natural hazards and human-related threats along a consistent hierarchy to generate 
useful risk information for decision makers.  
• It is flexible to real application of risk assessment. Even though only reduced water 
quantity and water contamination are considered as risks in this study, the method 
developed here can be easily reused to other risks (such as low pressure failures, etc.).  
However, there are still further work required to improve the frameworks developed in this study, 
which can be summarised briefly as follow.  
• The framework for vulnerability assessment is required to be further studied as 
vulnerability also plays important role in introducing risk into the water supply system. 
This study assumes the values of vulnerabilities to be unity, which makes the evaluation 
of this study more conservative. However, detailed study is required in order to make the 
assessment be closer to the real situation.  
• The process of generating fault tree structure at system level is based on the normal flow 
directions of a water supply system, which is a conserve approximate of the real cases. 
However, the flow directions might change in real cases of failures. Therefore, further 
study is necessary to improve the generation of fault tree at system level in the future so 
that more reasonable results can be obtained.  
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CHAPTER 
4  
Quantitative Aggregative Risk Assessment of Water 
Supply Systems  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter studies a method that can quantitatively evaluate the frameworks of aggregative risk 
assessment for water supply system proposed in Chapter 3. There are two aspects required to be 
mathematically represented for these frameworks. One is mathematical evaluation of risks 
associated with hazards. The other is the mathematical method that can aggregate risk along the 
hierarchical structure to obtain risks of objects, subsystems, and the overall water supply system. 
Fuzzy sets theory and Dempster-Shafer theory are adopted in this study to perform quantitative 
evaluations of aggregative risks (Figure 4.1). Firstly, fuzzy sets theory is used to represent the 
characteristics of a hazard such as likelihood of the occurrence and relative severity. Fuzzy sets 
theory, an effective method of representing imprecise, vague, and fuzzy information, has been 
effectively applied to many engineering problems. Usually, there are multiple types of hazards in 
a water supply system that are described in various forms including probability distribution, 
numerical intervals, linguistic variables, etc. Its application of representing risks is specifically 
considered in this chapter.  
Secondly, combination rule of Dempster-Shafer theory is used in this study as an aggregative 
method to integrate risk information from lower levels to higher levels along the hierarchical 
assessment structure. Dempster-Shafer theory is one of the evidential reasoning methods that can 
effectively aggregate or fuse information from multiple sources. It has been extensively applied to 
many engineering systems like AI and expert systems, engineering design assessment, safety 
analysis, environmental assessment, etc. This study adopts this method, coupled with fuzzy sets 
theory, to generate aggregative risks of the water supply system.  
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Figure 4.1 Quantitative methods used to evaluate the framework of aggregative risk assessment 
for the water supply system 
Among the following parts of this chapter, Section 4.2 explains the basics of fuzzy sets theory and 
its ability of representing uncertain information in a risk assessment. Section 4.3 introduces the 
basics of Dempster-Shafer theory and its effectiveness of aggregating/integrating information 
from multiple sources. After that Section 4.4 illustrates the process of aggregative risk assessment 
for water supply systems based on the two theories. Then Section 4.5 gives a brief discussion 
about the potential usefulness of aggregative risks in water supply system. Lastly, Section 4.6 
summarises the proposed quantitative method and also gives comments on it. Figure 4.2 explicitly 
depicts the structure of this chapter. 
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Figure 4.2 Structure of developing quantitative methods for aggregative risk assessment of water 
system 
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uncertain factors like the ability of human approaching the component, the ability of human 
transporting and implanting explosives, the ability of human obtaining sufficient quantities, and 
the extent the terrorist willing to risk their lives, etc. (Haimes et al., 1998). All of these factors are 
subjective in nature and hard to be represented by a single precise probability distribution 
function. Secondly, historical records of several risk scenarios, particularly extreme hazardous 
events (e.g., extreme flood, human explosive, etc.), are not complete and sufficient. An analyst 
always has difficulties in developing proper probability distribution functions with these limited 
data. Thirdly, in many cases, risk analysts are more confident with linguistic representations (such 
as very high, slightly low, etc.) and logic cause-effect relationships rather than precisely 
numerical representations and physical or mathematical models to give risk evaluations. However, 
probabilistic variables have limited ability to represent these linguistic or descriptive information. 
Fourthly, an effective risk assessment is always based on the consideration of multiple hazards 
which are always represented in various forms such as probabilistic data, experts opinions, 
linguistic representation, etc. This is another hurdle that limits the effectiveness of probability 
theory in risk assessment. Therefore, there is a need to find an effective method to meet the above 
characteristics of risk assessment. 
Alternative to probabilistic theory, fuzzy sets theory, introduced by Zadeh (1965) to deal with 
problems in which vagueness is presented, could be used to represent subjective, vague, linguistic, 
and imprecise data and information effectively. Applications of fuzzy sets theory have been 
extensively studied to handle the ambiguity and vagueness involved in the risk analysis in 
different engineering areas (Lee,1996; El-Baroudy and Simonovic, 2004; Sadiq and Husain, 
2005).  
4.2.2 Basics of Fuzzy Sets Theory 
To get a brief view of fuzzy sets theory, it is necessary to introduce several basic concepts, i.e., 
fuzzy sets, fuzzy numbers, α-cut sets, and extension principle, as they are frequently used in 
engineering problems. 
(1) Fuzzy sets 
Fuzzy sets are a mathematical tool used to deal with real-world-sense fuzziness (Cai, 1996). In a 
traditional set, “membership” stipulation, or characteristic function, is what actually defines a set 
whose boundaries are precisely defined: e.g., “a set of pipes whose failure probability is 0.1.” For 
each element, characteristic function, can be either 1, if its failure probability is 0.1, or 0, if its 
failure probability is not 0.1. On the contrary, a fuzzy set is defined as a set of elements that 
belong to a space (the universe) whose boundaries are not precisely defined. Rather than 
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represents the likelihood of a hazard or threat in precise probability, fuzzy sets theory uses a range 
or a set of probabilistic values to represent the probability. Associated with each probability, p, in 
the range or the set, a membership function is defined to express the grade, between 0 and 1, with 
which the analyst believes that the likelihood of the hazard is p. For example, a fuzzy set A can be 
defined as “the set of pipes whose failure probabilities are about 0.1.” Because of the subjective 
restriction ‘about’, the membership of an element x to the set A is no longer a binary type (i.e., the 
element belongs or does not belong to the set), but rather is defined by its membership function 
µA(x) (Figure 4.3).  
 
Figure 4.3 An example of using fuzzy set to represent failure probability of pipes 
In Figure 4.3, x denotes the probability of pipe failure; µA(x) denotes the membership of x. µA(x) 
establishes how much the element x belongs to the set A (i.e., if µA(x) is close to 1, then x more 
strongly belongs to set A; on the contrary, if µA(x) is close to 0, x then more weakly belongs to set 
A.). Thus it is shown that elements whose failure probabilities are in the range of [0.05, 0.15] 
belong to the fuzzy set A with different grades from 0 to 1. Pipes with failure probability 0.1 have 
the highest grade, i.e. 1. The grade levels are gradually decrease with the change of failure 
probability from 0.1 to 0.05 or from 0.1 to 0.15. Thus fuzzy sets explicitly represent the subjective 
representation, ‘about’, in a mathematical way.  
Formally, let U be a classic set, whose generic element is denoted x. A fuzzy set A defined on U is 
a mapping from U to the unit interval [0,1], denoted by (Dubois and Prade, 1980; Zimmermann, 
1991) 
( ){ }UxxxA A ∈= ;)(,µ  (4.1) 
or simply by 
( ))(, xxA Aµ=  (4.1’) 
where µA(x) is referred to as the membership function, whose value at x signifies the grade of 
membership of x of the fuzzy set A and may vary from 0 to 1.  
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(2) Fuzzy numbers 
In addition to the above representation of fuzzy sets, fuzzy numbers are also frequently used to 
represent imprecise variables in practical applications. In terms of mathematical definition, a 
fuzzy number is a convex and normal fuzzy set, i.e., a special case of fuzzy sets. Normally there 
are two simple membership functions frequently used for a fuzzy number: one is triangular 
function, the other is trapezoidal function. The triangular function could correspond to an 
inaccuracy of the type “the variable is certainly included between xa and xb and close to xc”, “the 
variable is about xc”, or “the variable is close to xc”, etc. While trapezoidal function translates 
information such as “the variable is certainly included between xa and xb and is likely around a 
value between xc and xd”. The key fuzzy or subjective words are “certainly”, “close”, “about”, and 
“likely around”. These words constitute the only real information that any risk analyst would have 
about the risk. The application of triangular and trapezoidal functions can be illustrated by two 
examples respectively: (1) “the failure probability of pipe A is about 0.1.” (Figure 4.4(a)); and (2) 
“the failure probability of pipe B is included between 0.05 and 0.25 and is most likely around 
value between 0.1 and 0.2.” (Figure 4.4(b)). 
 
Figure 4.4 Examples of using triangular and trapezoidal fuzzy numbers to represent failure rates 
of pipes 
It is stated, from above example, that a membership function simply indicates how much a given 
value belongs to a fuzzy set/number or how close it is to the most likely value. Thus it is 
advantageous to use a fuzzy number to represent imprecise or inaccuracy information in terms of 
mathematical language, which is  useful for quantitative risk assessment. 
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Once the imprecise data are changed into fuzzy numbers, the aim of risk assessment is to 
determine the final risk based on these fuzzy numbers. To accomplish this, the concepts, α-cut set 
and/or extension principle, are frequently used in quantitative analysis with fuzzy sets theory.  
(3) α-cut set 
For any ]1,0[∈α , an α-cut set of fuzzy set A, denoted by Aα, is a classic set defined by 
{ }αµα ≥∈= )(, xUxA A  (4.2) 
That is, the α-cut set of fuzzy set A is a crisp set that contains all the elements of the universe set 
whose membership grades are greater than or equal to the specified value of α. This is indicated in 
Figure 4.4. When α=0 the corresponding interval is called the “support” of the fuzzy set (the 
interval [0.05, 0.15] in Figure 4.4 (a)) while for α=1, and when the membership function is 
triangular, the interval comes down to one crisp value only, that is, the “the most likely value” 
(i.e. 0.1 in Figure 4.4 (a)).  
Because it is an interval and easier to be analysed, α-cut set is important to determine the 
operations on fuzzy sets, fuzzy arithmetic, and fuzzy relations, which is discussed in details in 
Appendix B.  
(4) Extension principle (Zimmermann, 1991; Dubois and Prade, 1980) 
Let f be a mapping from nUU ×⋅⋅⋅×1  to a universe Y such that 
),...,( 1 nxxff =  
The extension principle allows us to induce from fuzzy sets nAA ×⋅⋅⋅×1  to a fuzzy set B on Y 
through f such that 
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where f--1(y) is the inverse image of y, µB(y) the greatest among the membership values 
),...,( 1...1 nAA xxn××µ  of the realization of y using n-tuples (x1,…,xn). 
For n=1, the extension principle reduces to 
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Extension principle is one of the most important fundamentals in fuzzy sets theory to perform 
fuzzy calculations by using functions on fuzzy sets or numbers. Details about extension principle 
can be found in Appendix B. Although conceptual elegant, extension principle is difficult to use 
and the mathematical tools required to are still scarce (Revelli and Ridolfi, 2002). Alternatively, 
α-cut sets method is easier to be computerised. Therefore, this research adopts α-cut sets method 
to conduct fuzzy calculations.  
In this research, likelihood and severity of a hazard are represented in terms of fuzzy numbers. 
Risk of the hazard is then a function of these two fuzzy parameters. Detailed discussions about 
this are conducted in Section 4.5. 
4.3 Dempster-Shafer Theory and Its Potential in Risk Assessment 
4.3.1 Methods of Aggregating Information  
Once the risks of hazards in a water supply system have been determined, aggregation methods 
are then necessary for risk evaluations of components, subsystems, and the whole water system. 
Normally aggregation is used as an assessment method to meaningfully summarise and simplify a 
set of data, whether the data come from a single source or multiple sources. In aggregative risk 
assessment, for example, the determination of components risks is a process of aggregating risks 
from multiple hazards. Similarly determination of system risks is a process of aggregating risks 
from its subsystems and components.  
Familiar examples of aggregation techniques include arithmetic averages, geometric averages, 
harmonic averages, maximum values, and minimum values (Ayuub, 2001). Among them, 
combination rules are special types of obtaining data from multiple sources. From a set theoretic 
standpoint, combination rules can potentially occupy a continuum between conjunction (AND-
based on set intersection) and disjunction (OR-based on set union) (Dubois and Prade, 1992). In 
the situation of risk analysis where all sources of input information are considered equally 
reliable, a conjunctive operation is appropriate (i.e., A and B and C…). In the case where there is 
only one reliable source among many risk inputs, a disjunctive combination operation (i.e., A or B 
or C…) is used. However, many combination operations lie between these two extremes (i.e., A 
and B or C, A and C or B, etc.). In this thesis, the Dempster-Shafer theory is used to aggregate 
risks along the hierarchical structure of aggregative risk assessment. 
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4.3.2 Basics of Dempster-Shafer Theory 
The Dempster-Shafer theory was first developed by Dempster (1967) in the 1960s and later 
extended and refined by Shafer (1976) in the 1970s. It offers an alternative to traditional 
probabilistic theory for the mathematical representation of uncertainty. The significant innovation 
of this method is that it allows for the allocation of a probability to sets or intervals. The 
Dempster-Shafer theory does not require an assumption regarding the probability of the individual 
constituents of the set or interval. This is potentially valuable for the evaluation of risk in 
engineering applications where it is not possible to obtain a precise measurement from 
experiments, or where knowledge is obtained from expert elicitation. Several concepts of this 
theory, believed to be useful to risk assessment in this thesis, are the basic probability assignment 
(bpa) and its combination rule of multiple sources. More details about the Dempster-Shafer theory 
can be found in Appendix C.  
(1) Basic probability assignment function 
The basic probability assignment (bpa), also called basic evidence assignment, is an important 
concept in Dempster-Shafer theory. The term “basic probability assignment”, usually represented 
by m, does not generally refer to probability in the classical sense. It defines a mapping from the 
power set to the interval between 0 and 1, where its value of the null set is 0 and the summation of 
all subsets of the power set is 1. The value of the basic probability assignment for a given set A, 
m(A), expresses the proportion of all relevant and available evidence that supports the claim that a 
particular element of X (the universal set) belongs to the set A but no particular subset of A (Klir 
and Wierman, 1998). That is the value of m(A) pertains only to the set A and makes no additional 
claims about any subsets of A. Any further evidence on the subsets of A would be represented by 
another bpa (i.e. AB ⊂ , where m(B) would be the bpa for subset B). Formally, this description of 
m can be represented with the following equations: 
]1,0[)(: →XPm  
0)( =Φm  (4.4) 
∑
∈
=
)(
1)(
XPA
Am  
where P(X) represents the power set of X, Φ is the null set, and A is a subset of the power set (Klir 
and Wierman, 1998). 
For example, the failure frequency of a pipe in a distribution system is represented in terms of 
different levels—Low (L), Medium (M), and High (H). Thus in this case X={L, M, H} there is a 
power set which contains 8 subsets: Φ, {L}, {M}, {H}, {L, M}, {L, H}, {M, H}, and {L, M, H}. 
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In an assessment of the pipe failure, an analyst may report with 50% confidence that the 
likelihood is high, {H}, and with 30% confidence that the likelihood is medium or high, {M, H}. 
The basic probability assignment of this assessment (A) can be written as: m(A)H=0.5, 
m(A)M,H=0.3, and m(A)P(X)=0.2 because m(A)H+m(A)M,H+m(A)P(X)=1. In this example, {H} is a 
subset of {M, H}, but their basic assignments, i.e., 0.5 and 0.3 respectively, are different. 
(2) Combination rule 
One of the kernels in the Dempster-Shafer theory is its combination rule by which the 
evidence/information from different sources are combined. The original combination rule of 
multiple basic probability assignments is a generalisation of Baye’s rule (Dempster, 1967). This 
rule strongly emphasises the agreement  between multiple sources and ignores all the conflicting 
evidences through a normalisation factor. This can be considered as a strict AND-operation. The 
rule assumes that the information sources are independent and use the orthogonal sum to combine 
multiple sources. Formally, the combination of two sources (m12) is calculated from the 
aggregation of two basic probability assignments m1 and m2 in the following manner: 
K
CmBm
Am
ACB
−
=
∑
=
1
)()(
)(
21
12
I
 
0)(12 =Φm  (4.5) 
where ∑
Φ=
=
CB
CmBmK
I
)()( 21  
Here K is called the degree of conflict. It represents the basic probability associated with the two 
conflicting sources (i.e., source 1 and source 2). This is determined by summing the products of 
the basic probability assignments of all sets where the intersection is null. This rule is 
commutative, associative, but not idempotent or continuous.  
To continue the example illustrated above, another analyst gives a second assessment on the pipe 
failure probability with 80% confidence that it is high and with 20% confidence that it is medium. 
By aggregating the assessments of two analysts, the overall probability levels of the pipe can be 
obtained (Figure 4.5). Details of performing this combination are available in the Appendix C. 
The combined results show that failure probability of the pipe is Medium with 11% confidence 
and High with 89% confidence. These are in accordance with the two analysts evaluations. 
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Figure 4.5 An example of combining evidence in Dempster-Shafer theory 
Although the original combination rule discussed above can give reasonable results in most cases, 
it also receives serious criticism when there is significant conflict between the information 
sources. Consequently, other researchers (Zadeh, 1986; Yager, 1987; Inagaki, 1991; Zhang, 1994; 
Dubois and Prade, 1986, 1992) have developed modified Dempster rules that attempt to represent 
the degree of conflict in the final result. In this research, weights factors are considered for each 
elements and weighted combination rule is used to discount the conflictions among multiple 
sources. This method has also been applied to other studies (Yang et al., 2006; Yang and Singh, 
1994).  
4.4 Aggregative Risk Assessment of Water Supply Systems 
4.4.1 Applications of Fuzzy Sets in Risk Assessment 
With respect to the definitions in Section 1.2.2.1 and given that vulnerability is unity, risk is then 
a measure determined by likelihood and severity of a hazard, i.e., 
SLR ⊗=  (4.6) 
where R is the risk associated with a hazard or threat; L represents the likelihood of the hazard; 
and S represents the severity or consequence of the hazard; ⊗  denotes the multiplication 
relationship between likelihood and severity. This definition has been applied to risk assessment 
in many engineering systems such as software (Lee, 1996), environment (Sadiq et al., 2004), 
mechanical (Wang et al., 1995), process industries (Khan, et al., 2002, 2004; Khan and Haddara, 
2003; Krishnasamy, et al., 2005), water pipe deterioration analysis (Kleiner et al., 2006a,b), etc.. 
In this thesis, Equation (4.6) is used to describe the risk levels associated with each hazard in the 
water supply system.  
This definition indicates that if likelihood (L) and/or severity (S) are represented by fuzzy 
numbers, R will be a fuzzy number as well. The operator ⊗  is thus representing the 
Likelihood of 
pipe failure 
Assessment 
from analyst 1 
Assessment 
from analyst 2 
{M}: 11% 
{H}: 89% 
Combination 
{H}: 50% 
{M,H}: 30% 
{H}: 80% 
{M}: 20% 
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multiplication of two fuzzy numbers. This can be performed by using fuzzy operation rules. 
Specifically, if both likelihood and severity are represented as crisp numbers, risk will be also a 
crisp number. The operator ⊗  reduces to normal multiplications between two real numbers.  
According to the above discussions, the application of fuzzy sets theory in this study is depicted 
by Figure 4.6. 
 
Figure 4.6 Structure of applications of fuzzy sets theory to aggregative risk assessment 
4.4.1.1 Linguistic Risk Levels  
In risk assessment, it is not unusual that analysts prefer to describe risks in terms of different 
levels, such as high, medium, low, etc., rather than absolute values. This is necessary for several 
reasons. 
Firstly, risk is not absolutely objective in nature, but rather relative and subjective. It is usually a 
fuzzy concept in the sense that there does not exist a unique risk associated with a hazardous 
event occurring in a given period (Karwowski and Mital, 1986; Feagans and Biller, 1980). Then 
risk assessment deals with quantities which are inherently imprecise and whose future values are 
uncertain. Usually, linguistic categories or levels (e.g., very high, high, medium, low, very low, 
etc), instead of absolute numbers, are usually adopted because each linguistic category or level 
can deal with the various and uncertain risk values by including a range or set of numbers.  
Secondly, the real meaning of risk in practice is varied and application-specific; risks are thus 
measured in different units; and even similar risk values may indicate different levels of 
influences in different applications. Furthermore, risks with different units are difficult to compare 
or aggregate in a risk assessment. Alternative to the absolute numerical values, risk levels, one of 
the relative measures, can be more easily used by risk analysts, system managers, policy makers, 
and general users.  
4.4.1.1 Linguistic risk levels 
4.4.1.2 Fuzzy representations of 
risk factors 
4.4.1.3 Determination of risk levels 
To discuss the levels that are used to 
represent likelihood, severity, and risk in 
this study 
To discuss the calculation of fuzzy risk 
based on fuzzy likelihood and severity 
To determine the relative risk levels (or 
risk contributions) of a specific risk 
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Lastly, it is not unusual that analysts have more confident to give risk evaluations in terms of risk 
levels rather than numerical values in certain circumstances. Risk of human wilful attack on water 
supply assets is one of the examples.  
Therefore, this thesis uses risk levels to represent the risk items. Furthermore, the numbers of risk 
levels are also studied by many researchers as an important factor in practical risk assessment. 
Experiments by psychologists, such as those of Miller (1956), suggest that the maximum number 
of chunks of information is on the order of seven, plus or minus two. With respect to this, it is 
often recommended that the number of categories be restricted to no more than seven (Karwowski 
and Mital, 1986). Normally, too few levels will not be adequate to represent the real knowledge of 
analysts, while too many levels will bring extra difficulties in the following assessment. 
Therefore, seven categories of linguistic representations are adopted in this paper to express the 
degrees of likelihood and severity of hazards (Table 4.1). The seven categories or grades are 
extremely low, very low, slightly low, middle, slightly high, very high, and extremely high.  
Based on the definition of risk and seven grades for likelihood and severity, the relative grades of 
risk are generated based on seven rules (Table 4.2). In this research, seven basic categories (i.e., 
extremely low, very low, slightly low, middle, slightly high, very high, and extremely high) are 
defined as standard risk grades or categories, and the risk distribution of each hazard can be 
evaluated on the seven grades.  
Table 4.1 Linguistic levels and explanations used to evaluate likelihood and severity of a hazard 
Linguistic representation Descriptions of the linguistic values 
1. Likelihood  
Extremely low (EL) Practically impossible during the lifetime of the component 
Very low (VL) Conceivable, but highly unlikely 
Slightly low (SL) Only remotely possible 
Middle (M) Possible 
Slightly high (SH) Unusual but possible 
Very high (VH) Quite possible 
Extremely high (EH) Might well be expected 
  
2. Severity*  
Extremely low (EL) Influences to the users are minor and ignored 
Very low (VL) Few users are influenced 
Slightly low (SL) A small part of users are influenced 
Middle (M) Part of the users are influenced 
Slightly high (SH) Many users are influenced 
Very high (VH) A large part of the users are influenced 
Extremely high (EH) Catastrophic risks, or most users are influenced 
*Descriptions of severity levels are only a reference here, which can be changed when applied to 
according to the requirements of practical risk assessment.  
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Table 4.2 Linguistic levels and explanations used to evaluate risks 
Linguistic representation Descriptions of the linguistic values 
Extremely low (EL) If both likelihood and severity are extremely low 
Very low (VL) If both likelihood and severity are very low 
Slightly low (SL) If both likelihood and severity are slightly low 
Medium (M) If both likelihood and severity are medium 
Slightly high (SH) If both likelihood and severity are slightly high 
Very high (VH) If both likelihood and severity are very high 
Extremely high (EH) If both likelihood and severity are extremely high 
 
4.4.1.2 Fuzzy Representations of Risk Factors 
After the determination of linguistic levels for likelihood, severity, and risk, it is required to 
determine the relative mathematical expressions by using membership functions of fuzzy 
numbers. However, the determination of membership function is also hard and complicated. Any 
shape of a membership function is possible, but the selected shape should be justified by available 
information. Ross (2004) and Bilgic and Turksen (1999) discussed several methods of 
determining the membership functions. Meanwhile, it is also believed, in some cases, that the 
expressions of membership functions are not the dominant factors in engineering applications 
(Klir and Yuan, 1995). Therefore, this research assumes that the forms of membership functions 
would not influence the analysis results dramatically, and adopts the simple triangular fuzzy 
numbers to represent the basic risk factors.  
(1) Fuzzy representation of likelihood 
Triangular membership functions are adopted to mathematically represent the likelihood levels of 
hazards in this research (Table 4.1), which are determined by the following equations and 
illustrated in Figure 4.7. 
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where µL(x) denotes the membership function of likelihood; x denotes the values of likelihood. 
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Figure 4.7 Fuzzy representation of likelihood levels used in this study 
These above equations and Figure 4.7 show that likelihood is defined between 0 and 1. An 
extremely low (EL) fuzzy number is defined in the range [0,1/6], and each value of likelihood in 
this interval has a different membership value to represent the grade or confidence that the 
likelihood is viewed as extremely low. Similarly, other likelihood levels, i.e. very low (VL), slight 
low (SL), medium (M), slightly high (SH), very high (VH), and extremely high (EH), are defined 
as fuzzy numbers on the intervals [0,1/3], [1/6,1/2], [1/3,2/3], [1/2,5/6], [2/3,1], and [5/6,1] 
respectively.  
(2) Fuzzy representation of severity 
In practice, severity can be represented by different measures such as monetary loss, populations 
influenced by the risk, mean time to failure, etc. These measures are valued with different 
dimensions, which thus introduce difficulties in comparing risks by using Equation (4.6). To 
overcome this difficulty, severity is usually normalised to a dimensionless measure defined in the 
interval [0,1]. The normalisation process is always performed by dividing the severity value with 
the maximum value of possible severities. For example, a water distribution is composed of a 
pump and a set of pipes that supplies water to 10,000 persons. However, during a failure of the 
pump, there were about 2000 persons (Figure 4.8a) who were influenced and had no accessible 
water. By using fuzzy numbers, the severity of this pump failure is illustrated in Figure 4.8b. 
From the above example, a normalisation process can therefore be represented by 
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]1,0[]/,/[],0[ maxmaxmaxminmaxmin ∈⇔∈⇔=∈ SSSSSSSSS  (4.8) 
where S denotes the severity value, which can be measured by monetary loss, population of 
influenced people, mean time to failure, etc.; Smin(=0) and Smax denote the possible minimum and 
maximum values of severities, respectively.  
 
Figure 4.8 An example of normalizing severity measure 
After normalisation, severity levels become dimensionless variables and can be represented by 
fuzzy numbers defined in [0,1]. With respect to the normalised severity, triangular fuzzy functions 
are determined by the following equations and illustrated in Figure 4.9. 
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where µS(x) denotes the membership function of severity; x denotes normalised values of severity. 
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These equations and Figure 4.7 show that severity is defined between 0 and 1. A fuzzy number of 
extremely low (EL) is defined in the range [0,1/6], and each value of severity in this interval has a 
different membership value to represent the grade or confidence that the severity is viewed as 
extremely low. Similarly, other severity levels, i.e. very low (VL), slight low (SL), medium (M), 
slightly high (SH), very high (VH), and extremely high (EH), are defined as fuzzy numbers on the 
intervals [0,1/3], [1/6,1/2], [1/3,2/3], [1/2,5/6], [2/3,1], and [5/6,1] respectively.  
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Figure 4.9 Fuzzy representation of severity levels used in this study 
 (3) Fuzzy representation of risk 
According to the definitions in Table 4.2, the standard categories of risk levels can thus be 
determined by 
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 (4.10) 
where R  denotes fuzzy risk variable; L and S denote fuzzy variables of likelihood and severity 
respectively.  
This study adopts the α-cut sets method that was proposed by Kaufmann and Gupta (1991) to 
derive the equations for risks. The results are shown as below, while the detail process of the 
derivation can be found in Appendix B.  
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where µR(x) denotes the membership function of risk.  
The above equations show that risks are still fuzzy numbers, but not triangular as fuzzy numbers 
for likelihood or severity (Figure 4.10). Risks determined by the above equations are served as 
standard risk grades with which a calculated risk can be compared in order to obtain its relative 
risk levels (or risk distributions) for the calculated risk. 
 
Figure 4.10 Fuzzy representation of risk categories used in this study 
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4.4.1.3 Determinations of Risk Levels 
Normally a calculated risk is not always limited to the seven standard risk developed in the above 
section, however, it could be intersected with several risk grades with different degrees. This can 
be illustrated by an example as “The likelihood of the flood occurrence during summer time is 
very high, while its relative influences to the quality of river A is slightly low, how about the risk 
of flood to river A?” By using Equation (4.6), risk of the flood (hazard) can be obtained. However, 
it is not feasible to simply conclude that the risk is completely belonging to any one of the seven 
grades as it does not completely match with any single risk grade which has been determined by 
Equation (4.11) (Figure 4.11). The calculated risk intersects with several risk grades like Slightly 
low (SL), Medium (M), Slightly high (SH), and Very high (VH) with different degrees. The 
figure shows that the flood risk is close to Medium risk level and slightly moves to the direction 
of Slightly high. To give a reasonable evaluation, it is thus necessary to determine the degrees of 
intersections or compatibility between the calculated risk and the seven standard risk categories. 
Based on the degree of intersection, risk levels of calculated risks can then be easily determined.  
 
Figure 4.11 Intersections between fuzzy numbers 
 (1) The degree of intersection between fuzzy numbers 
In order to determine the intersection or compatibility between risks, this research supposes two 
axioms as follow: 
Axiom 1. If the calculated risk R is entirely included within a predefined fuzzy risk grade Ri 
(i=1,…,7), then it should completely belong to Ri. 
Axiom 2. If R intersects with several predefined fuzzy risk grades at the same time but it is not 
entirely included in any one of them, then it should belong to each of them to a certain degrees. 
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Several methods are available, but none of them can be described as the best method (Chen, 
2003). Extensive studies have been performed to determine the intersections of fuzzy numbers. 
Similarity or compatibility is one of most important factors that has been proposed in the fuzzy 
risk analysis (Chen,1996; Kangari et al.) and fuzzy decision making (Chen and Chen, 1998; Hsu 
and Chen, 1996; Lee, 1999). However, the existing methods could not perfectly meet the 
requirements of the above two axioms. Therefore, this research develops two methods, named 
overlap area method and weighted overlap area method, respectively, to determine the 
intersecting degrees between two fuzzy numbers.  
i. Overlap Area (OA) method 
The overlap area (shaded area in Figure 4.12) between a calculated risk and a predefined risk, as a 
fraction of the total area of the total area of the calculated risk, can represent the degree of their 
intersections; that is, 
B
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BA
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,
, =  (4.12) 
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where CA,B is the intersecting degree between fuzzy numbers predefined risk (A) and calculated 
risk (B); OAA,B is the overlap area of A and B; and ARB is the area of calculated risk B; µA(x) and 
µB(x) are the membership functions of risk A and risk B respectively.  
Alternatively, Equation (4.12) can also be written in terms of α-cuts as 
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where aL
α, aR
α, bL
α, and bR
α are the bounds of α-cuts of A and B respectively. 
Equations (4.12) and (4.13) are identical from mathematical point of view and produce the same 
results for compatibility between risks A and B. The difference between the two equations is that 
the latter is based on α-cuts of fuzzy numbers and easier to code in a programming language.  
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Figure 4.12 Compatibility analyses to quantify the degrees of intersection between two fuzzy 
numbers 
ii. Weighted Overlap Area (WOA) method 
In the example shown in Figure 4.13, if the overlap areas, OAA,B and OAA,C, are the same and areas 
of calculated risks B and C (i.e., AB and AC) are also same, then the intersecting degrees of CA,B 
and CA,C, determined by Equation (4.13), are identical. However, risk analysts might be prone to 
believe that calculated risk C is closer to predefined risk (A) than risk B because the most possible 
value of C is closer to A than that of B (Figure 4.13). This indicates that an overlap in higher 
membership values is more preferable to an overlap in a low membership values area.  
 
Figure 4.13 Overlap analyses between fuzzy numbers 
To account for this, an modified compatibility or intersecting degree measure is proposed here. 
This is achieved by considering the weights of membership values in Equation (4.13) 
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where CwA,B is the weighted intersecting degree between fuzzy numbers predefined risk (A) and 
calculated risk (B); α is used as a weighted factor in this equation.  
 (2) Determination of risk levels 
When applying the overlap area method or weighted overlap area method, the degrees of 
intersection between calculated risk and each of the seven predefined risk grades, denoted as CRi,R 
(i=1,…,7), are determined respectively. The closer the calculated risk (R) is to the ith risk grade 
(Ri), the larger CRi,R  is. More specifically, if R satisfies the requirement of Axiom 1, CRi,R  is equal 
to 1 and CRj,R  is 0 for any j=1,…,7 and j≠i. Therefore, degree of the calculated risk belonging to a 
risk grade i (i=1,…,7) can thus be obtained by  
∑
=
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7
1
,
,
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RR
RR
ij
i
i
C
C
r  (j=1,2,…,N) (4.15) 
where rij denotes the degrees of calculated risk j belonging to risk grade i. rij can also be viewed as 
a kind of risk distribution of risk j to risk grade i. Normally, in probability theory, risk distribution 
is defined with respect to a set of points, while risk distribution, in this fuzzy environment, is 
defined on a set of intervals (i.e., risk grades EL,…,EH). This is closer to the real situation of risk 
assessment and can cover the uncertainty due to incomplete data.  
For the example shown in Figure 4.11, risk levels of the flood during summer time are obtained 
by using overlap area method and weighted overlap method respectively. The results are listed in 
Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 Extents to different risk levels determined by OA and WOA respectively 
Risk levels EL VL SL M SH VH EH 
OA 0 0 0.128 0.563 0.288 0.021 0 
WOA 0 0 0.046 0.796 0.157 0.001 0 
OA—Overlay Area method; WOA—Weighted Overlay Area method;  
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Figure 4.14 Graphic representations of extents to different risk levels obtained by OA and WOA 
The above analyses are used in this study to determine the risk levels of hazards to a water supply 
system as shown by Figure 4.1. 
(3) Fuzziness of the risk level 
It is shown that risk levels are defined on seven grades. A risk may have different degrees, 
between 0 and 1, to multiple risk grades simultaneously. This can also be viewed as a fuzzy 
number defined on discrete set, i.e., seven risk grades. In order to evaluate the degree of fuzziness 
of this fuzzy number, a measure proposed by de Luca and Termini (1972) and Zimmermann 
(1991) is adopted in this thesis: 
∑
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where d(A) is the measure of fuzziness; )( iA xµ  is the degree to risk grade i; i denotes the number 
of risk grades, i.e., i=1,…,7; and K is assumed to be 1 in this thesis. 
Based on this equation, measures of fuzziness can be determined for the risk levels shown in 
Table 4.3. The measure of fuzziness of the risk level determined by overlay area method is 1.770, 
while the measure of fuzziness determined by weighted overlay area method is 1.135. This shows 
that the latter evaluation is less uncertain compared with the former. Application of this measure 
of fuzziness will be specifically discussed in Chapter 6.  
4.4.2 Risk Aggregation Using Dempster-Shafer Theory and Fuzzy Sets 
After risk levels of hazards have been determined, this study adopts combination rule of 
Dempster-Shafer theory to aggregate these results on the framework of aggregative risk 
assessment. The main task of Dempster-Shafer theory is to infer the risk of some hypotheses by 
collecting and combining relevant evidence for or against these hypotheses. This study views risk 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
EL VL SL M SH VH EH
OA
WOA
 Risk grades 
Chapter 4 Quantitative Aggregative Risk Assessment of Water Supply Systems 
 103 
levels of hazards as evidence, and risk levels of an object as a hypothesis. The determination of 
the risk levels of an object is thus a process of combining or aggregating the evidence from its 
multiple hazards. Similarly, risk levels of objects are further viewed as evidence to determining 
risk levels of subsystems and the overall water supply system. Therefore, by repeatedly using the 
combination rule on aggregative hierarchical structure, risk levels can be obtained for objects, 
subsystems, and overall system, respectively.  
However, modifications are needed for original combination rule of Dempster-Shafer theory 
before it is applied to this study due to two reasons. Firstly, this study represents basic evidences 
(i.e., risk levels of each hazard) in terms of fuzzy evaluating numbers rather than probabilistic 
numbers. However, original combination is usually conducted on probability numbers. Secondly, 
risk grades are required to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive in Dempster’s original 
combination rule. This requires intervals representing risk grades either in complete conflict (i.e., 
the intersection in null) or not in conflict at all. However, this is not the case in this study. For 
example, risk grades Very low (VL) and Slightly low (SL), described by two fuzzy numbers, are 
neither completely conflicting nor completely intersected, but partially intersected. Special study 
is therefore required to include the degrees of conflict between fuzzy numbers into the 
combination of Dempster-Shafer theory.  
Considering the fuzzy application of Dempster-Shafer theory, many researchers (Zadeh, 1979; 
Ishizuka et al., 1982; Yager, 1982; and Ogawa and Fu, 1985) have conducted the generalisations 
in different ways. However, there are four problems with these extensions recognised by Yen 
(1990) who developed a new approach based on the concept of α-cuts in fuzzy sets theory by 
decomposing fuzzy elements into non-fuzzy elements. Meanwhile, Jeang and Yang (2002) 
developed a method of managing complex fuzzy information with Dempster-Shafer theory by 
analysing relationships between the probability of fuzzy event and its membership functions. 
Yang et al. (2006) also developed a generalised method which can deal with triangular or 
trapezoidal fuzzy numbers. This research adopts critical results of Ishizuka and Yen’s methods to 
modify the original combination rule Dempster-Shafer theory. In the following part, this 
modification is discussed in two parts: (1) degrees of conflict between fuzzy numbers, and (2) 
combination in fuzzy sets theory. 
4.4.2.1 Degrees of Conflict between Fuzzy Numbers 
Normally the intersection between two different fuzzy numbers is a subnormal fuzzy set (Figure 
4.15). It is this subnormal fuzzy set that introduces partial conflict or partial intersection between 
two fuzzy numbers.  
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Figure 4.15 Degrees of conflict between fuzzy sets 
Ishizuka et al. (1982) proposed a measure to evaluate the degree of conflict between these two 
fuzzy sets (i.e., A and B). The measure is determined by 
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where A∩B denotes the intersection of A and B by following fuzzy intersection rule; J(A,B) 
represents the degree of intersection between them. If sets A and B are normal fuzzy sets, that is 
1)(max)(max == xx B
x
A
x
µµ , then 
)(max1),(1 xBAJ BA
x
Iµ−=−  (4.18) 
which is the degree of conflict proposed by Yen (1990). 
4.4.2.2 Combination Rule in Fuzzy Set Theory 
By considering the degree of intersection between two fuzzy numbers, the combination of risk 
levels from two hazards can be determined by 
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where Ri, Rj, and Rk represent predefined risk grades i, j, and k respectively if i, j, and k=1,…,7; 
R14 represents the degree to Θ; Ri (i=8,…,13) represents the partial intersections between two 
adjacent predefined risk categories respectively; m12(Ri) denotes the combined degree to risk level 
i from two hazards 1 and 2; m1(Rj) denotes degree to risk category j from hazard 1; and m2(Rk) 
denotes degree to risk category i from hazard 2; w1 and w2 are the weights of hazards 1 and 2 
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respectively; rj1 is the degree to risk category j of the risk introduced by hazard 1; and rk2 is the 
degree to risk category k of the risk introduced by hazard 2.  
Detailed derivation of the above equation is available in Appendix C.  
The application of the above equation is illustrated by a simple example: “In a water supply 
system, quality of the river is potentially threatened by two hazards, i.e., flood and accidental 
industrial discharge. According to the analysis based on historical data, flood with the return 
period of 10 years has very high influences on the river quality. The possibility of industrial 
charge failure is slight low, while its possible consequence will be extremely high according to 
the industry’s record and experts’ opinion. With these data, what about the risk levels of the river 
under the influences of these two hazards?” 
Firstly likelihoods and severities of the hazards (i.e., flood and industrial discharge) are 
represented in terms of probability number and fuzzy number, respectively (Table 4.4). In this 
example, likelihood of flood is represented by a probability number 0.1; likelihood of accidental 
industrial discharge is represented by a fuzzy number. Risks of these two hazards are obtained 
(Figure 4.16) as the multiplication of relative likelihoods and severities. 
Table 4.4 Inputs for the assumed hazards of flood and industrial discharge 
Hazards Likelihood Severity Risk 
Flood 0.1 Very high (2/3,5/6,1) (0.067, 0.083, 0.1) 
Industrial discharge Slight low (1/6,1/3,0.5) Extremely high (5/6,1,1) (0.14, 0.33, 0.5) 
 
Figure 4.16 Risks caused by hazards of flood and industrial discharge and their relationships with 
predefined risk categories  
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Figure 4.16 shows that both of the risks introduced by flood and industrial discharge do not 
completely intersect with the seven predefined risk grades. Weighted overlay area method is 
adopted here to calculate the risk levels of these two hazard (Table 4.5). Results show that risk of 
flood is less uncertain and belongs to risk levels VL and SL with degrees of 0.04 and 0.96 
respectively, while risk of industrial discharge is more uncertain and has degrees of 0.027, 0.598, 
0.372, and 0.02 to risk levels SL, M, SH, and VH respectively. Suppose weights of flood and 
industrial discharge are 0.4 and 0.6 in this example. Then the combined results are obtained by 
using Equation (4.19). The results are given in Table 4.5 and Figure 4.17. It is shown that the river 
example has degrees of 0.01, 0.359, 0.428, 0.202, and 0.001 to risk levels VL, SL, M, SH, and 
VH, respectively. These values can also be viewed as a risk distribution defined on the seven 
predefined risk grades. For the river, it has highest possible density in risk level M, then are the 
risk levels of SL, SH, VL, and EH in a decreasing order. This also indicates that more evidence 
from hazards support the risk level M, and no evidence supports risk levels of EL and EH.  
Table 4.5 Results of example showing the combination of risk levels from flood and industrial 
discharge 
Risk levels Weight EL VL SL M SH VH EH 
Flood 0.4 0 0.04 0.96 0 0 0 0 
Industrial 0.6 0 0 0.027 0.598 0.373 0.002 0 
Result  0 0.010 0.359 0.428 0.202 0.001 0 
 
 
Figure 4.17 Results of combining risks introduced by flood and industrial discharge 
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4.4.3 Aggregative Risk Levels of Objects 
(1) Determination of risk levels of objects 
Based on above discussions and the framework of aggregative risk assessment (Figure 4.1), a 
process is formed to evaluate risk levels of objects (Figure 4.18).  
 
Figure 4.18 Process of aggregative risk assessment for objects based on fuzzy sets theory and 
Dempster-Shafer theory 
This process firstly determines the risks levels of hazards and then aggregates these values to 
obtain risk levels of failure states and the object by using modified combination rule of Dempster-
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Shafer theory. This is also a general process that can be applied to evaluate the aggregative risk 
levels of all basic components (i.e., water source, water treatment plant, pipe, pump, or tank) in a 
water supply system. This study also codes the process (Figure 4.18) in an object-oriented 
programming language, Visual C++, to facilitate the calculation. 
In order to illustrate the application of the above process, a river under threat of multiple hazards 
is considered here as an example. “There are several hazards that influence the quality of river as 
a water source. Firstly, since the river is in a flooding plain, it is influenced by floods with low 
frequencies (i.e., lower than 1/50) according to historical records and experience. Furthermore, 
an industrial discharging point and a sewage discharge point are along the bank of the river. 
Their improper treatments or operations are two potential hazards to the river quality and 
consequently influence the treating process. In addition, human-related wilful chemical/biological 
contamination is also a potential threat to river quality as suggested by experts and managers. 
Lastly, there are also some regular transporting vehicles on this river. Historical studies show 
that pollutant spills of these vehicles are potentially contaminating the river as well. With respect 
to these above hazards, how about the risk levels of the river?” 
 
Figure 4.19 Aggregative risk assessment of a river example 
Based on the states transition diagrams of river object in Chapter 3, a framework is formed to 
represent aggregative risk assessment of the river example (Figure 4.19). This framework shows 
that flood is related to natural hazard failure state; human-related chemical/biological 
contamination, industrial, and sewage discharges are hazards related to state of human-caused 
failures; and spills from vehicles are related to interdependence failure state of the river. In this 
structure, R is used to denote the risk levels of the river contamination; F1, F2, and F3 are risk 
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levels associated with failure states of natural hazards failure state, human-caused failure state, 
and interdependence respectively; Hij denotes the risk levels of hazard j which is related to failure 
state i. 
In the process of determining aggregative risk of the river, risks associated with these hazards are 
firstly determined in terms of their likelihoods and severities. Here without compromising the 
applicability of proposed method, likelihoods and severities are subjectively assumed and given in 
Table 4.6. In addition, weights factors are also subjectively assumed in this example.  
Table 4.6 Inputting data for the river example 
Object State Hazard Weight Likelihood Severity 
F1 (w1=0.5) H11 w11=1 About 0.02 Very high 
H21 w21=0.4 Slightly low Very high 
H22 w22=0.3 Slightly low Extreme high 
F2 (w2=0.2) 
H23 w23=0.3 Very low Slightly low 
R 
F3 (w3=0.3) H31 w31=1 Very low Medium 
 
Risk levels of hazards are determined (Table 4.7) by using the method discussed in Section 
4.4.1.3. It is obvious that industrial discharge has the highest risk levels compared with other 
hazards, which is followed by sewage discharge, flood, spills, and human-related 
chemical/biological contamination in a decreasing order of risk levels. Then the aggregation is 
conducted to (Figure 4.19) to produce the risk levels of failure states. It is shown that failure state 
related to human factors has the highest levels, which indicates that mitigating measures on 
reducing human-related failures will be more effective to control the river quality than other 
measures. Lastly, by repeating the combination rules, risk levels of river are ultimately obtained. 
It belongs to the risk grades, from EL to SH, with  degrees of 0.1%, 12.9%, 75.3%, 9.7%, and 
1.9%, respectively.  
Further, risk levels of the river distributed on more ranges of risk grades than those of failure 
states and the hazards, which indicates that the evaluation of river is more uncertain than that of 
each failure state or hazard. This is obvious and in accordance with the common sense of risk 
assessment because that there are always more data and information directly supporting the 
evaluations of hazards rather than the evaluations of the river in a practical risk assessment. There 
are two sources contributing to the uncertainty of risk evaluation of the river. One is from the 
incomplete information of hazards; the other is from the conflict multiple sources during the 
process of aggregation. The former uncertainty can be reduced by obtaining more data about the 
hazards, while the latter uncertain can be expected to reduce by modifying the aggregation 
methods. Therefore, the aggregative risk can not only provide general risk levels, but also, 
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indicate uncertainties associated with the evaluations. Both of them are very useful for decision 
makers to optimise their managing and maintenance plans in water supply systems. 
Table 4.7 Risk levels associated with the river example 
Risk 
levels 
EL VL SL M SH VH EH 
Representative 
value 
H11 0 0.119 0.881 0 0 0 0 0.101 
H21 0 0 0.046 0.796 0.158 0 0 0.274 
H22 0 0 0.026 0.598 0.374 0.002 0 0.320 
H23 0.015 0.510 0.464 0.011 0 0 0 0.068 
H31 0.005 0.191 0.753 0.051 0 0 0 0.102 
         
F1 0 0.119 0.881 0 0 0 0 0.101 
F2 0.003 0.119 0.163 0.546 0.168 0 0 0.233 
F3 0.005 0.191 0.753 0.051 0 0 0 0.102 
         
River (R) 0.001 0.129 0.753 0.097 0.019 0 0 0.120 
 
 
Figure 4.20 Risk levels of the river example 
(2) Representative values of risk levels 
Results of aggregative risk assessment provide a kind of risk distribution on predefined risk 
categories for hazards, failure states, or an object (Figure 4.20). With respect to the risk 
distribution, a representative value, similar to expected value in probability distribution, can also 
be obtained by using centroid method proposed by Yager (1980) as 
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where C(Ri) is the centre of fuzzy risk category i; m(Ri) is the degree to risk category i. With both 
the final representative value and risk distributions, risk analysts can obtained a more 
comprehensive view about risks at object levels. Representative risk values of the river example 
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are shown in Table 4.7. The representative value can be used to rank the risk distributions, and 
has been applied in many engineering problems (Sadiq et al., 2004). 
Additionally, since this method can consistently produce risk levels of the elements that are at 
different hierarchical levels, it facilitates different analysts to make risk evaluations on object, its 
failure states, or hazards respectively according to their different requirements. 
4.4.4 Aggregative Risk Levels of Subsystems and System 
Similar to the process of determining risk levels of objects, a process is also formed to determine 
the aggregative risk at system level (Figure 4.21).  
Considering that, the exact hierarchy of whole/part relationship of a water system is closely 
related to its configuration and layout, this study uses a simple distribution network to illustrate 
the process of obtaining aggregative risks at system level (Figure 4.22).  
 
Figure 4.21 Process of aggregative risk assessment at system level based on combination rule of 
Dempster-Shafer theory 
The water distribution network in this example is composed of seven pipes that are under 
corrosion. The hazard causing pipe corrosion is assumed to be the surrounding soil because of its 
high moisture content, chemical content, and electrical resistivity. Although likelihood and 
severity of this hazard can be obtained from physical and statistical models that have been 
developed (Kleiner and Rajoni, 2001; and Rajani and Kleiner, 2001), this thesis subjectively 
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assume these data for this example (Table 4.8) in order to simply the process of obtaining inputs 
data. Here severity denotes the scope of soil corrosion on the external pipe walls or contaminants 
that will be introduced, and likelihood means the frequency of pipe failure due to the soil 
corrosion.  
 
Figure 4.22 Application of Dempster-Shafer theory in a simple distribution system 
Furthermore, since failure of each pipe has different influence to the users in this network, a 
weight factor is used to describe the degrees of this influence. In this example, the importance 
factor of a pipe is determined by the ratio between the reduced water quantity due to the pipe 
failure and the total demand quantity required at user point. The water demanded at the user point 
is assumed 14 L/s in this example network. Water flow rates of the seven pipes are given in Table 
4.8. Then weight of each pipe is determined by  
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where wi denotes the weight of pipe i; and Ci is the importance factor of pipe i. Therefore weight 
factor is a normalised importance factor in this example. There are certainly other methods that 
are applicable to determine weights for the pipes in a distribution network, however, this study 
adopts the above equation to simplify the process of determining the weights. This simplification 
will not compromise the value or usefulness of the aggregation method proposed in this thesis. 
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Table 4.8 Inputs data for the example of distribution example 
Pipe 
No. 
Length 
(m) 
Water flow 
rate (L/s) 
Age 
(years) 
Weight Likelihood Severity 
1 160 8 40 0.22 about 0.1 Medium 
2 80 3 10 0.10 about 0.05 Extremely low 
3 80 3 10 0.10 about 0.05 Extremely low 
4 80 5 15 0.16 about 0.05 Very low 
5 80 5 15 0.16 about 0.05 Very low 
6 320 6 30 0.19 about 0.2 Slightly low 
7 320 6 30 0.19 about 0.2 Slightly low 
 
The linguistic representations about severities (i.e., medium, extremely low, etc.) are represented 
by the fuzzy numbers discussed in Section 4.4.1.2. The fuzzy representations “about 0.1”, “about 
0.05”, and “about 0.2” are represented by triangular fuzzy numbers (0.05,0.1,0.15), (0.0,0.05,0.1), 
and (0.15,0.2,0.25) respectively. Then risks associated with pipe are obtained as the multiplication 
of fuzzy likelihoods and severities (Table 4.9). Finally by aggregating these risks along the 
hierarchical structure (Figure 4.22), risk levels are obtained for the distribution network. 
Table 4.9 Risk levels of pipes and distribution example 
Risk levels EL VL SL M SH VH EH 
Pipe 1 0.008 0.833 0.159 0 0 0 0 
Pipe 2 0.983 0.017 0 0 0 0 0 
Pipe 3 0.983 0.017 0 0 0 0 0 
Pipe 4 0.756 0.244 0 0 0 0 0 
Pipe 5 0.756 0.244 0 0 0 0 0 
Pipe 6 0 0.558 0.442 0 0 0 0 
Pipe 7 0 0.558 0.442 0 0 0 0 
        
Distribution system 0.254 0.551 0.195 0 0 0 0 
 
 
Figure 4.23 Degrees to risk levels of water distribution example 
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The results (Figure 4.23) show that the water distribution system has different degrees, i.e., 
25.4%, 55.1%, and 19.5%, to three risk grades, i.e., EL, VL, and SL respectively, because of the 
risk evidence from its pipes. The distribution system has the highest degree to risk grade VL, then 
are grades of EL and SL. Furthermore, since pipes 1, 6, and 7 have higher weights, that is higher 
influences on users, their risk levels are more dominant in determining the risk levels of the 
distribution system. This thus makes the network have higher degrees to risk grade VL than risk 
grade EL.  
4.5 Potential Applications of Aggregative Risks 
4.5.1 Aggregative Risk Assessment with Time 
In the preceding discussions, the proposed risk assessment only performed static evaluations for 
hazards, objects, subsystems and system so far. However, in practical plan or management of 
water system, managers and engineers would like to know the risk levels of the system at different 
period of time beside current risk levels, which requires a dynamic risk assessment considering 
the time factor. If the changes of likelihoods and/or severities of hazards over time could be 
predetermined by proper models, then the relative risk changes of objects, subsystems and the 
overall water supply system would be determined by repeatedly using the above aggregation 
method (Figure 4.24).  
 
Figure 4.24 Process of dynamic risk analysis of object, subsystem, and the overall water supply 
system 
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4.5.2 Assessment of Water Supply System Using Aggregative Risks 
Aggregative risks have been applied in many problems including risk assessment of software 
(Lee, 1996 and 1999; Chen, 2001; Lee et al., 2003), environmental risk assessment (Sadiq et al., 
2005), water quality failure in water distribution systems (Sadiq et al., 2004), etc. These 
applications imply the potential of aggregative risk in the future research. 
Aggregative risks can also be used as abstract measures to compare water supply systems, 
subsystems, or components from the risk perspective. With the risk distributions and the relative 
representative risk values, risk analysts can have a clear view of which part of the system has 
higher risk levels than others. This will be especially useful in project design and system 
maintenance and rehabilitations with limited budgets.  
Furthermore, aggregative risk can also be viewed as a surrogate measure of representing the status 
of the water system. With this surrogate measure and dynamic analyses, detailed analysis can be 
conducted to study the dynamic characteristics of the system, such as deterioration rate, 
availability of the system, failure rate at a specific time of period. In long terms, aggregative risk 
can serve a basis for benching marking acceptable risk levels in water systems (Sadiq et al., 
2004). 
4.6 Summary and Comments 
4.6.1 Summary 
This chapter discusses the quantitative evaluation of aggregative risk assessment of water supply 
system by using fuzzy sets theory and Dempster-Shafer theory. The proposed method has the 
following characteristics: 
• The method can deal with data from multiple sources that are represented in various 
forms including probabilistic data, linguistic variables, etc. by converting them to fuzzy 
numbers. With fuzzy representation of these input data, aggregative risk assessment can 
be conducted to evaluate the risk levels of components, subsystem, and overall water 
supply system respectively.  
• Direct results of this method is a kind of risk distribution which describes the degrees to 
predefined risk grades. Associated with this distribution, a representative aggregative risk 
value is also proposed in this study. The risk distribution and representative value 
together give a more comprehensive view of risk levels.  
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• The aggregative risk assessment can be performed at different hierarchical levels with this 
method. The combination rule is applied consistently at both object and system levels to 
obtain the risk levels. Different users can easily obtain the risk information according to 
the specific concern and requirements.  
4.6.2 Comments 
However there are several points needed to studied further in the future research: 
• The methods of determining likelihood and severity are required to specifically study for 
each hazard in the water supply system so that the inputting data for this method are more 
reliable and suitable for the real cases.  
• Weights also requires specific study by using proper methods. In practice, many factors 
such as costs, maximum flow rate, objectives of the water usage, hydraulic behaviours of 
the system, etc. will influence the determination for the weights factors for hazards, 
components, and subsystems. Therefore, the determination of weights can be performed 
in further work based on methods such as hydraulic simulation, cost analysis, etc.  
• The risk assessment is limited to single component failure or hazard occurring at a time. 
However, the assessment of simultaneous failures of components and hazards should be 
further studied in the future work because the consequences of simultaneous failures are 
usually more serious. 
• Risk assessment proposed in this thesis is limited to steady state condition. However, time 
dependent analysis is required in the further study. 
• Results of this chapter is only approximate because the vulnerabilities or the influences of 
component failures were not considered using hydraulic and other simulation models, 
which makes assessment rather subjective. Therefore, further work is required to 
overcome this limitations by including vulnerabilities explicitly.  
• Based on the object-oriented concepts, complex objects such as subsystems and the 
overall water supply system can be viewed as an self-contained unit, i.e., they can be 
viewed as abstract functional components as well. The aggregative risk results obtained in 
this research can be viewed a surrogate measure representing the risk property of the 
abstract component/object. Therefore, extensive applications of this surrogate measure is 
deserved .a further study. 
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CHAPTER 
5  
Quantitative Fault Tree Analysis of Water Supply 
Systems 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter studies the quantitative solution of the fault trees developed in Chapter 3 in order to 
quantitatively evaluate the cause-effect relationships in a water supply system (Figure 5.1). 
However, conventional probabilistic methods cannot be directly adopted in this study because the 
inputting data are not only represented in terms of probabilistic numbers but also fuzzy numbers. 
Therefore, fuzzy fault tree analysis is discussed in this thesis. Fuzzy numbers are used to represent 
the likelihood of occurrence of basic events which are at the bottom level of the fault tree. After 
that fuzzy fault tree analysis is performed to generate the quantitative results for the likelihood of 
occurrence of the top event.  
Even fuzzy fault tree analysis has been applied extensively in many engineering problems, it is 
still necessary for this study to consider special characteristics of water supply systems. One of 
the most important characteristics is failure dependencies in a water system. This indicates that 
the failure of a component in a water supply system can be either independent or dependent on the 
failure of another component. Therefore, the fault tree analyses are required to simultaneously 
consider independency and dependency in the process of risk assessment. However, few studies 
have ever considered the fuzzy information and dependencies so far. This study proposes a 
method that can deal with both fuzzy information and dependencies.  
Firstly, in risk scenarios where component failures are independent, a fuzzy evaluation method is 
formed by extending conventional probabilistic techniques to fuzzy domain. A fuzzy number, 
instead of a normal probability number is ultimately obtained for the top event of a fault tree. 
Secondly, in risk scenarios where component failures are dependent in a certain degree, a 
dependency factor is introduced to simply and approximately evaluate this dependency in a fault 
tree analysis.  
Chapter 5 Quantitative Fault Tree Analysis of Water Supply Systems 
 
 118 
 
Figure 5.1 Quantitative methods used to evaluate the fault trees of the water supply system 
Besides the likelihood of the top event, another useful result of fault tree analysis is importance 
measure for basic event that represents the risk or uncertainty contribution of the basic event to 
the risk or uncertainty of the top event. This importance measure is useful to rank the basic risk 
factors and therefore support the risk analysts to make decision in water supply systems. This 
study considers both risk and uncertainty importance measures associate with each basic event.  
In this chapter, Section 5.2 introduces basic concepts and reviews the methods about fuzzy fault 
tree analysis. After that, it proposes a method of fuzzy fault tree analysis based on α-cut sets. 
Section 5.3 discusses the methods of analysing failure dependencies among basic events in a fault 
tree by considering dependence factor. Section 5.4 discusses the methods of determining the fuzzy 
importance and fuzzy uncertainty importance of a basic event in a fault tree. Based on the 
methods proposed above, Section 5.5 illustrates the application of fuzzy fault tree analysis at both 
component and system levels. Lastly, Section 5.6 gives the summaries and comments. An explicit 
illustration of the structure of this chapter is available in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2 Structure of developing quantitative methods for fault trees of water systems 
5.2 Basics of Fuzzy Fault Tree Analysis  
5.2.1 Traditional Fault Tree Analysis  
Traditionally, it is always assumed that the basic events contained in a fault tree are independent 
and could be represented as probabilistic numbers. With this assumption, quantitative analysis of 
fault trees are usually performed by considering two cases: (1) fault trees without repeated event, 
and (2) fault trees with repeated events (Andrews and Moss, 2002; Henley and Kumamoto, 1981). 
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(1) Fault trees without repeated events 
In the event that the fault tree for a top event T contains independent basic events which appear 
only once in the tree structure, the top event probability can be obtained by working the basic 
event probabilities up through the tree. In doing this, intermediate gate event (“and” or “or”) 
probabilities are calculated by starting at the base of the tree and working upwards until the top 
event probability is obtained.  
 
Figure 5.3 Symbols representations of “and” and “or” events in fault trees 
For an “and” gate event, its probability is determined by  
∏
=
=
n
i
ipP
1
 (5.1) 
where P is the probability of “and” event; pi denotes the failure probability of basic event i; and n 
is the number of basic events associated with the “and” gate. 
For an “or” gate event, its probability is determined by  
∏
=
−−=
n
i
ipP
1
)1(1  (5.2) 
where P is the probability of “or” event; pi denotes the failure probability of basic event i; and n is 
the number of basic events associated with the “or” gate. 
(2) Fault trees with repeated events 
When fault trees have basic events which appear more than once, the methods most often used to 
obtain the top event probability utilise the minimal cut sets. A minimal cut set is a collection of 
basic events. If all these events occur, the top event is guaranteed to occur; however, if any basic 
event does not occur, the top event will not occur. Therefore, if a fault tree has nC minimal cut sets 
Ki, i=1,…, nC then the top event exists if at least one minimal cut set exists, i.e., 
U
C
C
n
i
in KKKKT
1
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An approximate evaluation of this is determined by 
∏
=
−−=≤
Cn
i
iKPTPTP
1
max )](1[1)()(  (5.3) 
where P(Ki) is the occurrence probability of minimal cut set i. This equation gives a conservative 
approximation of the likelihood of top event. Detailed derivation of Equation (5.3) can be found 
in Appendix D.  
5.2.2 Fuzzy Fault Tree Analysis 
However, it is often difficult to precisely describe the likelihoods of all hazards in terms of 
probability number in practice. Both probabilistic and fuzzy variables are inevitably used in a risk 
assessment. Such a situation challenges the application of conventional fault tree analysis which is 
based on probabilistic theory. Therefore a new formalism is required to capture the fuzzy and 
imprecision of likelihoods of multiple hazards.  
With respect to this inadequacy of the conventional fault tree analysis, extensive research has 
been performed by using fuzzy sets theory in fault tree analysis. The pioneering work on this 
belongs to Tanaka et al. (1983), which treated probabilities of basic events as trapezoidal fuzzy 
numbers, and applied the fuzzy extension principle to determine the probability of top event. 
Based on Tanaka’s work, further extensive research has been performed (Misra and Weber, 1990; 
Liang and Wang, 1993). Another variation of fuzzy fault tree analysis was given by Misra and 
Weber (1989). Their analysis is based on possibility distribution associated with the basic events 
and a fuzzy algebra for combining these events. Parallel with this, Singer (1990) analysed fuzzy 
reliability by using L-R type fuzzy numbers. In order to facilitate the calculation of Singer’s 
method, Cheng and Mon (1993) and Chen (1994) proposed revised methods to analyse the fault 
trees by specifically considering the failure probabilities of basic events as triangular fuzzy 
numbers. In addition to the above studies, Onisawa (1988) proposed a method of using error 
possibility to analyse human reliability in a fault tree. By combining with Onisawa’s work, Lin 
and Wang (1997) developed a hybrid method which can simultaneously deal with probability and 
possibility measures in a fault tree analysis. Dong and Yu (2005) used the hybrid method to 
analyse failure probability of oil and gas transmission pipelines. Sawer and Rao (1994), applied α-
cuts to determine the failure probability of the top event in fuzzy fault trees of mechanical 
systems. Cai et al. (1991) and Huang et al. (2004) adopted possibility theory to analyse fuzzy 
fault trees. Shu et al. (2006) used intuitionistic fuzzy methods to analyse fault trees on printed 
circuit board assembly.  
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Meanwhile, different methods have also been proposed to determine the importance of each basic 
event in a fuzzy fault tree by using fuzzy importance measures (Tanaka et al., 1983; Furuta and 
Shiraishi, 1984; Suresh et al., 1996; Guimarẽes and Ebecken, 1999). 
It is obvious from the above reviews that fuzzy fault tree analysis has been extensively studied for 
a long time and effectively applied to many engineering problems. However, its application in 
risk assessment of water system is still scarce and rarely considered. This research specifically 
discusses the application of fuzzy fault tree analysis in risk assessment of water supply systems.  
(1) Fuzzy fault trees without repeated events 
To obtain a quantitative evaluation, α-cuts are adopted to extend methods of conventional fault 
tree to the fuzzy fault trees. This method has several advantages to analyse fuzzy information in 
fault trees: (1) it is a kind of extensive method of many existing methods (such as Tanaka’s and 
Singer’s methods), which makes it easily used in many practical engineering systems including 
water supply systems; (2) it can deal with basic events with different membership functions (Mon 
and Cheng, 1994); and (3) it is easy to code into computer programmes, which thus facilitates the 
calculations on complex fault trees.  
As mentioned in Chapter 4, every fuzzy number can be equivalently represented by its α-cut sets. 
Given each α, there is an interval of confidence for the fuzzy number (Kaufmann and Gupta, 
1991), and calculation of fuzzy numbers can be thus based on this interval of confidence. For 
example, if a parallel system has n components whose failure probabilities are represented by n 
fuzzy numbers, then there are n intervals associated with each value of α: [p1α
L, p1α
R],…, and [pnα
L, 
pnα
R]. Extending conventional fault tree analysis to fuzzy analysis is thus a process of extending 
the conventional calculation on probability numbers to calculation on probability intervals. 
Details of calculation on intervals are available in Appendix B. This extension is illustrated by the 
following parallel and serial systems.  
i. Parallel system 
Since the failure of the parallel system occurs when all the n component fail, the failure 
probability of the system is determined by performing the multiplication of n intervals 
],[ RL ppp ααα ∈  
∏∏
==
==
n
i
R
i
R
n
i
L
i
L pppp
11
; αααα  (5.4) 
where pα is the α-cut set of the parallel system; piα is the α-cut set of component i in the system. 
pα
L and pα
R denote the lower bound and upper bound of the interval of the system, respectively; 
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and piα
L and piα
R denote the lower bound and upper bound of the interval of component i 
respectively.  
The difference between Equation (5.1) and Equation (5.4) is that the former is calculated on 
probability numbers, while the latter is calculated on intervals. By performing the calculation on 
all intervals’ values, i.e., α from 0 to 1, the fuzzy failure probability of the parallel system is 
ultimately obtained. This is equivalent to the “and” gate in the fault trees (Figure 5.3).  
ii. Serial system 
Similarly a serial system composed of n components will be failed if any one of the components 
fails. The failure probability of the system can be represented as an “or” gate in fault tree analysis. 
By performing calculations on intervals, the system failure probability can be represented as 
∏∏
==
−−=−−=
n
i
R
i
R
n
i
L
i
L pppp
11
)1(1;)1(1 αααα  (5.5) 
After determining the intervals of all values of α, i.e., from 0 to 1, the fuzzy failure probability of 
an “or” gate in a fuzzy fault tree is obtained. 
Since the failure likelihoods of basic events are represented by fuzzy numbers, it is obvious that 
the output (i.e., failure likelihood of top event) is also a fuzzy number according to equations (5.4) 
and (5.5). This is different from the probabilistic values determined by equations (5.1) and (5.2) in 
conventional fault tree analysis.  
(2) Fuzzy fault trees with repeated events 
Even fuzzy fault tree analysis has been studied for decades of years, the repeated events have been 
rarely considered in fuzzy fault trees. In order to deal with this repeated basic events, this study 
develops a method applicable to this problem by extending conventional analysis to fuzzy 
domain. In conventional analysis, failure likelihood of the top event in a fault tree with repeated 
events is approximately evaluated by its upper bound (Equation (5.3)). Therefore, it is 
straightforward that, failure likelihood of top event in fuzzy fault trees with repeated events can 
also be approximately evaluated by its maximum value. Here the difference with conventional 
methods is that the maximum value is also a fuzzy number rather than a crisp probability. 
Therefore, based on α–cut sets Equation (5.3) can be extended to fuzzy sets and represented by 
intervals as 
],[],[ Ru
L
u
RL pppp αααα ≤  (5.6) 
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where pα
L and pα
R denote the interval of the top event associated with each confidence level α; puα
L 
and puα
R represent an interval which is the upper bound of the top event. puα
L and puα
R are 
determined by 
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where NC denotes the number of the minimal cut sets in the fuzzy fault tree; piα
L and piα
R denote 
the interval which is the upper bound of the basic event i. 
 
Figure 5.4 Examples of fuzzy fault trees without and with repeated events 
 
Figure 5.5 Results of top events with and without repeated basic events by using fuzzy fault tree 
analysis 
Here, two simple examples (Figure 5.4) are given to explicitly explain the evaluations of fault 
trees without and with repeated events respectively. Suppose that failure probabilities of all basic 
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events are “about 0.5” and represented by triangular fuzzy number (0.4, 0.5, 0.6). The analysed 
results of these two examples are shown in Figure 5.5. In the fuzzy fault tree without repeated 
events, events B and C are connected by an “and” gate, which is in turn connected with event A 
by an “or” gate. By using the equations (5.4) and (5.5), the likelihood of the top event, also a 
fuzzy number, is obtained. In the fuzzy fault tree with repeated events (i.e., event B in this 
example), its top failure likelihood is approximately determined by its maximum value. In this 
example, there are 3 minimal cut sets (i.e., A, B “and” C, and B “and” D). By using equations 
(5.6) and (5.7), the conservative approximation is obtained to represent the failure likelihood of 
top event in a fault tree with repeated event. 
5.3 Dependency in Fuzzy Fault Tree Analysis 
In some risk assessment of water supply systems, failure dependency is very important because it 
reflects the real situations of risk scenarios. For example, in a water supply system with multiple 
sources, say a river and a reservoir, contamination of the river will influence the contamination of 
the reservoir during flood season. Therefore, contamination of the river would increase the 
likelihood of contamination of the reservoir. With respect to this, dependency should be 
considered during the fault tree analysis of contamination of water sources in the water supply 
system.  
Failure dependency has been considered in other engineering problems in the literature. Onisawa 
(1988) and Misra and Weber (1989) proposed two different methods of using conditional 
possibility to solve this problem respectively. In Onisawa’s method, error possibility was used to 
represent the human error, based on which the dependency between consecutive human tasks is 
considered for both parallel and serial tasks. The fuzzy causal relations, which represent the 
dependence between human tasks, are required to be explicitly known before analysis with this 
method. In Misra’s method, a factor for modelling dependency between events is used. Based on 
this factor and possibility operations, the conditional possibility was simply determined to 
represent the dependences in a fault tree.  
In this research, dependence factor, d, is adopted and the calculation is based on α-cut sets of 
fuzzy numbers. d can be either a crisp number or a fuzzy number in practical applications. If d 
equals zero, it means that no dependencies exist among basic events. If d equals 1, it indicates 
complete dependencies or perfect dependencies. With dependence factor d, conjunction of two 
events, say A and B, can be determined by 
)()|()( BpBApBAp =I  
)()1()|( ApddBAp −+=  
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Therefore, 
)())](1)(1(1[)()]()1([)( BpApdBpApddBAp −−−=−+=I  (5.8) 
where d is the dependence of event A occurs given that event B has happened. This equation 
represents a simplified approximation of real-world dependencies among failure events.  
For disjunction of two events A and B, in which occurrence of A depends on B with a degree of d, 
its probability can be derived as follow 
)]()1(1)][(1[1
)]()1()[()()(
)()()()(
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−+−+=
−+= IU
 (5.9) 
Based on equations (5.8) and (5.9), )( BAp I  is equal to p(A)p(B) if d is zero and )( BAp U  is 
equal to 1-(1-p(A))(1-p(B)), which is the case that A and B are independent with each other. If d 
increases to unity, )( BAp I  will be p(B)=min(p(A), p(B)) and )( BAp U  will be 
p(A)=max(p(A), p(B)), which is the case of complete dependency. This therefore indicates that the 
value of failure likelihood of top event changes with the variations of dependence factor and is 
constrained in the following intervals. 
[ ]))(),(min(),()()( BpApBpApBAp ∈I  
[ ]))(1))((1(1)),(),(max()( BpApBpApBAp −−−∈U  (5.10) 
Since probability of basic events A, B, and dependence factor can be fuzzy numbers, equations 
(5.8), (5.9), and (5.10) should be determined by using fuzzy arithmetic and fuzzy sets operations. 
The relative equations based on α-cuts are summarised in Table 5.1. 
The above method can be demonstrated by examples in two possible cases, i.e., the dependence 
degree can be predetermined and cannot be predetermined. In the first case, Figure 5.4a is taken 
as an example in which the failure of event B has influences on the failure of event C. The 
dependence degree is assumed high and represented by a fuzzy number (0.6, 0.7, 0.8). Failure 
probabilities of basic event are “about 0.5” and represented by a fuzzy number (0.4, 0.5, 0.6). The 
analysing results of fault trees both without and with dependency are shown in Figure 5.6 to give 
a comparison. As failure of event C is partially dependent on event B, the intersection of these 
two events will be increased based on equation (5.10). Thus the ultimate result of the fault tree is 
also increased. Analysed result (Figure 5.6a) agrees with this, which shows that the proposed 
method in this study reasonably reflects the dependencies in fault trees.  
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Table 5.1 Basic equations representing dependencies in fuzzy fault trees 
Dependence degree Event Equations 
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In the second case, Figure 5.4b is selected as an example in which the failure of event B has 
influence on event C. But the dependence degree is hard to be determined, i.e., dependence degree 
cannot be represented by a crisp or fuzzy number. Failure probabilities of basic events are also 
assumed to be “about 0.5” in this case. To obtain the final results of the top event, equations in 
Table 5.1 are applied. An interval of fuzzy numbers is obtained to represent the failure likelihood 
of top event (Figure 5.4b). The real likelihood of the top event is in the area constrained by the 
lower and upper bounds.  
 
Figure 5.6 Results of fuzzy fault trees with dependent events 
From the object-oriented point of view, dependencies among components in a water supply 
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show closer interrelationships, or higher likelihood of inflow hazards introduced by other 
components/objects. Even though inter-component linkages are not specially considered in object-
oriented whole/part relationships, fault trees are able to analyse the influences of inter-component 
linkage explicitly. Therefore, considering both aggregative risk and fault tree analysis together is 
expected to give a more comprehensive view of the risks in a water supply system.  
5.4 Importance Measures in Fuzzy Fault Trees  
Besides the likelihood of top event, another useful result of fault tree analysis is the importance of 
each basic event. The importance is used to represent the risk contribution of each basic event to 
the occurrence of the top event, and thus viewed as useful information for risk-related decision 
makings. Extensive research has been carried out to determine the importance of basic events in 
fuzzy fault trees. Tanaka et al. (1983) defined an improvement index to evaluate the importance 
of each basic event. Furuta and Shiraishi (1984) used representative value of fuzzy membership 
function to calculate the importance. Liang and Wang (1993) used ranking values to evaluate 
fuzzy importance index. Suresh et al. (1996) applied Euclidean distance to determine fuzzy 
importance measure and fuzzy uncertainty importance measure, which was further improved by 
Guimarẽes and Ebecken (1999).  
This research adopts the method based on Euclidean distance to obtain fuzzy importance measure 
and fuzzy uncertainty importance measure for the basic event in a fault tree. Fuzzy importance 
measure is used to evaluate the contribution of a basic event to the top event in a fuzzy fault tree. 
It is useful for the analysts to identify the priorities of components from the point of view of fault 
tree structure. While fuzzy uncertainty importance measure is used to evaluate the contribution of 
uncertainty from a basic event to the top event in a fuzzy fault tree. It plays an important role in 
the reduction of uncertainty because it identifies the sources of uncertainty having greatest impact 
on the uncertainty of the top event.  
5.4.1 Fuzzy Importance Measure 
Suppose that the likelihood of top event in a fault tree can be represented by 
),...,,,,...,( 111 niii pppppfp +−=  
where p denotes the likelihood of top event in a fault tree; pi (i=1,…,n) represents the failure 
likelihood of basic event in a fault tree; n is the number of basic components; f(•) denotes the 
structure function of the fault tree to determine the likelihood of top event. 
The likelihood of top event by making the component “i” fully unavailable (i.e., pi=1) is 
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),...,,1,,...,( 1111 niii ppppfp +−= =  (5.11) 
Similarly when the component “i” is fully functioning, the likelihood of the top event is 
),...,,0,,...,( 1110 niii ppppfp +−= =  (5.12) 
The total contribution of component “i” to the top event is thus the difference between pi=1 and 
pi=0 and is called Birnbaum importance (Suresh et al., 1996; Andrews and Moss, 2002). However, 
in fuzzy fault tree analysis where the likelihoods of basic events are fuzzy numbers, point estimate 
that is used in conventional fault trees is challenged and not easy to be applied. In order to deal 
with this, Euclidean distance is proposed (Suresh et al., 1996) to determine the importance 
measure of components in a fuzzy fault tree analysis, which is defined as 
),( 01 === iii ppEDI  
( ) ( )( )∑ ====== −+−=
α
αααα
2/12
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2
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R
i
L
i
L
iii ppppppED  (5.13) 
where Ii is the importance measure of components i; ED(pi=1, pi=0) is the Euclidean distance 
between two fuzz numbers pi=1 and pi=0; 
L
ip α,1=  and 
R
ip α,1=  are the lower and upper bounds of the 
interval associated with confidence level α when component “i” is fully unavailable; 
L
ip α,0=  and 
R
ip α,0=  are the lower and upper bounds of the interval associated with confidence level α when 
component “i” is full functioning.  
Furthermore, if the fuzzy fault trees have dependent events but the dependence degrees cannot be 
predetermined, the relative Euclidean distances can be determined for the upper and lower bounds 
of the top event respectively. Then the final importance measure is calculated as the average value 
of these two Euclidean distances in this research. Therefore, it is determined by 
2/)),(),(( 0,1,0,1, ==== += ililiuiui ppEDppEDI  (5.14) 
where ED(pu,i=1, pu,i=0) and ED(pl,i=1, pl,i=0) are the Euclidean distances associated with the upper 
and lower bounds of top event respectively.  
5.4.2 Fuzzy Uncertainty Importance Measure 
Fuzzy uncertainty importance measure is adopted to identify the components which contribute 
maximum uncertainty to the uncertainty of the top event and is defined as 
),( ii ppEDU =  (5.15) 
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where Ui is the uncertainty importance measure of component i; pi is the likelihood of top event if 
the failure probability of component i is a crisp value, i.e., no uncertainty with this value.  
If the fuzzy fault trees have dependent events but the dependence degrees cannot be 
predetermined, uncertainty measures can be determined for upper and lower bounds of the top 
event respectively. Then the final uncertainty importance measure is calculated as the average 
value of these two distances in this research. Therefore, it is determined by 
2/)),(),(( ,, illiuui ppEDppEDU +=  (5.16) 
where ED(pu , pu,i) and ED(pl, pl,i) are the uncertainty importance measures associated with upper 
and lower bounds of top event respectively.  
The applications of the above importance measures can be illustrated by several examples: (1) 
Example 1 (Figure 5.4a) in which basic events are independent; (2) Example 2 (Figure 5.4b) in 
which basic events are independent, but repeated events are included; (3) Example 3 (Figure 5.4a) 
in which event C is partially dependent on event B with a fuzzy degree of high (0.6, 0.7, 0.8); and 
(4) Example 4 (Figure 5.4b) in which event C is partially dependent on event B, but the 
dependence degree cannot be predetermined. The analysed results of the four examples are listed 
in Table 5.2.  
Table 5.2 Importance measures for four examples  
Example Events 
Fuzzy 
importance 
Rank 
Fuzzy uncertainty 
importance 
Rank 
A 11.65 1 0.58 1 
B 3.83 2 0.19 2 
Example 1 
C 3.83 2 0.19 2 
A 8.83 1 0.44 1 
B 5.76 2 0.28 2 
C 2.87 3 0.14 3 
Example 2 
D 2.87 3 0.14 3 
A 9.00 1 0.45 1 
B 6.55 2 0.33 2 
Example 3 
C 1.17 3 0.06 3 
A 7.40 1 0.37 1 
B 5.76 2 0.26 2 
C 2.87 3 0.15 3 
Example 4 
D 2.40 4 0.12 4 
 
Results show that in Example 1 event A has the highest importance, and events B and C have the 
same importance values which are lower than that of event A. In Example 2, event A has the 
highest importance, event B has the second highest importance, while event C and D have the 
lowest importance value. Since event B is a repeated event in this example, its importance value is 
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higher than those of events C and D. In Example 3, event A has the highest importance, event B is 
in the second place while event C is the lowest in importance. Analysed results of this example 
are different from those of example 1 because of the failure dependency between basic events B 
and C in this example. Considering that event B influences the occurrence of event C with certain 
degree, importance of event B is higher than that of event C as shown by the results. In Example 
4, event A has the highest importance value; event B is in second place followed by event C, and 
event D has the lowest value. The importance value of event C in Example 4 is higher that in 
Example 2 because of the failure dependency.  
5.5 Applications of Fuzzy Fault Trees in Water Supply Systems 
With the above quantitative methods and fault tree structures developed in Chapter 3, it is thus 
possible to evaluate the cause-effect relationships of risks in water supply systems. The whole 
evaluation process is divided into two steps: (1) fuzzy fault tree analysis for components; and (2) 
fuzzy fault tree analysis for system, which is discussed in detail in the following part.  
Furthermore, considering that both repeated events and dependencies influence the evaluation of 
fuzzy fault trees, it is necessary to identify them before the quantitative evaluation. A diagram is 
therefore formed to show the process of fuzzy fault tree analysis (Figure 5.7). Associated with 
each situation in the diagram, different equations discussed above are used to produce quantitative 
evaluations for the fault tree. By following this diagram, fuzzy fault tree can be performed at both 
component and system levels. 
5.5.1 Quantitative Analysis of Fault Trees for Components 
The fault tree structures, developed in Chapter 3, can now be quantitatively evaluated by using 
fuzzy fault tree analysis. The river example considered in Section 4.4.3 is also used here to 
demonstrate the process of fuzzy fault tree analysis at component level (Figure 5.8). In this figure, 
R denotes the contamination of the river, which is the top event of the fault tree. F1, F2, and F3 
denote the failure states of natural hazard, human-caused threat, and interdependencies 
respectively. H11 is the hazard of flood; H21, H22, and H23 are hazards of sewage discharge, 
industrial discharge, and human wilful chemical/biological contamination respectively; and H31 is 
the hazard of pollutant spills from vehicles on the river.  
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Figure 5.7 Diagram of fuzzy fault trees at both component and water system levels 
 
Figure 5.8 Fuzzy fault tree analysis for contamination of the river example 
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The fault tree of river contamination does not contain any repeated events and failure 
dependencies, therefore, Equations (5.4) and (5.5) are used according the process in Figure 5.7. 
Inputs of the analysis, i.e., likelihoods of these hazards, are given in Table 4.6, and the result is 
shown in Figure 5.9. Importance measures are calculated for this fault tree by using Equations 
(5.13) and (5.15). 
 
Figure 5.9 Fuzzy likelihood of the top event shown in Figure 5.8 
Table 5.3 Importance measures of the river example in Figure 5.8 
Hazards Fuzzy importance Rank 
Fuzzy uncertainty 
importance 
Rank 
H11 5.87 3 0.16 5 
H21 6.57 1 0.59 1 
H22 6.57 1 0.59 1 
H23 5.34 4 0.48 3 
H31 5.34 4 0.48 3 
 
The results show that the likelihood of top event is about 0.75 and constrained in the range of 
[0.41, 0.92] (Figure 5.9). Among the basic events, failures of sewage discharge and industrial 
discharge (i.e., H21 and H22 respectively) have the highest importance values (Table 5.3), which 
indicates that they contribute most to river contamination from the perspective of likelihood. 
Vehicle spills (H31) and human chemical/biological (H23) contamination have the lowest 
importance values and contribute least to the river contamination. For the uncertainty associated 
the top event, sewage and industrial discharges give the highest contributions, while flood has the 
lowest contribution to the uncertainty. With respect these results, risk analysts can have clear idea 
that effective mitigation measures should be those that can reduce the likelihoods of sewage and 
industrial charges so that the river contamination can be effectively controlled.  
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5.5.2 Quantitative Analysis of Fuzzy Fault Trees for System 
After the failure likelihoods of components have been determined, the likelihood of a subsystem 
or the overall water supply system risk can be obtained by analysing the fault trees associated 
with subsystems and the overall system. In the fault trees for water systems, failure likelihoods of 
components are viewed as basic events in this research. This can be explained by an example. 
 
Figure 5.10 Fuzzy fault tree analysis for a small water distribution network with no water 
delivered to user 
The small water distribution network is composed of seven pipes (Figure 5.10). Fault tree 
structure of no water flow at user side can be obtained from Figure 3.31. In this fault tree, the 
failure likelihoods of pipes are evaluated by fuzzy probabilities as (0.15, 0.2, 0.3), i.e., the failure 
likelihood of each pipe is about 0.2 and limited in 0.15 and 0.3. Meanwhile failure of pipe 5 is 
assumed to depend on pipe 6 with a degree of about 0.4 (0.3, 0.4, 0.5). Since there are repeated 
events in this fault trees (such as failures of pipe 2, pipe 3 and pipe 5), approximation equations 
(equations (5.6) and (5.7)) are used in this example to determine the risk likelihood of the top 
event. From the fault tree structure, six minimum cut sets are identified, i.e., {1}, {2,3}, {2,6}, 
{5,6}, {3,4,5}, and {7}, based on which the likelihood of top event (Figure 5.11) and importance 
of each basic event can be obtained (Table 5.4). 
Table 5.4 Importance measures of example fault trees shown in Figure 3.31 
Pipe Fuzzy importance Rank  Fuzzy uncertainty importance Rank 
1 9.92 1 0.35 1 
2 3.12 4 0.13 4 
3 1.97 5 0.08 5 
4 0.35 7 0.02 7 
5 1.39 6 0.06 6 
6 5.60 3 0.24 3 
7 9.92 1 0.35 1 
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Figure 5.11 The likelihood of top event of example fault tree shown in Figure 3.31 
The results show that the likelihood of top event is about 0.48 and constrained in the range of 
[0.35, 0.68] (Figure 5.11). Among the basic events, failures of pipes 1 and 7 have the highest 
importance values, which indicates that pipes 1 and 7 are ranked as most important components in 
the distribution network. Pipes 6, 2, 3, 5, and 4 are ranked as second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth 
most important components to the risk of no water at user point respectively. These results also 
indicate that mitigation measure should be taken on pipes 1, 7, and 6 so that the likelihood of the 
top event can be effectively reduced. Since pipe 4 has little influence on the top event, mitigation 
measures on this pipe will not improve the reliability of the network dramatically. 
5.6 Summary and Comments 
5.6.1 Summary 
This chapter discusses the methods of quantitative fault tree analysis based on which the cause-
effect relationships of risks are assessed. Fuzzy sets theory is adopted in this research to analyse 
the issues associated with fault trees such as repeated events and dependencies among basic 
events. The proposed in this chapter has the following characteristics: 
• The method can deal with both precise data and fuzzy data which are usually used to 
represent likelihood of different hazards in practice. Therefore it is applicable to assess 
the risks of water supply systems influenced by hazards with multiple forms.  
• Repeated events in fault trees are considered in the proposed method. In a fault tree with 
repeated events, the likelihood of top event is approximately evaluated by its upper 
bounds.  
• Dependencies among failure evens are considered in the proposed method. A simple and 
approximate method is discussed in this research by using dependence degrees.  
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• Both fuzzy importance measure and fuzzy uncertainty importance measure are considered 
in the proposed method. Fuzzy importance measure is used to evaluate the contributions 
of basic events. Fuzzy uncertainty importance measure is used to evaluate the 
contributions of  uncertainties from basic events.  
5.6.2 Comments 
However there are several points needed to studied further: 
• The inputs likelihood of basic events are assumed in this study. In the future research, it is 
required to develop the methods of determining the likelihood of each hazard. 
• The fault tree structure developed so far are not reflecting the vulnerability of each 
component in water supply systems. The influence of vulnerability to fault tree analysis is 
expected to be studied in the future. 
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CHAPTER 
6  
Applications of Object-Oriented Risk Assessment in 
Water Supply Systems 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter discusses the applications of the method developed in this study to an assumed water 
supply system. Since the main purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the risk assessment of the 
developed methods, it is feasible to adopt a virtual water supply system to illustrate the process of 
aggregative risk assessment and fault tree analysis. Although most of the inputs are subjectively 
assumed in this study, it is developed based on the consideration of real water supply systems. All 
the information provided in this example (i.e., data of nodes and links in Section 6.1.1) operates 
normally in the simulation software (i.e., EPANET), which indicates that the assumptions in this 
case are realistic. 
There are three important aspects that need to be discussed before conducting the risk assessment, 
i.e., basic information of the water supply system, potential hazards, and objectives of the risk 
assessment. In the following parts, Section 6.1.1 introduces the basic information of the system. 
Then Section 6.1.2 analyses the potential hazards associated with each component in the system. 
At last, Section 6.1.3 states the objectives of risk assessment for this assumed water supply 
system.  
6.1.1 Assumed Water Supply System 
The assumed water supply system is composed of water sources, water treatment plant, and water 
distribution network (Figure 6.1). There are three water sources, i.e., a river, a reservoir, and a 
group of wells supplying raw water to a water treatment plant by transmission pipes or channel. 
After raw water is treated in the water treatment plant, it is pumped to a water distribution 
network which is composed of 29 pipes and 22 water demand nodes.  
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Figure 6.1 Layout of the assumed water supply system in this study 
In this example, water distribution network is also a complex system that is neither serial nor 
parallel (Figure 6.2). To analyse this complex network, basic data about nodes and pipes are given 
and listed in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2, respectively. Then, hydraulic simulation is performed in 
EPANET (Rossman, 2000) to determine the flow directions in the distribution network (Figure 
6.2). These flow directions will be used to identify the cause-effect relationships for specific risk 
in the system. 
 
Figure 6.2 Layout of distribution network in the assumed water supply system under study 
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Table 6.1 Information of nodes in the water distribution network 
Node Elevation(m) Demand (L/s) Node Elevation(m) Demand (L/s) 
1 200*  12 182 263.72 
2 180 790.73 13 181 263.72 
3 181 440.71 14 183 158.15 
4 181 263.72 15 181 114.34 
5 179 349.59 16 182 114.34 
6 179 105.58 17 182 142.38 
7 179 224.73 18 183 99.01 
8 178 91.12 19 182 114.34 
9 180 226.92 20 183 79.29 
10 182 224.73 21 184 71.41 
11 184 69.65 
 
22 183 103.39 
*This value is the water level at the outlet of pump. 
Table 6.2 Information of pipes in the water distribution network 
Pipe 
Terminal 
node 
Material Age (yr) 
Diameter 
(mm) 
Length (m) C 
1 1,2 CI 5 600 3050 140 
2 2,3 CI 10 450 1520 110 
3 2,5 CI 10 450 1980 110 
4 5,9 CI 10 400 670 110 
5 5,6 CI 10 300 1070 110 
6 5,7 CI 10 400 120 110 
7 6,8 CI 10 150 760 110 
8 9,8 CI 10 300 1370 110 
9 9,4 CI 10 350 1675 110 
10 9,14 CI 10 350 1375 110 
11 3,10 CI 10 400 1520 110 
12 3,4 CI 10 350 1520 110 
13 4,13 CI 10 350 910 110 
14 10,11 PVC 10 150 300 140 
15 10,12 CI 10 350 1680 110 
16 12,14 CI 10 300 1070 110 
17 13,12 CI 10 300 1220 110 
18 12,18 CI 10 250 450 110 
19 15,16 CI 10 250 120 110 
20 17,15 CI 10 250 245 110 
21 14,18 CI 10 250 440 110 
22 18,17 CI 10 250 210 110 
23 18,21 CI 10 250 300 110 
24 21,20 PVC 10 200 210 140 
25 17,19 PVC 10 250 140 140 
26 16,22 PVC 10 250 180 140 
27 19,16 PVC 10 250 240 140 
28 20,19 PVC 10 200 150 140 
29 20,22 PVC 10 200 240 140 
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6.1.2 Hazards to Components in the Water Supply System 
In this assumed water supply system, as most components are constructed and operated in an open 
environment, multiple hazards are potentially threatening the functionalities of components with 
different degrees. Identification of the potential hazards for each component is necessary and a 
critical step for risk assessment of the system.  
For the river in the water supply system, its service is potentially compromised by multiple 
sources (Figure 6.3). Firstly, since the river is within a flooding plain, it is inevitably influenced 
by floods. It is shown by historical data that floods, especially those with low frequencies (i.e., 
lower than 1/50), can affect its quality significantly because they have the ability to carry various 
and a large amount of pollutants. Secondly, there are a chemical factory along the west bank of 
the river, and a sewage discharge point along the east side. Both of these discharge points are at 
upstream part of the raw water in-take point. Thus improper treatments of the chemical waste 
water or sewage will negatively effect the river quality and hence influence the treating process. 
In addition, there are some regular transporting vehicles on this river. Data from the 
environmental agencies prove that pollutants from spills of the vehicles are another contributing 
factor to the river contamination. Figure 6.3 explicitly depicts the above four hazards (i.e., flood, 
sewage discharge point, industrial discharge point, and spills from vehicles) associated with the 
river.  
 
Figure 6.3 Potential hazards to water sources of the assumed water supply system 
The reservoir in this example locates at a rural area that is in the northwest part of the system. 
Livestock is always a hazardous factor that contributes substantial microbial load. Furthermore, 
non-point pollutant sources scattered around the reservoir have contaminated the site and hence 
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compromise its water quality. Meanwhile, as shown by Figure 6.3, the reservoir is within the 
flooding area and potentially contaminated by surface runoff with high pollutants. Therefore, 
flood, livestock, and contaminated site are viewed as three possible hazards to the reservoir 
contamination.  
Another water source, wells, has high iron concentration (e.g., Fe, Mn, etc.) because of the high 
content of minerals in the areas where the underground water flows. This has brought great 
difficulties of treatment process, and thus is viewed hazardous in this example. Meanwhile this 
area has been developed to a recreation area for human beings, which has made it influenced by 
human activities and site contaminations of non-point pollutant sources. Therefore, underground 
mineral, human activity, and site contamination of non-point sources are the three hazards needed 
to be considered for the wells (Figure 6.3).  
Even though drought is important to cause water shortage in a general water supply system, it is 
assumed that it is not serious and can be neglected in this example. The following analysis, 
therefore, will not consider the influence of drought.  
Being laid in an open area, the transmission aqueducts (i.e., pipes and channels) are potentially 
affected by several factors including extreme floods (or surface runoff), earth movement, extreme 
temperatures, and human wilful attacks. Consequence associated these hazards is dramatic 
decrease of water quantity supplied to the water treatment plant and the ultimate users. 
For the water treatment plant in the water supply system, its potential hazards are various as 
shown by its historical records of operation and management. These factors include flood 
influences on the constructures, process control failures, equipment failures, inadequate backup of 
main equipments, failures of alarm and monitoring system, power supply failures, and the human 
wilful chemical/biological contamination to the clean water tank at the end of the treatment 
process. These factors have different likelihoods of occurrences and possible consequences, and 
contribute substantially to the risk of water treatment plant.  
The pump station in the water supply system is potentially influenced by various types of hazards 
according to its historical records. Natural hazards that can affect the pump performance include 
flood and earth movement. Hazards that can make it in an operational failure state are control 
failure, equipment failure, failures of alarm and monitoring, and inadequate backup of the main 
pumps. In addition, power outage is also a significant hazard that will interrupt its normal 
operation due to its high dependence on power supply. Furthermore, with the highlight of human-
related threats, experts also suggest that threats such as bombing and physical disruption are also 
important and required in a comprehensive risk assessment of the pump.  
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Figure 6.4 Potential hazards to distribution pipes in the assumed water supply system 
Due to the surrounding conditions of the pipes and historical records, earth movement, soil, sewer 
leakage, and external loads are identified by the analysts as potential hazardous factors that would 
comprise the normal function of pipes (Figure 6.4). Firstly, in the area where pipes are buried, the 
volume of soil expands during wetting and shrinks during drying, which consequently introduces 
cyclic displacement and produces extra loads to damage the distribution pipes. Secondly, soils 
surrounding the pipes are with high concentrations of moisture content, chemical and 
microbiological contents, redox potential, etc., which thus increase the rate of soil-pipe 
interactions and pipe deterioration. Thirdly, there are many open drains in the distribution areas. 
Surrounding soil can be contaminated by sewer leakage from these open drains and hence has 
negative effects to the under buried pipes. Lastly, over burden of external loads of pipes, 
including earth weight and vehicle weight, is a possible reason of crushing force to cause 
longitudinal cracks of the pipes.  
By summarising the above discussions, potential hazards associated with the components are 
given in Table 6.3.  
6.1.3 Objectives of Risk Assessment of the Assumed Water Supply System  
Two concerns are identified for the risk assessment of the assumed water supply system: 
• to evaluate the risk levels of each component, subsystem, and the overall water system 
due to the influences of multiple potential hazards that are identified in Table 6.3, and 
• to identify the potential causes and their relative contributions to specific risk at the user  
demand points (Figure 6.2).  
With the results from the first issue, risk analysts can obtain useful risk information such as which 
kind of risk and which component risk levels are higher due to the influences from multiple 
hazards. While for each of the identified risk, the second issue can provide information of what 
External load 
Soil with different characteristics 
(e.g., moisture content, chemical 
and microbiological content, 
electrical resistivity, etc. )  
Sewer 
leakage 
Joint between pipes 
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are the possible causes and how about their contributions to this risk. Both of two issues are 
important for a risk assessment. This study will use demand point 8 as an example to illustrate the 
process of analysing cause-effect relationships based on fault tree method. Similar analyses could 
be conducted to other user points, but will not be specifically considered in this thesis.  
Table 6.3 Potential hazards associated with the assumed water supply system 
Component  or Object Function Potential hazards 
River Water source • Flood 
• Sewage discharge 
• Industrial discharge 
• Spills 
Reservoir Water source • Flood 
• Livestock 
• Contaminated site 
Wells (including well 1, 2 , 
and 3) 
Water source • Underground mineral 
• Human activity 
• Contaminated site 
Transmission  Deliver water • Flood 
• Earth movement 
• Extreme temperature 
• Human sabotage 
Channel Deliver water • Flood 
• Earth movement 
• Extreme temperature 
• Human sabotage 
Water treatment plant Treat water • Flood 
• Human chemical/biological contamination 
• Process control failure 
• Equipment failure 
• Alarm and monitoring failure 
• Inadequate backup 
• Power failure 
Pump Pump water • Flood 
• Earth movement 
• Bombing 
• Control failure 
• Equipment failure 
• Alarm and monitoring 
• Inadequate back up 
• Power failure 
Pipes in water distribution 
network (including 29 
pipes) 
Deliver water • Earth movement 
• External loads (e.g., soil load and traffic load) 
• Soil  
• Sewer leakage from open drains 
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To analyse the two issues above, an object-oriented framework of risk assessment is firstly 
formed in Section 6.2. Following this, Section 6.3 describes the aggregative risk assessment 
process to evaluate the risk levels of components, subsystems, and the system, respectively. 
Section 6.4 analyses the cause-effect relationships for specific risk at demand point 8 by using 
fuzzy fault tree analysis. Meanwhile priorities of risk contributions are identified for potential 
causes. Finally, Section 6.5 summarises the applications of risk assessment. 
6.2 Object-Oriented Framework of Risk Assessment 
6.2.1 Whole/Part Relationships of the Water Supply System 
According to the configuration of the water supply system, object-oriented hierarchy is developed 
to represent the aggregation and generalisation relationships among components, subsystems, and 
the overall system (Figure 6.5). Aggregation relationship depicts the whole/part relationships in 
the water supply system, while generalization relationship provides the abstraction between 
objects and classes.  
 
Figure 6.5 Object and class structures of the assumed water supply system under study 
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In this hierarchy, basic elements are river, reservoir, wells, water treatment plant, raw water 
transition pipes and channel, pump, and the distribution pipes. They are further classified to four 
basic classes, i.e., water source, water treatment plant, pipe, and pump, as shown by the class 
structure for this water supply system. Therefore, states transition diagrams of water source, water 
treatment plant, pipe, and pump developed in Chapter 3 are used here to represent the risk 
mechanism for each of the basic elements respectively. This is basis of risk assessment at 
component level for this example water supply system.  
Aggregation relationships provide the frameworks for aggregative risk assessment of water supply 
system. Risk level of the overall water supply system is determined by risk levels of its 
subsystems, which are, in turn, determined by risk levels of their sub-subsystems or components. 
If risk levels of components at the bottom level of aggregation structure have been determined, 
risk levels of subsystems or system can thus be obtained by integrating the risks levels along the 
aggregation structure. 
6.2.2 Interconnections Relationships between Objects 
Interconnections between components are determined by the water flow directions in the water 
supply system (Figure 6.1). To facilitate the automated evaluations by computer programming, 
the results are summarised in a table by viewing them as attributes associated with different 
components/objects (Figure 6.4). Although nodes (e.g., river, reservoir, etc.) and links (e.g., pipe 
and pump) are different for object-oriented programming, it is not necessary to consider them 
separately in risk assessment. Interconnections among these components provide the information 
of developing fault trees to represent cause-effect relationships of specific risk at system level. 
6.3 Aggregative Risk Assessment 
Aggregative risk assessment is composed of two parts: (1) frameworks of risk assessment of 
objects/components and system, and (2) quantitative evaluations of the frameworks developed in 
step 1, which is illustrated in detail as follow. 
6.3.1 Frameworks of Aggregative Risk Assessment  
(1) Frameworks of aggregative risk assessment at component level 
States transition diagrams proposed in Chapter 3, in collaboration with potential hazards (Table 
6.3) and object-oriented hierarchy (Figure 6.5), are used here to develop frameworks of 
aggregative risk assessment for basic elements of the system, respectively (Figure 6.6 to Figure 
6.12).  
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Table 6.4 Interconnections among components in the assumed water supply system 
Object From To  Object From To 
River - TP1  Pipe 12 Pipe 2 Pipe 13 
Reservoir - Channel  Pipe 13 Pipe 9 
Pipe 12 
Pipe 17 
Wells - TP2  Pipe 14 Pipe 11 - 
TP1 River WTP  Pipe 15 Pipe 11 Pipe 16 
 Pipe 18 
TP2 Well WTP  Pipe 16 Pipe 15 
Pipe 17 
Pipe 21 
Channel Reservoir WTP  Pipe 17 Pipe 13 Pipe 16 
Pipe 18 
WTP TP1 
TP2 
Channel 
Pump  Pipe 18 Pipe 15 
Pipe 17 
Pipe 19 
Pump WTP Pipe 1  Pipe 19 Pipe 18 
Pipe 20 
Pipe 26 
Pipe 1 Pump Pipe 2  Pipe 20 Pipe 22 Pipe 19 
Pipe 2 Pipe 1 Pipe 11 
Pipe 12 
 Pipe 21 Pipe 10 
Pipe 16 
Pipe 22 
Pipe 23 
Pipe 3 Pipe 1 Pipe 4 
Pipe 5 
Pipe 6 
 Pipe 22 Pipe 21 Pipe 20 
Pipe 25 
Pipe 4 Pipe3 Pipe 8 
Pipe 9 
Pipe 10 
 Pipe 23 Pipe 21 Pipe 24 
Pipe 5 Pipe 3 Pipe 7  Pipe 24 Pipe 23 Pipe 28 
Pipe 29 
Pipe 6 Pipe 3 -  Pipe 25 Pipe 22 Pipe 27 
Pipe 7 Pipe 5 -  Pipe 26 Pipe 19 
Pipe 27 
- 
Pipe 8 Pipe 4 -  Pipe 27 Pipe 25 
Pipe 28 
Pipe 26 
Pipe 9 Pipe 4 Pipe 13  Pipe 28 Pipe 24 Pipe 27 
Pipe 10 Pipe 4 Pipe 21  Pipe 29 Pipe 24 - 
Pipe 11 Pipe 2 Pipe 14 
Pipe 15 
    
 
 
Figure 6.6 Framework of aggregative risk assessment of river contamination 
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Figure 6.7 Framework of aggregative risk assessment of reservoir contamination 
 
Figure 6.8 Framework of aggregative risk assessment of wells contamination 
 
Figure 6.9 Framework of aggregative risk assessment of transmission pipe and channel 
 
Figure 6.10 Framework of aggregative risk assessment of water treatment plant object 
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Figure 6.11 Framework of aggregative risk assessment of the pump in the distribution network 
 
Figure 6.12 Frameworks of aggregative risk assessment of distribution pipes 
(2) Framework of aggregative risk assessment at system level 
Frameworks of aggregative risk assessment at system level are developed on the basis of object-
oriented whole/part relationships. This framework shows that risk of the water supply system is 
contributed by the risk of its subsystems including water sources, water treatment plant, raw water 
transmission pipes, and water distribution network. Risks of these subsystems are further 
determined by their sub-subsystems and components. Inputs data for this framework are the risk 
levels of basic elements. There are two risks considered in this thesis, i.e., reduced water quantity 
and water contamination. Two frameworks are thus needed at system level to evaluate the 
aggregative levels of these two risks (Figure 6.13). Even though shortage of water sources also 
influences the reduced water quantity in a general water supply system, it is not applied to this 
assumed example. This is because that drought, the possible hazard that will introduce water 
shortage, is not possible here according to the hazards analysis in Section 6.1.2.  
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Figure 6.13 Framework of aggregative risk assessment for the assumed water supply system 
6.3.2 Inputs Information of Aggregative Risk Assessment 
In order to evaluate the above frameworks of risk assessment quantitatively, it is necessary to 
firstly determine the inputs data including likelihood and severity of each hazard and weights 
factors of elements at the different hierarchical levels.  
(1) Likelihood and severity of hazard 
Determination of risks caused by multiple hazards is an uncertain process because their 
likelihoods and severities are related to many uncertain factors and cannot be represented 
precisely. This thesis uses multiple forms, including probability number, fuzzy number, and 
linguistic variables, to represent these multiple uncertainties associated hazards (Table 6.6).  
Firstly, flood is one of the most important hazards because of its influences on many components 
of the water supply system. Historical records and experiences are available to analyse the 
relationships between its likelihood and relative severity (Table 6.5). It is shown that floods with 
high frequencies (i.e., 1/10) have minor influences to the components of the system. However, 
floods with low frequencies, or extreme floods, have the ability to carry various and a large 
amount of pollutants, and hence can introduce more serious influences on water sources and other 
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components. Therefore, this study specifically considers the flood of low frequency (i.e., 
likelihood of 1/50 which is highlighted in Table 6.5) and analyses its influences to the risk of the 
overall system. 
Table 6.5 Relationships between likelihood and severity of flood hazards 
Consequence* 
Likelihood 
River Reservoir 
Transmission 
pipe 
Channel 
Water treatment 
plant 
Pump 
… … … … … … … 
1/10 M SL M SL VL VL 
… … … … … … … 
1/50 VH SH VH VH SH SH 
… … … … … … … 
1/100 VH VH EH EH VH VH 
* All the evaluations about consequences are based on experts’ opinions or engineers quantitative 
evaluations. 
For other hazards, there may not be sufficient records that can be used to evaluate their 
likelihoods and consequences. However, they can be approximated by considering the limited 
records, coupled with experiences of engineers and experts’ opinion. For example, from the 
records of chemical factory and relative records of other factories, the failure likelihood can be 
estimated approximately. While, its relative influences to the river (i.e., severity) is determined by 
the quality simulation models of the river. Similar evaluations can also be performed on other 
hazards including sewage discharge, pollutant spills, livestock, human activity, underground 
minerals, and contaminated site.  
While for the hazards related to water treatment plant and the pump station, linguistic and 
descriptive evaluations of their hazards can be easily obtained based on operational records 
coupled with managing experiences in other similar plants and pump stations. Even these 
linguistic evaluations are vague and uncertain in nature, they can normally be represented in terms 
of fuzzy numbers and valuable for a quantitative analysis.  
Finally, for the pipes in the water distribution network, the likelihoods of earth movement and 
temperature can be estimated based on the historical records, and their consequences can be 
subjectively described by fuzzy numbers. The influences of hazards like external loads, soil, and 
sewer leakage can be analysed by various statistical and/or physical models that have been well 
developed. However, in order to simply the process of determining these data, they are 
subjectively assumed and represented by fuzzy numbers in this thesis.  
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According to the above discussion, likelihoods and severities of hazards are summarised in Table 
6.6. 
Table 6.6 Inputs of likelihood and severity of hazards to the assumed water supply system 
Element Failure state Hazards Likelihood Severity 
River NH Flood 0.02 VH 
 HC Sewage discharge SL VH 
  Industrial discharge SL EH 
 IN Spill VL M 
Reservoir  NH Flood 0.02 SH 
 HC Livestock SH VL 
 IN Contaminated site SH SL 
Wells (1,2 and 3) NH Underground mineral VH M 
 HC Human activity SL SL 
 IN Contaminated Site SH SH 
Transmission (Pipe) NH Flood 0.01 EH 
  Earth movement About 0.01 EH 
 HC Sabotage VL SH 
 OP Temperature  About 0.2 VH 
Transmission (Channel) NH Flood About 0.02 VH 
  Earth movement  About 0.01 VH 
 HC Sabotage VL SH 
 OP Temperature About 0.02 SL 
Water treatment plant NH Flood 0.02 SH 
 HC Chemical/biological VL M 
 OP Process VL VH 
  Equipment SL M 
  Alarm and monitor SL M 
  Backup VL SH 
 IN Power SL EH 
Pump NH Flood 0.02 SH 
  Earth movement About 0.01 EH 
 HC Bombing EL EH 
 OP Control SL SH 
  Equipment SL M 
  Alarm and monitor SL M 
  Backup SL SL 
 IN Power VL VH 
Pipe (1-13, 15-23) NH Earth movement About 0.0.1 VH 
 OP External load M SH 
  Soil SL M 
 IN Sewerage leakage SL M 
Pipe (14, 24-29) NH Earth movement About 0.0.1 VH 
 OP External load M VH 
  Soil VL SL 
 IN Sewerage leakage SL M 
* NH—natural hazard failure state; HC—human-caused threat failure state; OP—operational failure 
state; IN—independence failure state.  
**EH—extremely high; VH—very high; SH—slightly high; M—medium; SL—slightly low; VL—
very low; EL—extremely low. These values can be represented by fuzzy numbers based on the 
discussion in Chapter 4. 
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(2) Determination of weight factors  
Weight factors represent the importance of risk contribution from basic factors. In practice, there 
are many methods that can be used to obtain these values, such as experts opinions, analytical 
hierarchy process (AHP), methods based on hydraulic simulations, etc. Detailed discussion of 
these methods exceeds the scope of this study. To simplify the process of demonstrating the 
proposed method, it is assumed that the relative hazards, associated with each failure state, 
equally contribute to the risk values of failure state. Furthermore, for each object, its failure states 
also have identical weights in risk assessment. According to different risk (i.e., water 
contamination or reduced water quantity), weights are subjectively assumed for pipe network, 
pump, water treatment plant, transmission pipes, channel, river, reservoir, and wells, respectively. 
Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 list the weights for the two risk scenarios.  
Table 6.7 Weight factors for aggregative risk assessment of water contamination 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Failure state Hazards 
WSS WS River  NH w=1/3 Flood w=1.0 
 w=0.2 w=0.5  HC w=1/3 Sewage discharge w=0.5 
      Industrial discharge w=0.5 
    IN w=1/3 Spill w=1.0 
  Reservoir   NH w=1/3 Flood w=1.0 
  w=0.2  HC w=1/3 Livestock w=1.0 
    IN w=1/3 Contaminated site w=1.0 
  Wells   NH w=1/3 Natural chemical w=1.0 
  w=0.3  HC w=1/3 Human activity w=1.0 
    IN w=1/3 Contaminated Site w=1.0 
 WTP   NH w=0.25 Flood w=1.0 
 w=0.5   HC w=0.25 Chemical/Biological w=1.0 
    OP w=0.25 Process w=0.25 
      Equipment w=0.25 
      Alarm and monitor w=0.25 
      Backup w=0.25 
    IN w=0.25 Power w=1.0 
 WDN Pipes Pipe 1-29 IN w=1.0 Sewerage leakage w=1.0 
 w=0.3 w=1.0     
       
   
Their weights 
are determined 
in Table 6.9.     
*WSS—water supply system; WS—water source; WTP—water treatment plant; WDN—water 
distribution network; NH—natural hazard failure state; HC—human-caused threat failure state; OP—
operational failure state; IN—independence failure state.  
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Table 6.8 Weight factors for aggregative risk assessment of reduced water quantity 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Failure state Hazards 
WSS Trans- Pipe Pipe 1-2 NH w=1/3 Flood w=0.5 
 mission w=0.8 w1=0.5   Earth movement w=0.5 
 w=0.3  w2=0.5 HC w=1/3 Sabotage w=1.0 
    OP w=1/3 Temperature  w=1.0 
  Channel  NH w=1/3 Flood w=0.5 
  w=0.2    Earth movement w=0.5 
    HC w=1/3 Sabotage w=1.0 
    OP w=1/3 Temperature  w=1.0 
 WTP   NH w=1/3 Flood w=1.0 
 w=0.2   OP w=1/3 Process w=0.25 
      Equipment w=0.25 
      Alarm and monitor w=0.25 
      Backup w=0.25 
    IN w=1/3 Power w=1.0 
 WDN Pump  NH w=0.25 Flood w=0.5 
 w=0.5 w=0.5    Earth movement w=0.5 
    HC w=0.25 Bombing w=1.0 
    OP w=0.25 Control w=0.25 
      Equipment w=0.25 
      Alarm and monitor w=0.25 
      Backup w=0.25 
    IN w=0.25 Power w=1.0 
  Pipes Pipe 1-29 NH w=0.5 Earth movement w=1.0 
  w=0.5 OP w=0.5 External load w=0.5 
     Soil w=0.5 
   
Their weights 
are determined 
in Table 6.9.     
 
For the pipes in water distribution network, their weight factors are determined by their capacities 
of carrying water flow. Carrying capacity is determined by (Wagner et al., 1988) 
Q=0.2795CD2.63S0.54 
where Q is the flow capacity (million gallons per day (mgd)), C is the Hazen-Williams 
coefficient, D is the internal pipe diameter (feet, 1ft=0.3048m), and S is the maximum hydraulic 
gradient. Values of C and D are given in Table 6.2. S is assumed to be 0.01 in this example. Based 
on the values of carrying capacity, weight of each pipe is determined by 
∑
=
=
n
i
i
i
i
Q
Q
w
1
 
where Qi is the carrying capacity of pipe i; wI is the weight of pipe i in aggregative risk 
assessment; i is the index of pipe number; n is the number of pipes in the distribution network. 
The results are summarised in Table 6.9 and applied to both risk of reduced water quantity and 
risk of water contamination.  
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Table 6.9 Weights factors of pipes in the water distribution network 
Pipe No. 
Capacity 
(mgd) 
Weights  Pipe No. 
Capacity 
(mgd) 
Weights 
1 20.15 0.20  16 2.56 0.03 
2 7.43 0.07  17 2.56 0.03 
3 7.43 0.07  18 1.58 0.02 
4 4.60 0.05  19 1.58 0.02 
5 2.56 0.03  20 1.58 0.02 
6 5.45 0.05  21 1.58 0.02 
7 0.41 0.00  22 1.58 0.02 
8 2.56 0.03  23 1.58 0.02 
9 3.84 0.04  24 1.12 0.01 
10 3.84 0.04  25 2.01 0.02 
11 5.45 0.05  26 2.01 0.02 
12 3.84 0.04  27 2.01 0.02 
13 3.84 0.04  28 1.12 0.01 
14 0.53 0.01  29 1.12 0.01 
15 3.84 0.04     
 
6.3.3 Quantitative Results of Aggregative Risk Assessment 
The method of aggregative risk assessment have been developed in Chapter 4 and coded with 
Visual C++ in this study. By using this method and the above inputs, quantitative results of 
aggregative risk assessment are obtained and discussed below.  
(1) Aggregative risk assessment at component level 
With the above inputs and aggregative assessment frameworks, risk levels are obtained for 
different components in the water supply system, which includes river, reservoir, wells, 
transmission pipes, channel, water treatment plant, pump, and pipes. Table 6.10 list the results of 
aggregative risk assessment of the river, while risk levels of other components can be found in 
Appendix E.  
Here risk levels are represented by seven predefined risk grades from extremely low (EL) to 
extremely high (EH). Value associated with each risk grade denotes the degrees that the risk item 
belongs to it. All the values of the seven grades therefore represent a risk distribution of the risk 
item under study. Meanwhile, associated with each risk distribution are representative value and 
fuzziness measure that represent the aggregative risk value and relative uncertainty with this 
evaluation, respectively. 
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Table 6.10 Results of aggregative risk assessment of river contamination 
Risk levels EL VL SL M SH VH EH 
Fuzzi
-ness 
Represen-
tative value 
Flood 0.079 0.921 0 0 0 0 0 0.555 0.027 
Sewage discharge 0 0 0.046 0.796 0.158 0.001 0 1.134 0.275 
Industrial discharge 0 0 0.026 0.598 0.373 0.002 0 1.471 0.320 
Spills 0.005 0.191 0.753 0.051 0 0 0 1.279 0.102 
          
Natural hazard 0.079 0.921 0 0 0 0 0 0.555 0.027 
Human-caused 0 0 0.031 0.718 0.249 0.001 0 1.303 0.295 
Interdependence 0.005 0.191 0.753 0.051 0 0 0 1.279 0.102 
          
River 0.029 0.427 0.301 0.189 0.054 0 0 2.121 0.117 
 
For example, due to the influences of multiple hazards (i.e., flood, sewage discharge, industrial 
discharge, and spills pollutant from vehicles) the river has different degrees to several risk grades 
from EL to SH (Table 6.10). It has the highest degrees on risk grade VL, followed by risk grades 
SL, M, SH, and EL. The representative risk value of this risk distribution is approximate 0.117 
and the uncertainty or fuzziness with this distribution is 2.121. This uncertainty or fuzziness 
comes from the fact that risk is represented in terms of a distribution on several risk grades rather 
than a crisp value. These numbers can be explained more clearly in the following ways: 
• Risk levels or risk distributions are a type of measure based on evidence. Higher values to 
specific risk grade indicates more or stronger evidence supporting the evaluation on this 
risk grade. On the contrary, lower values indicates weaker evidence. The river, for 
instance, has the highest degree to risk grade VL and zero to risk grade EH because of 
stronger evidence supporting risk grade VL, while no evidence supporting its belonging 
to risk level EL. 
• There are uncertainties with the evaluations of risk levels or risk distributions. 
Uncertainty associated with a hazard is caused by incomplete data or approximate 
evaluation of its likelihoods of occurrence and relative severity. While the uncertainty of 
aggregative risk, e.g., risk of the river, is introduced by two sources. One is the lack of 
information about hazard; the other is the conflicting evidence from multiple hazards. For 
example, hazard of flood provide evidence supporting the risk grades of EL and VL 
(Table 6.10), while industrial discharge supports risk grades from SL to VH. It is obvious 
that there are conflict between the information provided by these two hazards. It is the 
conflict that introduces extra uncertainty to the evaluation of river risk. The uncertainty of 
the evaluation of river (i.e., 2.121) is therefore larger than that of a single hazard (e.g., 
0.555 of flood). However, if multiple sources of evidence were not conflict, the 
uncertainty with the aggregative risk would not necessary increase. For example, sewage 
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discharge and industrial discharge (Table 6.10) support the same risk grades from SL to 
VH, the uncertainty of their aggregation (i.e., 1.303 of human-caused failure state) is not 
increased by comparing with the uncertainties of the two hazards (i.e., 1.134 and 1.471 
respectively). With these results, risk analysts can identify the main reasons of uncertainty 
associated specific risk assessment and make reasonable decisions in the water systems.  
• Aggregative risk also gives a way of ranking components in terms of their risk levels. 
Among the three water sources, for instance, risk associated with wells is higher than that 
of reservoir, which is in turn higher than that of the river (Figure E.1 to Figure E.3 in 
Appendix E). This comparison can help system managers to adjust the management 
policies and maintenance measures among the water sources.  
• If the analysts or managers have their acceptable level for each risk grade, this 
aggregative risk distribution can explicitly show whether the hazard or risk of a 
component is acceptable or not. For example, if the acceptable level for risk grade SL is 
20%, then it is obvious that risk of the river is unacceptable as it has 30.1% degrees to the 
SL.  
Risk levels of all the element are also depicted in Figure 6.14 where risk distributions and their 
uncertainties are obviously expressed. 
(2) Aggregative risk assessment at system level 
After the determination of risk levels of components, it is easy to obtain risk levels of subsystems 
and the overall water supply system by aggregating these risks along the hierarchical structures 
(Figure 6.13).  
Firstly, contributing factors to reduced water quantity are transmission pipes, water treatment 
plant, and components of water distribution network. Results of this aggregation are summarised 
in Table 6.11.  
• Risk levels of transmission pipes, belonging to four risk grades from EL to M, are 
obtained by aggregating the risks of the pipes and channel that connected the water 
sources and water treatment plant.  
• Risk of water distribution network is determined by repeating the risk aggregation on the 
pump and pipes. It has degrees to six risk grades from EL to VH, which indicates that it 
has higher uncertainty (i.e., 2.295) than that of transmission pipes (i.e., 1.878).  
• Finally, by aggregating risks of transmission pipes, water treatment plant (WTP), and 
water distribution network (WDN), risk levels of reduced water quantity in the water 
supply system are ultimately obtained. Its is shown that it has the highest degree to risk 
grade SL which is followed by risk grades VL, M, EL, SH, and VH.  
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• Representative risk values show that water treatment plant has the highest risk degrees, 
then are the transmission pipes and water distribution network. While fuzziness measures 
show that the risk evaluations of water treatment plant are most uncertain because 
conflicting among its contributing factors. The risk levels of water distribution network is 
also with high uncertain, even its representative risk value is low, because the conflict 
between risks of pump and pipes. These results can be used by risk analysts to select 
mitigation measures and determine the further detailed risk studies. 
Secondly, for the risk of water contamination, its contributing sources are water sources, water 
treatment plant, and pipe lines in the distribution network. Results of this aggregation are listed in 
Table 6.12.  
• The risk levels of contamination of water source are obtained by aggregating the risks 
from river, reservoir, and wells. For the water distribution network, its risk of 
contamination are evaluated by doing the aggregation on its pipes. Risk of pump is not 
considered in this assessment because consequence of pump failures is only reduced 
water quantity rather than contamination.  
• The water supply system has the highest degree to SL that is followed by M, VL, SH, EL, 
and VH. Among the contributing subsystems, water sources have a risk value that is 
slightly higher than that of water distribution network. Both of them are higher than that 
of water treatment plant. Meanwhile, due to consistency between multiple contributing 
elements, uncertainty of risks of the whole system is not increased. 
The results of above aggregative risks are depicted in Figure 6.15 and Figure 6.16 respectively. 
Table 6.11 Results of aggregative risk assessment of reduced water in water supply system 
Risk levels EL VL SL M SH VH EH 
Fuzzi
-ness 
Representa-
tive value 
Transmission pipes 0.075 0.182 0.574 0.170 0 0 0 1.878 0.113 
WTP 0.060 0.323 0.170 0.308 0.138 0.001 0 2.337 0.168 
WDN 0.188 0.386 0.229 0.157 0.039 0.001 0 2.295 0.097 
WSS 0.122 0.314 0.327 0.191 0.046 0.001 0 2.298 0.116 
 
Table 6.12 Results of aggregative risk assessment of water contamination in water supply system 
Risk levels EL VL SL M SH VH EH 
Fuzzi
-ness 
Representa-
tive value 
WS 0.022 0.272 0.315 0.165 0.212 0.015 0 2.278 0.189 
WTP 0.042 0.287 0.347 0.232 0.092 0 0 2.271 0.147 
WDN 0 0.012 0.502 0.475 0.011 0 0 1.511 0.180 
WSS 0.020 0.162 0.424 0.333 0.060 0.001 0 2.086 0.162 
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Figure 6.14 Risk levels of components in the assumed water supply system 
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Figure 6.14 (Cont.) Risk levels of components in the assumed water supply system 
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Figure 6.15 Risk levels reduced water quantity in the assumed water supply system 
 
Figure 6.16 Risk levels of contamination in the assumed water supply system 
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6.4 Fault Tree Analysis 
Fault tree analysis is conducted here to assess the cause-effect relationships for a specific risk in 
the water supply system. Fault tree analyses in this application is composed of two steps: (1) 
construction of fault trees; and (2) quantitative analysis of fault trees developed in step 1. This is 
illustrated in detail in the following parts. 
6.4.1 Fault Tree Structures 
To analyse the risk of no water flow and water contamination at demand point 8, fault trees are 
required to be constructed at both component and system levels. Fault trees at the component 
level identify the potential hazards or threats which can make the specific component fail, while 
those at system level identify the potential components which will influence or contribute to the 
risk at user point.  
(1) Fault Trees of Components 
As discussed in Chapter 3, fault trees of components are developed in three steps based on the 
relationships among object, failure states, and potential hazards or threats. To take the 
contamination of river as an example, there are three possible failure states according to the 
hazards identified above. Each of these failure states, i.e., natural hazards failure state, human 
caused failure state, or interdependence failure state, can cause contamination to the river 
component. Furthermore the natural hazard failure state is caused by hazard flood. While human-
caused failure state is caused by either industrial discharge or sewage discharge, and 
interdependence failure state is caused by hazard of pollutant spills. By viewing those hazards as 
basic events, fault tree for contamination of the river is thus constructed (Figure 6.17). Similarly, 
fault trees for risks of other components are also developed in Figure 6.18 through Figure 6.23. 
Meanings of the symbols used in the following fault tree can be referred to figures shown in 
Figure 6.7 through Figure 6.12, respectively.  
 
Figure 6.17 Structure of fault tree representing the potential causes to river contamination 
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Figure 6.18 Structure of fault tree representing the potential causes to reservoir contamination 
 
Figure 6.19 Structure of fault tree representing the potential causes to well contamination 
 
Figure 6.20 Structure of fault tree representing the potential causes to transmission pipes and 
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Figure 6.21 Structure of fault tree representing the potential causes to water treatment plant 
 
Figure 6.22 Structure of fault tree representing the potential causes to pump failure 
 
Figure 6.23 Structure of fault tree representing the potential causes to of pipe 
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 (2) Fault Trees of the System 
In order to develop fault trees for risk of the water supply system, the interconnection 
relationships are required (Table 6.4). Two fault trees are developed for the risk of no water flow 
and contamination at user point 8, respectively (Figure 6.24 and Figure 6.25).  
 
Figure 6.24 Fault tree representing the potential causes to no water flow at user point 8 
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Figure 6.25 Fault tree representing the potential causes to water contamination at user point 8 
The developed fault tree for no water at user point 8 (Figure 6.24) indicates that this risk is 
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6.25), failures of pipes 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, or 8, water treatment plant, river, reservoir, or wells are 
identified as the potential contributing factors. The following quantitative risk assessment is able 
to describe the cause-effect relationships more clearly.  
6.4.2 Inputs Information for Fault Tree Analysis 
The input data for the quantitative fault tree analysis are the likelihoods of hazards which are the 
basic event and at the bottom level of the tree structures. These inputs data are available in Table 
6.6. The method to evaluate the fault trees quantitatively have been discussed in Chapter 5 and 
coded with Visual C++ in this study. Results of these fault trees are specifically discussed below. 
6.4.3 Quantitative Results of Fault Tree Analysis 
(1) Fault tree analysis at component level 
Based on the fault tree structures (Figure 6.17 to Figure 6.23) and evaluation method proposed in 
Chapter 5, quantitative results of fault trees are obtained for risks of components of the water 
supply system (Figure 6.26). As most of the input data are fuzzy numbers, the obtained results are 
also fuzzy numbers. Meanwhile, the importance measures of hazards are also analysed for each 
component in order to evaluate the risk contributions from basic event to the top event in the fault 
tree structures (Table 6.13). Several conclusions are obtained from the fault tree analysis as 
follow: 
• Fault tree analysis represents the cause-effect relationships to specific risk of each 
component in terms of likelihood of occurrence. Because the differences of hazards and 
fault tree structures, the likelihood of top event of different component is also different. 
Therefore, they will have different contributions to the relative risk in the water supply 
system, which are discussed in the following part. Additionally, the likelihoods of risk of 
different components have different uncertainties. For example, the possible likelihood of 
river contamination is with more uncertainty compared with that of reservoir 
contamination as shown by Figure 6.26. 
• Different hazards have different contributions to the likelihood of component risk. The 
importance measures (including fuzzy importance and fuzzy uncertainty importance) of 
each hazards are determined to describe the above differences of contributions explicitly 
(Table 6.13). For the river, sewage and industrial discharges have the highest importance 
measures, which indicates that they contribute more to occurrence of river contamination. 
Thus river quality would be effectively controlled if these two hazard were controlled at 
an acceptable level. Furthermore, fuzzy uncertainty importance measure provides a 
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ranking of reducing uncertainty of the top event in a fault tree analysis, which is useful to 
guide the further data collection or detailed analysis about the hazards.  
 
Figure 6.26 Fuzzy representations of failure likelihoods of components in the assumed water 
supply system 
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Figure 6.26 (Cont.) Fuzzy representations of failure likelihoods of components in the assumed 
water supply system 
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Table 6.13 Importance measures of fault trees at component levels 
Risk of elements* Threats 
Fuzzy 
importance 
Rank 
Fuzzy 
uncertainty 
importance 
Rank 
River(R2) Flood 6.52 4 0 4 
 Sewage discharge 8.9 1 0.762 1 
 Industrial discharge 8.9 1 0.762 1 
 Spills 7.2 3 0.62 3 
Reservoir(R2) Flood 2.117 3 0 3 
 Livestock 5.296 1 0.451 1 
 Human activity 5.296 1 0.451 1 
Well(R2) Underground mineral 3.902 1 0.346 1 
 Human activity 1.239 3 0.12 3 
 Contaminated site 2.234 2 0.209 2 
Transmission aqueducts Flood 10.452 3 0.053 3 
 Earth movement 10.347 4 0.052 4 
 Sabotage 12.094 2 1.009 1 
 Temperature 12.701 1 0.319 2 
Water treatment plant Flood 4.37 6 0 6 
(R1) Process control 4.693 4 0.434 4 
 Equipment 5.755 1 0.528 1 
 Alarm and monitoring 5.755 1 0.528 1 
 Inadequate backup 4.693 4 0.434 4 
 Power failure 5.755 1 0.528 1 
Water treatment plant Flood 4.019 7 0 7 
(R2) Chemical/Biological 4.282 4 0.41 4 
 Process control 4.282 4 0.41 4 
 Equipment 5.24 1 0.498 1 
 Alarm and monitoring 5.24 1 0.498 1 
 Inadequate backup 4.282 4 0.41 4 
 Power failure 5.24 1 0.498 1 
Pump (R1) Flood 3.54 6 0 8 
 Earth movement 3.486 7 0.02 7 
 Bombing 3.484 8 0.061 6 
 Control 4.636 1 0.43 1 
 Equipment 4.636 1 0.43 1 
 Alarm and monitoring 4.636 1 0.43 1 
 Inadequate backup 4.636 1 0.43 1 
 Power failure 3.785 5 0.354 5 
Pipes (R1) Earth movement 5.617 3 0.029 3 
 External loads 10.396 1 0.872 1 
 Soil 7.865 2 0.663 2 
Pipes (R2) Sewer leakage - 1 - 1 
Pipes (R3) Earth movement 1.604 4 0.008 4 
 External loads 3.307 2 0.27 2 
 Soil 2.428 3 0.196 3 
 Sewer leakage 5.404 1 0.868 1 
*R1, R2, and R3 denote risks of reduced water quantity, water contamination, and water 
contamination and reduced quantity, respectively. 
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Therefore, the fault tree analysis can produce information of which component has higher 
likelihood of occurrence, and which hazard contribute most to this occurrence. They are useful for 
risk management of components in the water supply system.  
(2) Fault tree analysis at system level 
Based on analysis at component level, quantitative results are obtained for the risks of reduced 
water and contamination at demand point 8 respectively (Figure 6.27). It is shown that both the 
risk of reduced water quantity and risk of contamination have very high probability to occur. 
Thus, under the current situation, the hazards can very possibly influence the water supply system 
by decreasing the water quantity of contaminating the water quality delivered to users at demand 
point 8. Therefore, mitigation measures should be taken to reduce the risks caused by the hazards. 
This can be achieved with the help of analysing the importance as follow. 
 
Figure 6.27 Fuzzy representations of failure likelihoods of risks in the water supply system 
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failure, alarm and monitor failure, and inadequate backup as shown by Table 6.13. Similarly, for 
the river pollution, the effective measures should be able to mitigate the occurrences of sewage 
and industrial discharge because they influence more to risk of the river. 
Table 6.14 Results of importance measures of fault trees at system level 
Elements 
Fuzzy 
importance 
Rank 
Fuzzy 
uncertainty 
importance 
Rank 
Transmission pipes 0.108 5 0.017 5 
Transmission channel 0.108 5 0.017 5 
Water treatment plant 0.186 2 0.05 2 
Pump 0.225 1 0.051 1 
Pipe 1 0.171 3 0.03 3 
Pipe 3 0.171 3 0.03 3 
Pipe 4 0.073 7 0.013 7 
Pipe 5 0.073 7 0.013 7 
Pipe 7 0.073 7 0.013 7 
Pipe 8 0.073 7 0.013 7 
     
Contamination at user point 8     
River 0.368 3 0.066 2 
Reservoir 0.23 10 0 10 
Well 0.494 2 0.061 3 
Water treatment plant 0.546 1 0.134 1 
Pipe 1 0.284 4 0.036 4 
Pipe 3 0.284 4 0.036 4 
Pipe 4 0.284 4 0.036 4 
Pipe 5 0.284 4 0.036 4 
Pipe 7 0.284 4 0.036 4 
Pipe 8 0.284 4 0.036 4 
     
Contamination at user point 8 (With dependent event) 
River 0.375 3 0.085 2 
Reservoir 0.224 10 0 10 
Well 0.478 2 0.06 3 
Water treatment plant 0.523 1 0.132 1 
Pipe 1 0.276 4 0.035 4 
Pipe 3 0.276 4 0.035 4 
Pipe 4 0.276 4 0.035 4 
Pipe 5 0.276 4 0.035 4 
Pipe 7 0.276 4 0.035 4 
Pipe 8 0.276 4 0.035 4 
 
This thesis also considers the failure dependency in the water supply system. For example, during 
the flooding season, the contamination of the reservoir is possibly influenced by the 
contamination of the river as well. With respect to this, the likelihood of reservoir contamination 
due to flood is dependent on the likelihood of river contamination during flood time. It is assumed 
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that the dependency is about 0.5 and can be represented by a triangular fuzzy number (0.4, 0.5, 
0.6) in this application. The results are listed in Table 6.14. It is shown that the importance value 
of river is increased from 0.368 to 0.375 by considering the failure dependence, while importance 
measures of other components are decreased. This indicates that river contamination is more 
important in this situation than that in the former situation.  
6.5 Summary 
The applications of the risk assessment methods developed in this research are demonstrated by 
an assumed water supply example. From this example application, the following conclusions can 
be made: 
• Risk levels of each element (including pipe, pump, river, well, etc.), each subsystem (i.e., 
water source, transmissions, water treatment, and water distribution), and the overall 
water supply system are obtained by using the aggregative risk assessment method 
proposed in Chapter 4. Risk levels are defined on seven grades (i.e., EL, VL, SL, M, SH, 
VH, and EH) in this application. The risk levels are a set of numbers which represent the 
degrees belonging to different risk grades. From these numbers, the risk distribution are 
directly illustrated. Meanwhile, the representative risk value, similar to the expected value 
in probability theory, and fuzziness of the risk distribution are also obtained to produce 
more useful information for risk decision making.  
• For each risk, the potential hazards or threats and their risk contributions are identified 
and analysed by using the fuzzy fault tree analysis proposed in Chapter 5. The analysis 
are performed at both component and system levels. At the component level, the 
mechanism of hazards resulting in different risk are analysed. At the system level, fault 
trees are constructed to represent the logic relationships for risk at user demand point. In 
these fault trees, failures of components and their contribution to the top event are 
identified and analysed. Based on these analyses, analysts can easily identify the critical 
assets and hazards for the specific risk at user demand points.  
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CHAPTER 
7  
Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Work 
Water supply systems are one of most important fundamentals for human living and development. 
Risk assessment has been recognised as an important part of water management. Risks within a 
water supply system are mainly related to water quality and/or water quantity. Potential factors 
that can cause these risks are generally associated with complex internal and external activities 
during the process of delivering water from sources to customers. An effective risk assessment 
thus requires the consideration of the characteristics of potential hazards and threats, risk levels of 
components, and comprehensive understanding of cause-effect relationships for specific risk in 
the system. With respect to this requirement, several conclusions are obtained from the current 
study as follow.  
7.1 Conclusions 
7.1.1 General Conclusions 
The literature review, conducted in Chapter 2, highlights the limitations associated with the 
existing methods to generate a comprehensive risk assessment for water supply systems. Most of 
the previous studies were specific to either subsystems/components, or one aspect of risk 
assessment. Furthermore, they were developed for specific applications, which thus limits their 
reusability if applied to other systems with different configurations and layouts. The important 
hurdles of conducing a comprehensive risk assessment are identified as complexity of water 
supply systems and uncertainty of risk analysis. 
In order to overcome the limitations of existing methods, the current study adopts an object-
oriented approach to develop hierarchical frameworks for risk assessment of water supply 
systems, and applies fuzzy sets-based methods to evaluate these frameworks. Two types of 
frameworks are developed in this thesis, i.e., (1) framework for aggregative risk assessment to 
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evaluate risks of components, subsystems, and overall water supply system, and (2) framework 
for fault tree analysis to represent the cause-effect relationships of specific risk. 
Results generated from these frameworks are useful for decision makers to prioritise their 
mitigations strategies for water supply systems. Firstly, the results of aggregative risk assessment 
are risk levels for components, subsystems, and the overall water supply system, respectively. The 
application in Chapter 6 shows that risk analysts can use this information to compare components 
and to identify the uncertainties contributing to the aggregative risk. Secondly, the results of the 
fault tree analysis are the likelihood of occurrence for a specific risk and importance measures of 
the potential contributing factors. The application in Chapter 6 demonstrates that they are useful 
to identify the critical components and hazards for a specific risk. Based on this analysis, decision 
makers can select effective mitigation measures to control and manage risks. 
7.1.2 Specific Conclusions 
The method developed in thesis can better meet the requirements of comprehensive risk 
assessments than existing methods in the following ways.  
(1) This study proposes a new method of developing hierarchical frameworks for risk 
assessment of water supply system. These frameworks can provide a comprehensive view of 
the risks in the system, and also be easily used by different users. 
Firstly, hierarchical frameworks of risk assessment have been developed at both component and 
system levels in Chapter 3. These frameworks provide a comprehensive view of risks associated 
components, subsystems, and the overall water supply system, and explicitly represent the cause-
effect relationships for specific risk. However, this would be difficult to obtain by using the 
existing methods that are reviewed in Chapter 2.  
Secondly, the frameworks can be flexibly established at different hierarchical levels according to 
the requirements of system observers or available information at hand. The discussion in Section 
3.2.2 shows that system observers can truncate the hierarchy at higher/micro levels or extend it to 
lower/micro levels dependent on the their specific requirements and/or available information of 
hazards. However, existing methods can hardly meet the requirements of multiple users, as they 
were originally developed for some specific users. 
(2) The frameworks developed in thesis can be easily reused in different water supply 
systems because of its new way of organising risk information. 
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Chapter 3 of this thesis discusses the organisation of risk in the water supply system around 
objects, and based on this, has developed general frameworks for risk assessment. These general 
frameworks can be easily reused in specific water supply system as shown in Chapter 6. However, 
most of the existing methods consider the risk information according to specific application or 
hazards, which limits their reusability in different situations. 
(3) The framework developed in this thesis can give evaluations of risks by considering 
multiple hazards that are represented in varied forms. 
The frameworks developed in this thesis have the ability to deal with varied number and types of 
hazards. The examples in Chapter 4 and application in Chapter 6 show that multiple hazards, both 
natural and human-related, can be simultaneously considered in the same framework. 
Furthermore, the number of hazards associated with an object can also be varied in water supply 
systems. Although hazards may be varied in different water supply systems, the ability of the 
frameworks will not be compromised. However, most of the existing methods can only deal with 
specific hazards, which thus limits their ability to generate comprehensive views of risk 
assessment.  
(4) The fuzzy sets-based methods used in this study can cover more uncertainties than 
probabilities can in most historical methods. 
Hazards in the water supply system are usually represented in varied forms. Probability is suitable 
to describe those that are statistic in nature, but has difficulties in representing others that are 
vague and descriptive. Fuzzy sets theory can effectively represent the latter uncertainties. In 
addition, probability can also be transferred to fuzzy numbers (Kaufmann and Gupta, 1991), while 
the reverse transformation is not unusually difficult. Therefore, fuzzy sets-based methods, used in 
this thesis, can consider wider range of uncertainties to generate a more comprehensive view of 
risk.  
7.2 Further Work 
This study has developed a new approach for risk assessment of water supply systems. However, 
there is work that should be undertaken to further strengthen the approach developed here. This 
includes extra conceptual frameworks to meet the requirements of comprehensive risk 
assessment, and quantitative analysis methods to produce more reasonable and useful risk 
information for decision makings.  
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7.2.1 Further Conceptual Frameworks 
The present study only considers aggregative risk assessment and fault tree analysis in water 
supply systems. However, more frameworks are required for a comprehensive risk assessment. 
(1) A framework for vulnerability assessment of water supply system is required. By considering 
the vulnerability and hazards simultaneously, risk analysts can have better understanding on 
the likelihood and severities associated risks. In this study, vulnerability is assumed to be 
unity for all the components, which is not in accordance with the real case. Therefore there is 
a need to develop a framework for vulnerability assessment.  
(2) In order to describe the cause-effect relationships more comprehensively, a framework is also 
required for forward event tree analysis to analyse the potential consequences for some 
specific risks. With this framework, risk analysts can predict possible risk scenarios 
associated with specific hazardous event, which will be of benefit for planning and 
management of water supply system.  
7.2.2 Further Revision of the Quantitative Analysis Methods 
Further work is required to enhance the applicability of the developed risk assessment method by 
water utilities. Firstly for the aggregative method, further research should focus on. 
(1) Developing proper membership functions of likelihood and severity for each hazard in the 
water supply system. Likelihoods of hazards can be analysed by using different existing 
models based on historical data, data from similar systems, experts’ opinion, experiences of 
engineers, etc. Severity of each hazard can either be objectively studied with help of 
developed models, or subjectively evaluated by the risk analyst, experts, etc. However, how to 
represent likelihoods and severities with proper fuzzy membership functions is still a 
important task requiring further studies. Ross (2004) and Bilgic et al. (1999) have discussed 
several methods of determining membership functions, which could be the basis for future 
work.  
(2) Determining weights factors properly. Weights are only subjective simple heuristics in this 
research. However, more detailed research is required to study proper methods of determining 
weight factors, as they significantly influence the results of aggregative risk assessment. In 
practice, weights of a component might be related to many factors such as cost, location, 
hydraulic behaviours, etc., which may bring difficulties in evaluating weights precisely. 
Therefore, proper consideration of these factors is important for the method developed in this 
thesis to generate more reasonable and useful results.  
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Secondly for fault tree analysis, there are also several aspects that would benefit from further 
study: 
(1) Degrees of dependencies are assumed in this study. However, more reasonable values can be 
used if they can be determined more precisely. 
(2) The fault tree structure developed in this study does not recognise the vulnerability of each 
component in water supply systems. Therefore, vulnerability factors should be included in the 
assessment of fault trees in future. 
7.3 End Point 
This thesis has made a contribution to the understanding of risk assessment for water supply 
system and new ideas of organising complex risk information based on concepts of object-
oriented approach. It is hoped that this work will increase the efficiency of water utilities to 
manage risks in a complex water system that is affected by multiple hazards.  
It is emphasised that this work is the first step in the formulation of object-oriented frameworks 
for risk assessment of water supply systems. It is anticipated that future research will result in a 
better understanding of this method, and overall improved risk assessment.  
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APPENDIX  
A 
Potential Chemical and Biological Hazards/Threats to 
Water Supply Systems 
The following table lists the chemicals that are effective in drinking water. The list includes both 
chemical warfare agents and industrial chemical poisons, which could be used a short checking 
list for contamination assessment in water supply system.  
Table A.1 Potential chemicals effectiveness in water supply systems (Mays, 2004b) 
Recommended guidelines 
Chemical agents (mg/L unless 
otherwise noted) 
Acute concentration 
0.5L 5L/day 15L/day 
Chemical warfare agents:    
Hydrogen cyanide 25 6.0 2.0 
Tabun (GA, µg/L) 50 70.0 22.5 
Sarin (GB, µg/L) 50 13.8 4.6 
Soman (GD, µg/L) 50 6.0 2.0 
VX (µg/L) 50 7.5 2.5 
Lewisite (arsenic fraction) 100-130 80.0 27.0 
Sulfer Mustard (µg/L)  140.0 47.0 
3-quinuclidinyl benzilate (BZ, µg/L)  7.0 2.3 
Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) 0.050   
Industrial chemical poisons:    
Cyanides 25 6.0 2.0 
Arsenic 100-130 80.0 27.0 
Fluoride 3000   
Cadmium 15   
Mercury 75-300   
Dieldrin 5000   
Sodim fluoroacetate   None provided 
Parathion   None provided 
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The following table lists several pathogens and biotoxins that can potentially cause problems in 
drinking water production and distribution. This list includes important characteristics of agent 
such as type, possibility of being weaponized, stable in water, and chlorine tolerance. This could 
be used as a checking list for biological hazards to water supply systems in practice.  
 
Table A.2 Potential biological threats to water supply systems (Mays, 2004b) 
Agent Type Weapon-
ized 
Water 
threat 
Stable in water Chlorine tolerance 
Anthrax Bacteria Yes Yes 2 years (spores) Spores resistant 
Brucellosis Bacteria Yes Probable 20-72 days Unknown 
C.perfringens Bacteria Probable Probable Common in sewage Resistant 
Tularemia Bacteria Yes Yes Up to 90 days Inactivated, 1ppm, 5min 
Glanders Bacteria Probable Unlikely Up to 30 days Unknown 
Meliodosis Bacteria Possible Unlikely Unknown Unknown 
Shigellosis Bacteria Unknown Yes 2-3 days Inactivated,0.05ppm,10min 
Cholera Bacteria Unknown Yes “Survives well” Easily killed 
Salmonella Bacteria Unknown Yes  8 days, fresh water Inactivated  
Plague Bacteria Probable Yes 16 days Unknown 
Q fever Rickettsia Yes Possible Unknown Unknown 
Typhus Rickettsia Probable Unlikely Unknown Unknown 
Psittacosis Rickettsia-like Possible Possible 18-24 h, sea water Unknown 
Encephalomyelitis Virus Probable Unlikely Unknown Unknown 
Hemorrhagic fever Virus Probable Unlikely Unknown Unknown 
Variola Virus Possible Possible Unknown Unknown 
Hepatitis A Virus Unknown Yes Unknown Inactivated, 0.4ppm, 30min 
Cryptospridiosis Protozoan Unknown Yes Stable for days or more Oocysts resistant 
Botulinum toxins Biotoxin Yes Yes Stable  Inactivated, 6ppm, 20min 
T-2 mycotoxin Biotoxin Probable Yes Stable Resistant 
Aflatoxin Biotoxin Yes Yes Probably stable Probably tolerant 
Ricin  Biotoxin Yes Yes Unknown Resistant at 10ppm 
Staph enterotoxins Biotoxin Probable Yes Probably stable Unknown 
Microcystins Biotoxin Possible Yes Probably stable Resistant at 100ppm 
Anotoxin A Biotoxin Unknown Probable Inactivated in days Unknown 
Tetrodotoxin Biotoxin Possible Yes Unknown Inactivated, 50ppm 
Saxitoxin Biotoxin Possible Yes Stable Resistant at 10ppm 
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APPENDIX  
B 
Fuzzy Sets Theory 
For the convenience of the reader to understand both basics of fuzzy theory and its application in 
this thesis, we divide this appendix to two parts. The first part is to briefly summarise some basic 
concepts of fuzzy sets theory, which includes fuzzy sets, fuzzy numbers, fuzzy operations, fuzzy 
arithmetic. The second part introduces the derivations of equations used in Chapter 4.  
B.1 Basics of Fuzzy Sets Theory 
B.1.1 Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy Numbers 
Definitions of fuzzy sets and numbers have been provided in Chapter 4. The main purpose of this 
appendix is to introduce the operations and arithmetic on fuzzy sets. 
B.1.2 Operations of Fuzzy Sets 
The fuzzy sets-theoretic operations are defined via membership functions. Here we present the 
concepts suggested by Zadeh (1965). 
Definition 1: Intersection. The membership function )(xCµ  of the intersection is pointwise 
defined by  
 Xxxxx BAC ∈= )),(),(min()( µµµ  (B.1) 
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Figure B.1 Intersection of two fuzzy sets 
Definition 2: Union: The membership function )(xCµ  of the union BAC U=  is pointwise 
defined by 
 Xxxxx BAC ∈= )),(),(max()( µµµ  (B.2) 
 
Figure B.2 Union of two fuzzy sets 
Definition 3: Complement. The membership function of the complement of a fuzzy set A, 
)(_ x
A
µ , is defined by 
 )(1)(_ xx A
A
µµ −=  (B.3) 
 
Figure B.3 Complement of fuzzy set 
A 
Complement of set A 
A B 
C=AU B. 
A B 
C=A∩B. 
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B.1.3 Extension Principle 
Mathematical definition has been found in Chapter 4. The application of extension principle can 
be illustrated by an example: “if a pump is about 10 years old, how about its failure probability?” 
Normally, failure probability of a pump with time can be determined by 
tetp λ−=)( . However, in 
this example, t (about 10 years old) is represented as a fuzzy number (Figure B.4), which thus 
requires extension principle to obtain the membership function for the failure probability p(t). The 
result of failure probability of pump is also a fuzzy number due to the fuzzy time inputs. 
 
Figure B.4 An example of explaining fuzzy extension principle 
Extension principle is one of the most important fundamentals in fuzzy sets theory to perform 
fuzzy calculations by using functions on fuzzy sets or numbers. However, it is difficult to apply to 
practical problem. An alternative to this is α-cut as discussed below. 
B.1.4 Fuzzy Arithmetic 
Since α-cut of fuzzy number is always an intervals of confidence. Fuzzy number can be 
considered as a generalisation of interval of confidence. Therefore, the arithmetic operation of 
fuzzy number can use the same process as intervals of confidence operation, but level by level 
(Kaufmann and Gupta, 1991). 
Definition 4: Interval of confidence arithmetic. For any two intervals of confidence, [a, b] and 
[c, d], the arithmetic operation are performed in the following way: 
Addition: [a, b]+[c, d]=[a+c, b+d] 
 
Failure probability 
tetp λ−=)(  Fuzzy representation 
of failure probability 
Fuzzy representation of 
time “about 10 years” 
t (year) 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
10 8 12 
1 
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Subtraction:  [a, b]-[c, d]=[a-d, b-c] 
Multiplication:  [a, b]•[c, d]=[min(ac, ad, bc, db), max(ac, ad, bc, db)] 
Division: [a, b]/[c, d]=[min(a/c, a/d, b/c, b/d), max(a/c, a/d, b/c, b/d)] 
Power:  [a, b][c, d]=[min(ac, ad, bc, bd), max(ac, ad, bc, bd)] 
Definition 5: Triangular fuzzy number. The membership function Tµ  of triangular fuzzy 
number T on ),( ∞+−∞=R  is ]1,0[: →RTµ : 
 








≤<
−
−
≤<
−
−
=
otherwise
uxm
mu
xu
mxl
lm
lx
xT
0
)(µ  (B.4) 
where uml ≤≤ , and l and u stand for the lower and upper values of the support of the fuzzy 
number T, respectively, and m for the modal value. A triangular fuzzy number is also denoted by 
(l, m, u). 
 
Figure B.5 Triangular fuzzy number 
Definition 6: Operations of triangular fuzzy number. For any two triangular fuzzy numbers, 
T1=(l1, m1, u1), and T2=(l2, m2, u2), the arithmetic operations are performed in the following way 
(van Laarhoven et al., 1983): 
Addition: ),,( 21212121 uummllTT +++=+  
Subtraction:  ),,( 21212121 lummulTT −−−=−  
Multiplication:  ),,( 21212121 uummllTT ×××≅×  
l m u x 0 
1 
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Division: )/,/,/( 21212121 lummulTT ≅÷  
Power:   ),,( 2222 1111
umlT
umlT ≅  
The above operations are suitable to be programmed, therefore they are used to automatically 
perform the operations of fuzzy numbers in this study.  
B.2 Calculation of Risk 
Because of the simple representations of triangular fuzzy numbers, it is easy to derive 
mathematical representations of risks in terms of the production of likelihood and severity that are 
represented by triangular fuzzy numbers (Kaufmann and Gupta, 1991). For any hazard, its 
likelihood of occurrence and relative severity are represented by two triangular fuzzy number 
L=(l1, m1, u1) and S=(l2, m2, u2). Therefore, L and S can be mathematically represented by 
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Figure B.6 Determination of risk in terms of the production of likelihood and severity 
For a confidence level α, the α-cut sets can be determined for L and S respectively as 

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Therefore, 

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By using production of intervals, then 
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Thus by solving the equations, 











≤<
−−+
≤<
−−+−
==
otherwise
uuxmm
a
xcabb
mmxll
a
xcabb
xR
0
2
)(4
2
)(4
)( 2121
2
22
2
22
2121
1
11
2
11
µα  
where 





=
−+−=
−−=
211
1222111
22111
)()(
))((
llc
llmllmb
lmlma
 and 





=
−+−=
−−=
212
1222112
22112
)()(
))((
uuc
umuumub
mumua
 
Applying the above results to the likelihood and severity levels defined in Chapter 4, risk analysts 
can obtain the seven risk levels respectively.  
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APPENDIX  
C 
Dempster-Shafer Theory 
For the convenience of the reader to understand both basics of Dempster-Shafer theory and its 
application in this thesis, we divide this appendix to two parts. The first part is to briefly 
summarise some basic concepts of Dempster-Shafer theory, which includes basic probability 
assignment, belief, plausibility, and combination rule. The second part introduces the combination 
rules used in Chapter 4.  
C.1 Basics of Dempster-Shafer Theory  
C.1.1 Basic Probability Assignment, Belief, and Plausibility  
(1) Basic Probability Assignment 
The definition of basic probability assignment is available in Chapter 4. 
(2) Belief function (Bel) and plausibility (Pl) 
From the basic probability assignment, the upper and lower bounds of an interval can be defined. 
The interval is bounded by two non-additive continuous measures called belief and plausibility 
respectively. The lower bound belief (Bel) for a set A is defined as the sum of all the basic 
probability assignments of the proper subsets (B) of the set of interest A, i.e., AB ⊆ . The general 
relation between bpa and Bel can be defined as 
∑
⊆
=
AB
BmABel )()(  (C.1) 
The upper bound, plausibility (Pl), is the summation of basic probability assignment of the sets B 
that intersect with the set of interest A, i.e., Φ≠AB I and therefore, it can be defined as 
∑
Φ≠
=
AB
BmAPl
I
)()(  (C.2) 
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In Dempster-Shafer theory, basic probability assignment (bpa), belief (Bel), and plausibility (Pl) 
are in one-to-one correspondence, they can be seen as three facets of the same piece of 
information. In Chapter 4, it is introduced how to use bpa to derive Bel and Pl. However, it is also 
possible to obtain the basic probability assignment (bpa) from the belief measure with the 
following inverse function: 
∑
⊆
−−=
ABB
BA
BBelAm
|
)()1()(  (C.3) 
where |A-B| is the difference of the cardinality of the two sets. 
In addition, plausibility can be determined by 
)(1)(
_
ABelAPl −=  (C.4) 
where 
∑∑
Φ=
⊆
==
ABB
ABB
BmBmABel
I|
|
_
)()()(
_
 (C.5) 
 
C.1.2 Combination Rule of Dempster-Shafer Theory  
To continue with the introduction in Chapter 4, the combination can be shown by an example 
(Figure C.1). In this example, there are two analysts to give their assessments of failure 
probability of a pipe in terms of linguistic levels such as high (H), medium (M), and low (L). The 
process of combining the two assessments is explicit shown by an computation table (Table C.1).  
 
Figure C.1 An example of combining evidences in Dempster-Shafer theory 
 
 
Likelihood of 
pipe failure 
Assessment 
from analyst 1 
Assessment 
from analyst 2 
{M}: 11% 
{H}: 89% 
Combination 
of Dempster-
Shafer theory 
{H}: 50% 
{M,H}: 30% 
{H}: 80% 
{M}: 20% 
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Table C.1 Computation table of combining evidences in Dempster-Shafer theory 
 m1 L M H L,M L,H M,H L,M,H 
m2  0 0 0.5 0 0 0.3 0.2 
L 0 {L}0 {Φ}0 {Φ}0 {L}0 {L}0 {Φ}0 {L}0 
M 0.2 {Φ}0 {M}0 {Φ}0.1 {M}0 {Φ}0 {M}0.06 {M}0.04 
H 0.8 {Φ}0 {Φ}0 {H}0.4 {Φ}0 {H}0 {H}0.24 {H}0.16 
L,M 0 {L}0 {M}0 {Φ}0 {L, M}0 {L}0 {M}0 {L, M}0 
L,H 0 {L}0 {Φ}0 {H}0 {L}0 {L, H}0 {H}0 {L, H}0 
M,H 0 {Φ}0 {M}0 {H}0 {M}0 {H}0 {M, H}0 {M, H}0 
L,M,H 0 {L}0 {M}0 {H}0 {L, M}0 {L, H}0 {M, H}0 {L,M,H}0 
         
 K 0.1       
∑
=ACB
CmBm
I
)()( 21  0 0.1 0.8 0 0 0 0 
 m12 0 0.11 0.89 0 0 0 0 
Although the original combination rule discussed above can give reasonable results in lots of 
cases, it also receives serious criticism when significant conflict in the information sources. 
Consequently, other researchers have developed modified Dempster rules that attempt to 
represent the degree of conflict in the final result. This will be discussed in the following part.  
C. 2 Combination Rule in Fuzzy Sets Theory 
C.2.1 Two Fuzzy Combination Rules 
This appendix only reviews the methods proposed by Ishizuka et al. (1982) and Yen (1990) as 
they are closely related to the derivation the combination rule used in this thesis.  
(1) Ishizuka et al.’s (1982) combination rules 
In order to combine two evidences within fuzzy sets, i.e., risk levels used in this study, Ishizuka et 
al. (1982) extended Dempster’s rule by taking into account the degree of intersection of two sets, 
J(A,B). 
 
∑
∑
−−
=
=
ji
jiiji
CBA
jiji
BmAmBAJ
BmAmBAJ
Cm
ji
,
2
21
12
)()()],(1[1
)()(),(
)(
I
 (C.6) 
where 
 
)](max),(min[max
)]([max
),(
xx
x
BAJ
BxAx
BAx
µµ
µ I=  (C.7) 
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Figure C.2 Combination of two fuzzy sets 
The denotations of the parameters used in the equations can be explicitly described by a figure 
shown above.  
(2) Yen’s (1990) combination rule 
An important assumption in this study is that all risk levels are normal fuzzy sets. Therefore, their 
intersections will be subnormal fuzzy set as shown in Figure C.2. Yen (1990) dealt with these 
subnormal fuzzy sets by normalising them to normal fuzzy sets in the process of deriving 
combination rule.  
It is straightforward to normalise the subnormal fuzzy set ,say A, by 
 )(
)(max
)(
)( xk
x
x
x A
A
x
A
A
µ
µ
µ
µ ×==  (C.8) 
where k is the normalisation factor. 
The criterion for normalising the probability mass of a subnormal fuzzy set, say A, is that the 
probabilistic constraints imposed by the subnormal fuzzy set should be preserved after the 
normalisation. Since the αi cut of the subnormal fuzzy set becomes kαi cut of the normalised fuzzy 
set, the probability assigned to them should be the same: 
)()(
ii
AmAm αα =  
Since  
))(()( 1−−= iiAmAm i ααα  
))(())(()( 11 −− −=−= iiii AkmkkAmAm i ααααα  
Therefore, 
A B maxxµA(x) 
maxxµB(x) 
maxx[µA∩B(x)) 
Subnormal 
fuzzy set  
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)(max)(/)()( xAmkAmAm A
x
µ==  
The remaining mass (1-1/k)m(A) is the amount assigned to the empty set the subnormal fuzzy set 
and, hence, should be part of the normalisation factor in generalised Dempster’s rule. 
Therefore, the combination rule proposed by Yen (1990) is 
 
∑
∑
−−
= =
BA
BA
x
BA
x
CBA
BA
x
xx
BmAmx
Cm
,
21
12
)(max))(max1(1
)()()(max
)(
II
I
I
µµ
µ
 (C.9) 
It is also obvious that Equation (C.7) can be derived by setting fuzzy sets A and B normal in 
Ishizuka et al.’s method. Equation  (C.7) is used the current study as the combination rules 
applied to fuzzy risk levels.  
C.2.1 Combination Rule Used in This Thesis 
(1) Combination rule 
By considering the confliction measure of fuzzy sets, the risk extents to intersection of two fuzzy 
sets can be determined by 
)()(),( 21 BmAmBAJ  
where m1(A) and m2(B) are the basic probabilities assigned to A and B respectively which are the 
values of extents to risk levels in this research. 
Normally, if two sets are conflict, their intersection will be empty set. If two sets are partially 
conflict, their intersection will belong to empty set with a certain degree. Therefore, degree of 
conflicting between two fuzzy sets is viewed as the measure of representing the degree to empty 
set. Therefore, 
( ) )()(),(1)( 21 BmAmBAJm −=Φ  (C.10) 
)()(),()( 21 BmAmBAJBAm =I  (C.11) 
where m(Φ) denotes the degree to empty set; and m(A∩B) denotes the degree of intersection 
between A and B. Therefore, the combination of extents to risks from two hazards can be thus 
derived in this research as 
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∑
∑
−−
=⊕=
=
kj
ikj
RR
kjkj
RRR
kjkj
kji
RmRmRRJ
RmRmRRJ
RmRmRm
,
21
21
2112
)()()],(1[1
)()(),(
)()()(
I
 (i,j,k=1,…,14) 
111 )( jj rwRm =  and 222 )( kk rwRm =  (C.12) 
where Ri, Rj, and Rk represent predefined risk levels i, j, and k respectively if i, j, and k=1,…,7; R14 
represents the degree to Θ; Ri (i=8,…,13) represents the partial intersections between two 
predefined risk levels i-8 and i-7 (i.e., risk levels 1 and 2, 2 and 3,…, 6 and 7; m12(Ri) denotes the 
combined degree to risk level i from two hazards 1 and 2; m1(Rj) denotes degree to risk level j 
from hazard 1; and m2(Rk) denotes degree to risk level i from hazard 2; w1 and w2 are the weights 
of hazards 1 and 2 respectively; rj1 is the extent to risk level j of the risk introduced by hazard 1; 
and rk2 is the extent to risk level k of the risk introduced by hazard 2.  
(2) Reassignment 
From the above equations, extent to the intersection area between two adjacent risk levels (i.e., 
level i and level i+1), m12(R7+i), is also determined. Since R7+i is not an predefined standard fuzzy 
evaluation grade for risk, however, the extent to it should be reassigned back to Ri and Ri+1. The 
ratios of assignments to Ri and Ri+1 can be obtained by using the concepts of compatibility 
discussed above: 
717
7
,,
,
+++
+
+
=
iiii
ii
RRRR
RR
i
CC
C
Ra  and 
717
71
,,
,
1
+++
++
+
=+
iiii
ii
RRRR
RR
i
CC
C
Ra  (C.13) 
where Rai and Rai+1 denote the ratios of reassignment to risk levels Ri and Ri+1 respectively; 
7, +ii RR
C and 
71 , ++ ii RR
C  denote the compatibilities between the intersected area, a subnormal fuzzy 
number, and predefined risk levels Ri and Ri+1 respectively. 
A combination table is used here to help the explanation of combination rules (Table C.2). This 
table illustrates the process of combining risk extents from two sources. For each source, its risk 
extents are represented for seven risk levels and intersections between these risk levels. It shows 
that complete intersection, complete confliction, and partial confliction exist between two sources. 
For example, if the risk levels of two sources are {EL}, then their intersection will be complete 
intersection and resulted risk level is also {EL}. While if the risk levels of two sources are EL and 
VL respectively, their intersection will be partial intersection. Then two results, 
{EL∩VL}and{Φ’}, are obtained. {EL∩VL} represents that risk level fuzzy numbers EL and VL 
are partially intersected, while {Φ’} denotes partial conflict between the two sources. If risk levels 
of two sources are {EL} and {M}, they don’t intersect with each other. Thus complete conflict is 
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introduced and represented as {Φ}. According to the fuzzy risk levels in this research (Figure 
4.10) and Ishizuka’s intersection measure, J(A,B) is equal to 1 for complete intersection, 0.5 for 
partial section, and 0 for complete conflict. Therefore the combined risk levels of two sources are 
determined by 
)()()()()()()( 2141142121
'
12 iiiii RmRmRmRmRmRmRm ++= ; i=1,..,7 
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX  
D 
Fault Tree Analysis 
This appendix gives the derivation of approximate determination of fault trees with repeated 
events. 
When fault trees have basic events which appear more than once, the methods most often 
used to obtain the top event probability utilize the minimal cut sets. A minimal cut set is a 
collection of basic events. If all these events occur, the top event is guaranteed to occur; 
however if any basic event does not occur, the top event will not occur. Therefore, if a fault 
tree has nC minimal cut sets Ki, i=1,…, nC then the top event exists if at least one minimal cut 
set exists, i.e., 
U
C
C
n
i
in KKKKT
1
21 ...
=
=+++=  
Thus, 
P(system failure)=P(at least 1 minimal cut set occurs) 
=1-P(no minimal cut set occurs) 
Since 
P(no minimal cut set occurs)≥∏
=
Cn
i
P
1
(minimal cut set i does not occur) 
(Equality being when no event appears in more than one minimal cut set), therefore 
P(system failure)≤ ∏
=
−
Cn
i
P
1
1 (minimal cut set i does not occur) 
i.e., 
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∏
=
−−=≤
Cn
i
iKPTPTP
1
max )](1[1)()(  (D.1) 
where P(Ki) is the occurrence probability of minimal cut set i. This equation gives a 
conservative approximation of the likelihood of top event. 
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APPENDIX  
E 
Tables of Aggregative Risk Assessments for Chapter 
6 
Table E.1 Results of aggregative risk assessment of river contamination 
Risk levels EL VL SL M SH VH EH 
Fuzzi
-ness 
Represen-
tative 
value 
Flood 0.079 0.921 0 0 0 0 0 0.555 0.027 
Sewage discharge 0 0 0.046 0.796 0.158 0.001 0 1.134 0.275 
Industrial discharge 0 0 0.026 0.598 0.373 0.002 0 1.471 0.320 
Spills 0.005 0.191 0.753 0.051 0 0 0 1.279 0.102 
          
Natural hazard 0.079 0.921 0 0 0 0 0 0.555 0.027 
Human-caused 0 0 0.031 0.718 0.249 0.001 0 1.303 0.295 
Interdependence 0.005 0.191 0.753 0.051 0 0 0 1.279 0.102 
          
River 0.029 0.427 0.301 0.189 0.054 0.000 0 2.121 0.117 
 
Table E.2 Results of aggregative risk assessment of reservoir contamination 
Risk levels EL VL SL M SH VH EH 
Fuzzi
-ness 
Represen-
tative 
value 
Flood 0.166 0.834 0 0 0 0 0 0.899 0.027 
Livestock 0.001 0.059 0.861 0.079 0 0 0 0.913 0.117 
Contaminated site 0 0.001 0.122 0.821 0.056 0 0 1.060 0.244 
          
Natural hazard 0.166 0.834 0 0 0 0 0 0.899 0.027 
Human-caused 0.001 0.059 0.861 0.079 0 0 0 0.913 0.117 
Interdependence 0 0.001 0.122 0.821 0.056 0 0 1.060 0.244 
          
Reservoir 0.048 0.293 0.352 0.291 0.016 0 0 2.131 0.128 
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Table E.3 Results of aggregative risk assessment of wells contamination 
Risk levels EL VL SL M SH VH EH 
Fuzzi
-ness 
Represent
ative 
value 
Underground 
mineral 
0 0 0 0.100 0.845 0.055 0 0.971 0.439 
Human activity 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.111 
Contaminated site 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.444 
          
Natural hazard 0 0 0 0.100 0.845 0.055 0 0.971 0.439 
Human-caused 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.111 
Interdependence 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.444 
          
Wells 0 0 0.290 0.036 0.656 0.018 0 1.490 0.345 
 
Table E.4 Results of aggregative risk assessment of transmission pipe  
Risk levels EL VL SL M SH VH EH 
Fuzzi
-ness 
Represent
ative 
value 
Flood 0.4 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 1.346 0.025 
Earth movement 0.340 0.660 0 0 0 0 0 1.282 0.025 
Sabotage 0.001 0.059 0.861 0.079 0 0 0 0.910 0.117 
Temperature 0 0 0.563 0.437 0 0 0 1.371 0.172 
          
Natural hazard 0.359 0.641 0 0 0 0 0 1.305 0.025 
Human-caused 0.001 0.059 0.861 0.079 0 0 0 0.910 0.117 
Operational 0 0 0.563 0.437 0 0 0 1.371 0.172 
          
Transmission pipe 0.074 0.179 0.564 0.183 0 0 0 1.895 0.115 
 
Table E.5 Results of aggregative risk assessment of channel 
Risk levels EL VL SL M SH VH EH 
Fuzzi
-ness 
Represent
ative 
value 
Flood 0.077 0.923 0 0 0 0 0 0.544 0.027 
Earth movement 0.389 0.611 0 0 0 0 0 1.337 0.025 
Sabotage 0.001 0.059 0.861 0.079 0 0 0 0.910 0.117 
Temperature 0.021 0.908 0.071 0 0 0 0 0.665 0.034 
          
Natural hazard 0.214 0.786 0 0 0 0 0 1.038 0.026 
Human-caused 0.001 0.059 0.861 0.079 0 0 0 0.910 0.117 
Operational 0.021 0.908 0.071 0 0 0 0 0.665 0.034 
          
Transmission 
channel 
0.056 0.580 0.340 0.024 0 0 0 1.650 0.061 
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Table E.6 Results of aggregative risk assessment of water treatment plant 
Risk levels EL VL SL M SH VH EH 
Fuzzi
-ness 
Represent
ative 
value 
Flood 0.166 0.834 0 0 0 0 0 0.899 0.027 
Chemical/biological 0.005 0.191 0.753 0.051 0 0 0 1.279 0.102 
Process 0.001 0.059 0.680 0.253 0.006 0 0 1.463 0.143 
Equipment 0 0.012 0.502 0.475 0.011 0 0 1.511 0.180 
Alarm and monitor 0 0.012 0.502 0.475 0.011 0 0 1.511 0.180 
Backup 0.001 0.059 0.861 0.079 0 0 0 0.910 0.117 
Power 0 0 0.026 0.598 0.373 0.002 0 1.471 0.320 
          
Natural hazard 0.166 0.834 0 0 0 0 0 0.899 0.027 
Human-caused 0.005 0.191 0.753 0.051 0 0 0 1.279 0.102 
Operational 0 0.029 0.657 0.308 0.005 0 0 1.431 0.153 
Interdependence 0 0 0.026 0.598 0.373 0.002 0 1.471 0.320 
          
WTP (R1)* 0.060 0.323 0.170 0.308 0.138 0.001 0 2.337 0.168 
WTP (R2)* 0.042 0.287 0.347 0.232 0.092 0 0 2.271 0.147 
* R1 and R2 denote the risk levels of reduced water quantity and water contamination 
associated with water treatment plant (WTP) respectively. 
 
Table E.7 Results of aggregative risk assessment of pump failure 
Risk levels EL VL SL M SH VH EH 
Fuzzi
-ness 
Represent
ative 
value 
Flood 0.166 0.834 0 0 0 0 0 0.899 0.027 
Earth movement 0.340 0.660 0 0 0 0 0 1.282 0.025 
Bombing 0.301 0.529 0.166 0.004 0 0 0 1.781 0.040 
Control 0 0.001 0.122 0.821 0.056 0 0 1.060 0.244 
Equipment 0 0.012 0.502 0.475 0.011 0 0 1.511 0.180 
Alarm and monitor 0 0.012 0.502 0.475 0.011 0 0 1.511 0.180 
Backup 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.111 
Power 0.001 0.059 0.680 0.253 0.006 0 0 1.463 0.143 
          
Natural hazard 0.235 0.765 0 0 0 0 0 1.092 0.026 
Human-caused 0.301 0.529 0.166 0.004 0 0 0 1.781 0.040 
Operational 0 0.005 0.538 0.442 0.015 0 0 1.487 0.177 
Interdependence 0.001 0.059 0.680 0.253 0.006 0 0 1.463 0.143 
          
Pump 0.130 0.349 0.368 0.149 0.004 0 0 2.138 0.092 
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Table E.8 Results of aggregative risk assessment of pipes (CI) 
Risk levels EL VL SL M SH VH EH 
Fuzzi
-ness 
Represent
ative 
value 
Earth movement 0.389 0.611 0 0 0 0 0 1.337 0.025 
External load 0 0 0.012 0.498 0.479 0.012 0 1.512 0.347 
Soil 0 0.012 0.502 0.475 0.011 0 0 1.511 0.180 
Sewage leakage 0 0.012 0.502 0.475 0.011 0 0 1.511 0.180 
          
Natural hazard 0.389 0.611 0 0 0 0 0 1.337 0.025 
Operational 0 0.005 0.234 0.534 0.222 0.005 0 1.824 0.262 
Interdependence 0 0.012 0.502 0.475 0.011 0 0 1.511 0.180 
          
Pipe (R1) 0.245 0.398 0.093 0.186 0.077 0.002 0 2.302 0.109 
Pipe (R2) 0 0.012 0.502 0.475 0.011 0 0 1.511 0.180 
* R1 and R2 denote the risk levels of reduced water quantity and water contamination 
associated with CI pipes respectively. 
 
Table E.9 Results of aggregative risk assessment of pipes (PVC)  
Risk levels EL VL SL M SH VH EH 
Fuzzi
-ness 
Represent
ative 
value 
Earth movement 0.511 0.489 0 0 0 0 0 1.386 0.024 
External load 0 0 0 0.100 0.845 0.055 0 0.971 0.439 
Soil 0.015 0.510 0.464 0.011 0 0 0 1.522 0.069 
Sewage leakage 0 0.012 0.502 0.475 0.011 0 0 1.511 0.180 
          
Natural hazard 0.511 0.489 0 0 0 0 0 1.386 0.024 
Operational 0.007 0.251 0.234 0.063 0.417 0.027 0 2.189 0.253 
Interdependence 0 0.012 0.502 0.475 0.011 0 0 1.511 0.180 
          
Pipe (R1) 0.328 0.435 0.081 0.019 0.129 0.008 0 2.127 0.096 
Pipe (R2) 0 0.012 0.502 0.475 0.011 0 0 1.511 0.180 
* R1 and R2 denote the risk levels of reduced water quantity and water contamination 
associated with PVC pipes respectively. 
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APPENDIX  
F 
Basic Concepts about Risk Assessment 
Threats/Hazards:  are natural or human-related events that adversely influence normal 
performance of water supply system. In this study, both natural hazards and human-
related threats are represented in terms of their likelihoods (occurrence) and severities 
(consequences) in order to support a quantitative analysis. 
Vulnerability:   is defined in this study as a property associated with a component, a 
subsystem, or the overall water supply system to represent the possibility of being 
influenced by hazards/threats with given likelihoods and severities. This property is 
determined by the attributes and conditions of a component, a subsystem, or the overall 
water supply system, and is varied with time and changes of hazards/threats.  
Risk: is a cumulative measure that is determined by likelihood and severity of hazard and 
vulnerability of asset in a water supply system. 
Object: is an abstract of a components, a subsystems, and the overall water supply system 
in object-oriented representation. 
Class: is a template or blueprint that defines the methods and variables included in a 
particular kind of objects. 
States transition diagram: is a diagram that shows the states space of a given object, the 
event that cause a transition from normal state to failure state, and reaction that result 
from a state change. 
 
 
